2nd. I confirmed what I have already had the honour of writing to you respecting the continental troops, and the militia whom we are to have with us. I told you that by counting the enemies in New York at fourteen thousand men, of which ten thousand are regulars, and four thousand very bad militia, I thought their numbers were somewhat exaggerated, and that it was necessary to begin by deducting the sailors employed by Admiral Arbuthnot. As to the fortifications, I said that the American troops would take charge of New York, and that the fort of Brooklyn (upon which you might operate in concert with a division of our troops) is merely an earthen work of four bastions, with a ditch and a shed, containing from a thousand to fifteen hundred men, and having in front another smaller work, which cannot contain more than a hundred men. I added that nothing could prevent a regular approach upon Brooklyn, and that that post is the key of New York.
3rd. I explained to you General Washington's plan, and told you that the moment you began your march, he would repair to Morrisania, where, I again repeat, he would establish batteries that would close the passage of Hell's Gate, and secure the one from the continent to Long Island, so as to have nothing to fear from the enemy's ships. Whilst awaiting your arrival, gentlemen, our army would entrench itself at Morrisania, or, if possible, on the Island of New York, and would place itself in a situation to detach a corps of troops, as soon as you shall have approached us, either by coming by land to Westchester, and passing afterwards under favour of our batteries, or by repairing by sea to Wistown, or any other bay in that neighbourhood. General Washington would furnish a sufficient corps of Americans, and fifteen large cannon, to co-operate with your troops, and he believes that with these forces, and united with artillery, the point of Brooklyn might soon be taken, and consequently the town of New York.
4th. I represented to you that Long Island was a rich country, which, even alter the destruction effected by the English, still possesses some resources; that we might feel certain of being joined there by the militia of the island; and, in short, that with the assistance of our Morrisanian under-batteries, and still more with a battery on the Island of New York, we should assure the communication between Long Island and the continent. From these various circumstances, my own private opinion would decidedly be to commence our action, if the fleet could be placed in security, before we possessed any superiority of naval force.
5th. I strongly insisted upon the necessity of taking possession, as soon as possible, of the New York harbour. I requested M. de Ternay to examine that point with the pilots I gave him, and by the immense advantages of that measure I hoped that, either with the aid of land forces on the side of Sandy Hook, or merely by the superiority of his own naval force, he would be enabled to accomplish the object we had feared his attempting when we expected him with Admiral Graves.
6th. When proposing to you to send your magazines to Providence, I told you that Rhode Island was completely useless to the Americans, but very important for the succours arriving from France, in case, however, no army should be necessary to preserve it; that if the English were to commit the fault of taking it, a superior fleet, aided by forces from the continent, would always have the power of retaking it.
7th. I ended by having the honour of telling you, gentlemen, that in order to operate upon New York it would be necessary not to commence later than the first days of September; and, after this explanation, I said that General Washington, feeling the most perfect confidence in you, was very desirous of having your opinion upon the subject, and would only undertake what might appear to you most advantageous.
This, gentlemen, is what I had the honour of saying to you, and this is what you did me the honour to reply to:—
1st. That the succour sent to the United States was anything rather than trifling; that the second division was to set out a short time after you, and, that it might justly be expected every instant; that it would consist at least of two thousand five hundred, and, in all probability, of a still greater number of troops; that it was to be sent by three ships, but that, according to all appearances, a larger number of vessels would be granted; that the only reason which could prevent its arriving before the 1st of September, would be the impossibility of a junction between the French and Spanish fleets, and that, in the latter case, it would arrive, at farthest, by the end of autumn, and would then be a great deal stronger; that M. de Guichen has been apprised of our projects, and has received the order to facilitate them; that, consequently, the Chevalier de Ternay has written to him for the five promised vessels; and that, from all these circumstances, you hoped to be able to act before the end of the campaign, but did not doubt, at least, having the power of furnishing us with very superior forces for this winter, and for the next campaign.
2nd. The project of attacking Brooklyn was extremely agreeable to you, and appeared to you the most proper measure for the reduction of New York; but you think that we ought to have upon that Island a force at least equal to that which the enemy may offer us, and you added that by leaving a counterfeit at New York, they may fall on the corps of Long Island, with nearly their whole army, which contingency, you will perceive, had been already provided for by Washington's arrangements.
3rd. You appeared to me doubtful whether it would be possible to stop the enemy at the passage of Morrisania, but on this point I can give you no decisive information. The idea of repairing by land to Westchester appeared less agreeable to you than that of going by sea into a bay of Long Island. As to the landing, the Count de Rochambeau looks upon it as a very long operation, and, from his own experience on the subject, he believes that it would require nearly three weeks to land an army, with all its accoutrements, for a campaign and siege. You desired to have every possible information concerning Brooklyn, in order to be able to make calculations accordingly for the artillery and engineer service. You appeared to me to consider a naval superiority as necessary, even at the commencement of the campaign; but it is true that this idea may partly proceed from your doubts relating to the communication concerning Morrisania.