A minister of a foreign court, formerly allied with France, and who, at that time, was frequently with M. de Puisieux, put into his hands a memorial on this head, which the King never saw, and it was not till long after that I read it.
“France, said that piece, is not yet in a condition to go to war again: things should be left to remain as they are, till she is able to cope with England; otherwise every thing will be ruined. The war by sea will give the turn to that by land: Great Britain will chuse this juncture for inducing the King of Prussia to declare against France, which thus will have two weighty wars on its hands, and only for a continent of no great importance, and which, at last, it will certainly lose, for the events of this war may be easily foreseen.
“The English navy is much superior to that of France; and the King of Prussia has two hundred thousand well disciplined men, ready, at the first order, to march, and make a powerful diversion in Germany; and, with the addition of those in England, will unquestionably turn the scale in the north. France is very well as it is, and should aim at nothing beyond keeping itself so, till a favourable opportunity shall enable it to do better.
“Nothing in America calls for haste; you will always have time enough to make good your claims there: the Savages are your friends; they cannot endure the English. At present interfere no farther than fomenting this variance without promoting it; the time will come when you may make your own use of it: precipitancy spoils the most promising affairs; whereas time and patience bring every thing to bear.
“Don’t imagine that your intrigues with the Americans blind Europe; the most clandestine practices of courts are always detected. Already, you are made accountable for the proceedings of the Canadians, though you appear not to concern yourselves about them. It is known to all Europe, that the North American savages act without any continued design, when not spirited up and directed. Every body knows those automata have no will of their own, saying and doing only just as they are bid to do.
“Your navy is but in its infancy, scarce begun to be formed, so that a war only of two years would totally destroy it. Before engaging in a war, there is a sure way of knowing whether it should be undertaken, which is to weigh the advantages of the conquests with the disadvantages of the defeats.
“Should you beat the English at sea, which is a circumstance out of all probability, you will retain North America, which you already have; if beaten, and here the likelihood lies, you will lose America, and perhaps all your other colonies, for one conquest ever leads to another.
“The English, though beginning the war only on account of Canada, will avail themselves of their first victory to enlarge their views: and the court of St. James’s may afterwards strike out such a scheme of destruction to France, as perhaps, at present, it does not think of.
“A great disadvantage to France, is its having no ally who can help it to recover its losses against the English: the Spanish navy is in no better condition than that of France; and the Dutch rejoice in a war between the maritime powers, were it only for the vast advantages accruing to them from their neutrality. A continental power may retrieve the loss of a battle by a subsequent victory; a more experienced general, better disciplined troops, or more favourable circumstances, will give a turn to a land-war; but the maritime concerns of France are so situated, that a colony taken from it is lost for ever; its ships, the only means of bringing it again into the path of victory, being destroyed.”
This memorial, however approved by some politicians to whom I have since shewed it, had not the effect which might have been expected; another, afterwards presented to the same Minister, set the same object in a very different light.