A History of the Ninth Regiment, Illinois Volunteer Infantry

by Marion Morrison

The terrible conflict which was endured by the 9th Ill. Inft., in this battle, will be seen from the number of killed and wounded. There was present for duty when the Regiment went into the engagement, 570 men. Of these 348 were killed and wounded, and ten were captured. One commissioned officer was killed, and 19 wounded. Only four commissioned officers were left unhurt. I heard one of the soldiers who was present at the time, say, that when they ceased fighting on Sabbath evening, there were 70 men in line for duty, out of the whole Regiment. It is said that Col. Mersy, when the Regiment was first drawn up in line after the battle was over, shed tears, saying, "Vel, vel; dis is all dat is left of my little Nint!" It must have been a sad sight to see a Regiment, which numbered over 1,000 men when at Paducah a few month's previous, cut down to this small number. But such is war.

Such was the battle of Shiloh, and such the part taken in it by the 9th Ill. Inft. The writer well remembers the feeling which prevailed in the North with reference to it. There was rejoicing over it as a victory. Still it was regarded as a dearly bought victory. There was a very decided feeling that somebody was at fault. That the rebels had completely surprised our army. That our pickets were out but a very short distance. Hence, the surprise. Gen. Grant, as chief in command, was faulted. It was charged that he was drunk at the time. That he had disobeyed orders, and landed his men on the wrong side of the river, etc. I heard a citizen of Chicago, not a month ago, say that if Gen. Grant had made his appearance in Chicago immediately after the battle of Shiloh, he would have been mobbed, such was the feeling of indignation.

It is not my province here to write a defense of Gen. Grant. Nor is it needed. His own brilliant career since that, has set him right in the minds of the people. A man who has captured more prisoners and more guns than the world-renowned warrior, Napoleon Bonaparte, certainly does not need, at this day, a written defense of his military career. Suffice it to say, the officers and men who fought under him, even at Shiloh, become restless if a word is said against him.

Immediately after this battle, Gen. Halleck, who had charge of the South-Western Department of the army, with his "Head Quarters" at St. Louis, left that place for the field of strife and took command of the army in person. Expectation was high in the North. It was thought that now surely the rebels will be "pushed to the wall." Never since the war broke out, has there been such intense anxiety in the North-west, as that which filled the public mind during the time which intervened between the battle of Shiloh and the evacuation of Corinth. Many hearts were sad over friends who fell at Shiloh. Every days' news was anxiously awaited, expecting it to bring an account of another terrible conflict. The suspense was long and painful. When the news finally came that Corinth was ours, but that the enemy had evacuated it, there was a feeling of sadness ran through the public mind. They were not prepared for that. They were prepared to hear of many slain in the effort to take Corinth, but not to hear that the enemy had fled and was out of reach.

The 9th Ill. Inft. remained in camp on the battle-ground of Shiloh, exposed to all the sickening influences of the nearness of so many dead animals, as well as offensive odor arising from the shallow and imperfect burial, which necessarily had to be given to so great a multitude of dead. In conversation with a citizen from Illinois, who visited the battle-ground a week or ten days after the battle, I learned from him that the offensive smell of the dead was almost insufferable. That, together with the diet upon which the soldiers had to live, produced disease to an alarming extent. Here the Regiment remained in camp until the 29th of April, over three weeks. On that day it removed, with camp and garrison equipage, towards Corinth ten miles, and bivouacked. It moved forward again on the 30th, five miles further, and went into camp. Here the Regiment had muster and inspection by Col. Mersy commanding.

Here Brig. Gen. R. J. Oglesby took command of our Brigade, in place of Col. McArthur who was severely wounded in the late battle, Brig. Gen. T. A. Davies took command of our Division, in place of Gen. W. H. L. Wallace who was mortally wounded.

On the first of May, moved camp five miles further towards Corinth, and remained there until the 4th of May. On that day removed to Monterey, Miss., and went into camp a little West of that town, and remained there until the 8th of May, when another forward movement was made, to within seven miles of Corinth, finding no enemy.

The country here is very poor and broken, and water very scarce and unfit for use. A great many of the men were sick with the Diarrhea and Typhoid Fever. The Regiment remained here until the 14th of May, when it moved two miles further in the direction of Corinth.

The Division moved forward again on the 16th, about one mile, and formed a line, with Brig. Gen. Hurlbut's Division on our right. On the 17th, moved forward again one mile, and one-half mile on the 19th. This brought our line within two and a-half miles of Corinth, and within range of 32-pounder rifled guns. None were fired, however, and the plain inference was, that the enemy had none. On the 21st of May, our line advanced 400 yards, and again on the 29th 400 yards more. The pressure now became so heavy, that the enemy evacuated Corinth, and moved Southward toward Okolona.

Thus it will be seen, our army was just one month moving from Pittsburg Landing to Corinth, a distance of about thirty miles. Just one mile per day. And this after having remained 22 days in camp, before leaving the battle-ground. This, too, in pursuit of a fleeing enemy. It will be difficult ever to convince the country that this great delay was necessary. And yet many military men, who were present, regard it as a master-piece of Generalship. The country through which this vast army must pass, was entirely uncultivated. No army could have subsisted in it, even for a few days. Had our army advanced rapidly, they were exposed to a flank movement which would have thrown the enemy between them and the river, and cut off, as a natural consequence, our supplies. That done, and our whole army would have been at the mercy of the enemy. There was certainly great caution. But it was thought it was all needed.