I intend to have the honour of paying my respects to you after dinner on Saturday. If you approve of my idea, M. de Chaumont, or any other person you may prefer, might be summoned at the same time; for by the ordinary method this business will never be achieved. I hope that, in, consequence of my aversion to delays in military affairs, you will pardon the importunity which my confidence in you has inspired, in favour of a project of which you feel the importance.
I have the honour to be, with the most sincere respect and affection, &c.
Permit me to confide to you, also, under the same secrecy, my fears that orders have not yet been sent to all the ports.
Endnote:
1. In the previous recital a few words have been said relating to this armament. Two frigates, bearing the American colours, were to have been placed under the orders of Paul Jones, and M. de Lafayette was to command the small army intended to descend unexpectedly upon the western coast of England, and to ransack Bristol, Liverpool, and other commercial towns, for the advantage of the American finances. But this expedition was soon considered below the position in which M. de Lafayette was placed, and was abandoned for the plan of a descent on England, which was to be executed by the combined forces of France and Spain. The slowness of the latter power occasioned, at a later period, the failure of the project; and the only result it produced was Paul Jones's expedition, and the conflict between the Bonhomme Richard and the Serapis. See farther on the first letters to congress and to Washington. In a collection of Franklin's private letters, there is also found a letter relating to this affair, and the note written by M. de Lafayette to Paul Jones when the expedition was abandoned. (A Collection of the Familiar Letters and Miscellaneous Papers of B. Franklin, Boston, 1833. Washington's writings, Vol. vi., Appendix viii.)
TO M. DE VERGENNES.
Paris, April 26th, 1779.
Sir,—Allow me the honour of proposing to you a plan, the success of which, uncertain as it now is, will depend perhaps upon your approbation. As your means of attack or defence depend on our maritime force, would it not be doing a service to the common cause to increase for a time that of our allies? To purchase vessels would be too expensive for a nation so destitute of money; it would answer all purposes to hire them, and would enable, us to make such diversions, or to undertake such operations, as might be deemed necessary.
Do you not think, sir, if the King of Sweden would lend to America four ships of the line, with the half of their crews, and the United States would engage to return them within a year upon certain conditions, that the step would be advantageous for us? The vessels might come to us under the Swedish flag. France need not be implicated at all. We could supply them in part, provide them with officers in blue, and send them out under the American flag. It would only be necessary to know, whether France would engage to be responsible for the sum requisite for the hire, and would help to complete the equipment. Even if the first part should meet with obstacles, the government might pledge itself only in case it should exceed my fortune.
I have not as yet spoken to Dr. Franklin about the scheme, but I have sounded the Swedish ambassador on the subject, much to my satisfaction; he asked me for a letter, directed to him, which might be sent to his king; and since I saw that this important project might result in something advantageous, I was constrained to confide it to you, and ask your opinion. The Swedish ambassador states that the vessels may be here in two months and a half; consequently, including the rest of the fleet, the whole might be at sea in the month of August; and arrive at Rhode Island, Bermuda, or somewhere else in America, in the month of October, which would be a good season.