“Europe was engaged for near two hundred years in negociation and war, to prevent the crown of Spain devolving to any branch of the house of Bourbon. The will of a weak and languishing prince bequeathed it entirely to France, at a time that Lewis XIV. did not even think of being included in the treaty of partition.

“The English never could have imagined making a conquest of Gibraltar, which gave them an ascendency in the ocean, and made them masters of the Mediterranean; when the same accident that gave Spain to the house of Bourbon, produced them the acquisition of that important fortress, which they have ever since retained, though the reasons that induced them to gain possession of it no longer subsist, &c.

“If we were to recur to the origin of great revolutions, we should find that fortune governed the world, and that policy, which would reduce all events to rule, prevails too much in the cabinet of princes. He added, that these enumerations of the power of the states of Europe are useless, as it is not strength that regulates the fate of governments, but a certain combination of accidents, in opposition to which neither negociations nor armies can prevail.”

I do not at present recollect the precise terms in which this memorial of M. de Belleisle was conceived; I only remember that he concluded with these words: “France cannot be hurt by all the great states of Europe: Prussia only is to be feared, and England dreaded.”

Though the king had for some time been fond of talking of state affairs, he was so polite as to dwell but little upon them in my company. Notwithstanding what I have said of his gravity, there is no man in France so agreeable at a tête-a-tête, as Lewis XV. He is some days so happy and vivacious, as even to inspire mirth and joy.

I have frequently mentioned his goodness; I shall now give a little anecdote, which will corroborate what I have said upon that head. One night, after having been pretty late with me in my apartments, he told me he should not dine with me the next day (as he frequently used to do) having resolved to go to Marli, where he should remain till towards the evening. My brother Marigni paid me a morning visit that day, and as I was quite alone, I desired him to stay and dine with me. We conversed together for some time, after which he went to take a turn in Versailles gardens, till it was the hour to go to dinner.

The king altered his mind and did not go a riding. Instead of going to Marli, he came to dine with me. He observed the table laid with two covers, and as he had the day before acquainted me with his intended journey, he testified his surprise, asking me for whom I had intended the second cover. “Sire, I replied, my brother came to see me this morning, and as I was alone, I invited him to dine with me; but as your majesty does me that honour yourself, I shall send to acquaint him that he cannot be a guest.” No, replied the king, your brother is one of the family; instead of removing the cover that was laid for him, only lay another, and we will all three dine together. My brother returned, and the king behaved to him with all possible politeness. This is not an important anecdote, but it displays this prince’s regard, even in the most minute affairs.

M. Rouillé furnished the king every day with fresh estimates, by which it appeared that the marine was re-established. This minister publickly said in 1751, that he had seventy ships of the line, and thirty frigates; but he said that he had more than there really were. Ministers, in general, increase their plan; they almost constantly confound the establishments already made, with those that still remain to be made, and these latter frequently never take place.

A man of understanding said to me at that time, that if France had a fleet of seventy men of war or frigates, ready to put to sea, the great object of the French marine would be accomplished. This same person averred, that we wanted no more to face the English, who have not a greater number of ships fit for engagement; for, added he, we must not confound the coasting cruizers, and those which are destined for convoys; they are not comprised among the number of ships of the line.

The English embassador was ordered to keep a watchful eye upon M. Rouillé and all his operations, in order to acquaint his court therewith. He no longer asked the administration, as was customary with him, what we intended to do with so many ships, because he had frequently had for answer, that the court of France was not obliged to give Great-Britain an account of what she did.