TO GENERAL WASHINGTON.
(ORIGINAL)
Elk, March the 8th, 1781.
My dear general,—Your letter of the 1st inst. did not come to hand until last evening, and I hasted to answer to its contents, though I should, in a few hours, be better able to inform you of my movements.~{1}
From what I hear of the difficulties to convoy us down the bay, I very much apprehend that the winds will not permit any frigate to come up. Count de Rochambeau thinks his troops equal to the business, and wishes that they alone may display their zeal and shed their blood for an expedition which all America has so much at heart. The measures he is taking may be influenced by laudable motives, but I suspect they are not entirely free from selfish considerations. God grant this may not be productive of bad consequences. Baron de Viomenil will also want to do every thing alone. As to the French troops, their zeal is laudable, and I wish their chiefs would reserve it for the time when we may co-operate with an assurance of success.
I heartily feel, my dear general, for the honour of our arms, and think it would be derogatory to them had not this detachment some share in the enterprise. This consideration induces me to embark immediately, and our soldiers will gladly put up with the inconveniences that attend the scarcity of vessels. We shall have those armed ones (though the largest has only twelve guns) and with this every body assures us that we may go without any danger to Annapolis. For my part I am not yet determined what to do; but if I see no danger to our small fleet in going to Annapolis, and if I can get Commodore Nicholson to take the command of it, I shall perhaps proceed in a small boat to Hampton, where my presence can alone enable me to procure a frigate, and where I will try to cool the impetuosity or correct the political mistakes of both barons.~{2}
Whichever determination I take, a great deal must be personally risked, but I hope to manage things so as to commit no imprudence with the excellent detachment whose glory is as dear, and whose safety is much dearer, to me than my own. I have written to General Greene, and will write to the governors, either to get intelligence or to prepare means to operate; but (General Greene excepted) I do not give them any hint of our intentions further than the expedition against Portsmouth.
When a man has delicate games to play, and when chance may influence so much his success or miscarriage, he must submit to blame in case of misfortune. But your esteem, my dear general, and your affection, will not depend upon events. With the highest respect and most tender friendship, &c.
Endnotes:
1. An instruction of the 20th of February, enjoined to General Lafayette to take the command of a detachment assembled at Peekskill, to act in conjunction with the militia, and some vessels of M. Destouches. He was to proceed by a rapid march to Hampton, on the Chesapeak bay, to surprise Arnold at Portsmouth: he had orders to return back immediately if he learnt that the latter had quitted Virginia, or that the French commander had lost his naval superiority. M. de Lafayette reached Pompton the 23rd, (from whence he wrote to the general-in-chief,) Philadelphia the 2nd, and Head-of-Elk the 3rd of March. Washington, however, had himself repaired to Newport to urge the departure of M. Destouches, which event he announced in a letter of the 11th. The result of his encounter on the 16th with Admiral Arbuthnot was to oblige the squadron to return to Newport, and M. de Lafayette to begin his retreat on the 24th. He spoke himself in the following terms of the expedition of which this letter treats:—