1st. That the Duke of Mantua should receive French troops into Casale;
2nd. That he should be named Generalissimo of any French army which Louis XIV. might send into Italy;
3rd. And that after the execution of the treaty the sum of 100,000 crowns should be paid to the prince.[493]
Immediately after the signing of this document, Matthioly was received by Louis XIV. with the most flattering distinction in a secret audience. The King presented him with a valuable diamond in remembrance of his visit, caused him to be paid 400 double louis,[494] and promised him that after the ratification of the treaty he should receive a much larger sum for his reward, as well as a place for his son among the King’s pages, and a rich abbey for his brother.[495]
No intrigue was ever better conducted or had more chances of success. In Piedmont a court divided, powerless, and almost servilely devoted to France; in the remainder of Italy, as in Piedmont, princes kept in the most complete ignorance; in Mantua a duke perfectly ready to sell a portion of his states; lastly, the two ambassadors charged with the negotiation of this affair having an equal interest in its success, since it would enrich one and assure to both the gratitude of their masters, and a high position.
Two months after Matthioly’s visit to France, the courts of Turin, Madrid, and Vienna, the Spanish Governor of the Milanese, and the State Inquisitors of the Venetian Republic—that is to say, all those who were most interested in opposing this project—were acquainted with the minutest details of it, and were ignorant neither of the price to be paid for the surrender, the time at which it was to take place, nor the names of the negotiators. In one word, they knew everything, for at different times[496] they had received the confidence of the better informed of the participators in this intrigue, of Count Matthioly himself.
By what motive was he actuated? Must we see in this treason an act inspired by base cupidity? Was Matthioly a rogue, who, after having received Louis XIV.’s money, preceeded to sell himself by turns to the Austrians, the Spaniards, the Venetians, and the Piedmontese? Or, disquieted in mind and suddenly struck by the apparition of his country in danger, was he seized with remorse at the moment of bartering her away, and did he seek the only means of preserving her from the encroachments of an ambitious King? Was he an intriguer, a low informer, or a man struggling between two opposing sentiments, whose greedy ambition had first led him to assist his master’s criminal projects, and whose patriotism had then suddenly determined him to cause them to miscarry? These are questions which nobody will ever be able to answer, because nobody ever received his confidences. It is, however, worthy of remark, that if cupidity alone had been Matthioly’s motive, he would have stooped to the execution of the treaty of Casale, since this offered him many more material advantages than he could hope for from a sudden change of conduct. That Matthioly should be designated a rogue in the despatches afterwards exchanged between the Court of Versailles and the French representatives in Italy, is not at all astonishing; this anger was the natural consequence of a bitter disappointment. But the fact that there was room for a more noble motive, and that a patriotic inspiration was possible, is sufficient to prevent us from unreservedly condemning this man, who perhaps thought to save his country. No doubt he ought to have cast aside all the appearances of knavery, to have returned Louis XIV. his presents, to have first dissuaded Charles IV., and if the latter had persisted in introducing the French army into Italy, then, and then only, to have revealed the danger to the other princes. In this case it would have been necessary to do it openly, with frankness, without dissimulation, and by informing the Abbé d’Estrades of what would have no longer been a treason, but a truly patriotic act. Was, however, such a line of conduct open to Matthioly, surrounded with spies, watched over and having to fear a power so formidable as France, and a resentment so dangerous as Louis XIV.’s? Must we altogether blame him if he could not strip his character of all its craftiness and duplicity, and if, amid the dishonouring appearances of treason, he thought to perform an honourable act? To the present time people have seen in him only a contemptible cheat, but however weak the contrary presumption may be, do not let us altogether reject it. Let us cease to place ourselves only in the French point of view, and by considering the peril to which Italy would have been exposed by the cession of Casale, let us not refuse to suppose that Matthioly, by preventing it, understood, perhaps, the interest of his country better than his own, and that, into a mind naturally greedy, a noble and disinterested sentiment was able to penetrate.
FOOTNOTES:
[476] Marie-Jeanne-Baptiste de Nemours, widow of Charles-Emmanuel and mother of Victor-Amadeus II.
[477] Despatch of the Marquis de Villars to Pomponne, January 8, 1677:—Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, section Savoy, 66.