Thoughts on the mechanism of societies

by marquis de Charles Casaux

I have perused several of these petitions; and the substance of what has appeared to me most striking in every one of them is nearly this: “Let every thing be taxed in England, nothing more equitable; let every thing be taxed, every thing, except all the things that concern your humble petitioners: you cannot tax them, without ruining their trade; and not only their trade, but also the whole trade of the nation at large; and not only without ruining the whole trade of the nation at large, but without stifling that principle of liberty, that noble spirit of life, which has so highly distinguished her above all the nations in the world.”

Were any one to infer, from the foregoing extract, that my intention is to stigmatize the use of petitions,—notwithstanding the most invincible antipathy I bear to exclamations, which, for the most part, betray either weakness or hypocrisy, I should exclaim, O Divine Liberty, of humbly shewing, to the most respectable parts of a nation, all kinds of ideas, whether absurd or reasonable! Divine Liberty, never treated in England but with that regard which is due from one man to whatever comes from another man! Divine Liberty, who givest to the Legislator, the time, knowledge, and often the means, necessary to prevent him from falling into such errors as it is not beyond the power of human nature to avoid, ... be thou ever blessed, and mayest thou be worshipped wherever men are not infallible, and wherever millions of men may suffer from a single mistake!

In England, the produce of taxes on the various articles of consumption, amounts, I suppose, to 8,000,000l.: in order to procure the 5 or 6 other millions required, a part of which is necessary, a part of which is supposed to be so on account of the plan of a reimbursement, the land continues to be taxed for 2 millions, and the other 3 or 4 are taken from perhaps 30 different articles, one of which will bring in 150, another 100, a third 60, a fourth 30 thousand pounds, &c. with a salvo for Government to tax half a score more articles, if it should be robbed rather too unconscionably on the produce of the former; for, in all countries throughout the world, this is all the conjuration in that part of the administration of finances which relates to the collecting of taxes; if you rob Government in one point, be sure Government will ransom you, if required, on ten others; nothing more just, but nothing more easy.

Now, if we lay it down for an indubitable maxim, that the most able Administrator of finances, cannot take from an individual, more than what he possesses, it seems to me then that it remains only to examine, whether that very individual from whom, one way or another, out of the 20 he is possessed of, 5 may be wrested,—will be less aggrieved if the 5 be taken out of his pocket, and he be sent to market with the remaining 15, than he would be, were he permitted to go with the whole 20 to market, where he would find those 15 which he used to purchase for 15, charged with the 5 which might have been taken from him at home?

The question more to the point is yet more singular; for it goes to this enquiry:

First, Whether the land proprietor, who is obliged to give at a fixed period three millions in taxes for his land, windows, domestics, and other objects more recently taxed, would think himself more injured if those three millions were divided and laid upon some objects of his consumption, while he should observe that by this new order of things he would gain the convenience, not only of paying these three millions by different and remote installments, but also of making use of the money previous to such payment,—without injury to the trader, to whom the interest would be one way or other repaid,—while on the other hand, a part of the money, laid out upon his land, would furnish new resources for augmenting the produce of the taxes, by increasing his faculties of consumption:

Secondly, Whether those unfortunate licensed persons, and others (who so bitterly complain of all the various taxes that produce to them three or four times the sum which they advance to Government) would not be justly, as they ought to be, relieved from the oppression (that is the word) if such taxes were taken off, and laid on articles of which they would themselves be the consumers:

Thirdly, Whether all those extraordinary, usurious, and unjust benefits, arising from those oppressive taxes which I have been mentioning, reduced to their proper point, by taxes that would not increase the price of any article beyond a known degree, would not naturally reduce the value of every thing to that necessary price I have spoken of,—to that price which every thing ought to maintain, that the imaginary oppressed might not actually oppress the imaginary oppressors,—that all things may be preserved in a just balance, without any person experiencing a change in his condition;—and consequently, without the consumption of any article being diminished, unless fancy or fashion should transfer it to another article that will indemnify for the deficiency.[9]

From England let us pass over to France, and always taking for granted that a Minister of finance is not a conjurer, and that he can take from the pockets of the people no more money than they possess; I wish it could be examined:

Whether the 41 millions of livres Tournois, produced by the poll-tax, and which should be paid no longer, when that tax should be transferred to, and divided between all the articles of the most general consumption, and of course the most productive, would diminish the general faculties, by increasing the value of those objects, to the whole of that sum which the contributors would gain by paying no longer the poll-tax.