The council of state could not resolve upon any fixed plan of operations, the members being divided in their opinion. I was a witness to a great part of the diversity of sentiments which then disturbed the court, with respect to this grand affair.
A man of much good sense said, like Marshal Belleisle, “that great armies were useless; that land campaigns were not the object, but a sea war; that the colonies should be put in a state of security, which alone could be conquered; that the plan of the English was not to increase their power in Europe, but to extend their limits in America; that all their designs tended that way, and that we should direct ours to the same object; that France was guarantied in Europe by the general balance; but that there was no system whereby our settlements in the new world were guarantied; that the crown would lose its influence, when trade would be entirely in the power of the English; that the British navy was already superior to the navies of all Europe, but that after the loss of Canada and the other parts of the continent of America, it would be the only one in Europe; that this was the crisis for France, and that if the opportunity was neglected of protecting ourselves from this last attempt, it would never return; that all other plans of warlike operations should be given up, to pursue that of the colonies, as they interested the general republic; but that this personally and solely interested France; that America being once conquered, the whole body of Europe could not restore the equilibrium, because the power of the first states of the continent did not extend to the sea; that the English in the center of the christian world, were separated from Christendom; that they could not be attacked in their own islands; that nature had secured them from all invasions in Europe, &c.”
The opposite party, on the contrary, said, “that great armies should be raised to oppose the allies of England, who would not fail to form designs in Germany; that here the capital strokes would be struck; that the war in America was only the pretext for that which was to be carried on in Europe; that some troops should be sent to Canada; but that numerous legions should be raised for Germany; that we were mistaken if we thought the English limited their enterprizes to America, as it was visible that their designs tended to excite a revolution in the north of Europe; that the general balance guarantied France no farther than she herself contributed to support a just equilibrium; that with respect to trade in general, there was no reason to apprehend that England could engross it, as there were not sufficient materials in that country to compass the design; that the English were compelled to have recourse to industrious nations, and where the price of labour was not so high; that universal trade consisted in exchanges, and that a people who should considerably diminish that of other states, would greatly cramp their own; that with respect to the navy, one could not be immediately formed to balance that of England; that the expences made upon this account would be endless, as the time was too short and the means too circumscribed; that the loss of Canada was not certain, the events of war being casual; that the savage nations loved the French and hated the English; that they would prefer being exterminated, rather than submit to the British yoke; lastly, that if Canada should be conquered in this war, it might be retaken in another; but that if the English, united with their allies, should avail themselves of favourable circumstances to gain advantages in Europe, it would be then too late to repair the damage, as the last victories would be guarantied by new treaties of peace; whereas in America the barbarous nations in alliance with France, who are unacquainted with the laws of nations, are always ready to create revolutions: in a word, that it was France’s interest to set on foot numerous armies to support her pretensions by land, and to yield for some time the dominion of the sea, &c. &c.”
A third party maintained that both these objects should be attended to: “We should (said they) prevent the English making conquests in America, and hinder any taking place in Europe. France is sufficiently powerful for this; she need only manage well her forces; she will prevail every where, when those who govern the state unite in one common interest; that is to say, the glory of the nation, and the happiness of the people. If the northern powers of Europe are inclinable to avail themselves of the misunderstandings in America, we must keep our engagements, and send 24000 men into Germany. A more numerous army can only procure us a greater loss without any advantage. These moderate succours will enable us to send more considerable assistance to the new world, to protect our colonies; the revolution in Canada is not a maritime quarrel, it is a land war. The point is to defend the continent, and it is only necessary to land troops there; and this the English cannot prevent. They have taken no measures yet to block up the passages; but if we do not make haste, we shall be too late; for the English, who keep a steady eye upon our operations, will no sooner find that we do not make any great preparations by land, than they will begin to make very considerable ones by sea.”
There was also a numerous party inclined for peace: the reasons which they alledged, were founded upon our inability of carrying on the war; but the minds of the people were too much agitated to listen to plans of pacification; each had his schemes for pushing his fortune, and private interest always prevails over the common weal. Subaltern officers who wanted advancement, were desirous of sieges and battles. Those who endeavoured to obtain the command of armies, were desperate advocates for war; and such as would be employed in furnishing the necessaries for carrying it on, thought it indispensable: it is plain from these motives, how little the interest of the state was considered.
During this crisis the clergy of France were assembled; they deliberated very seriously, whether sick people should have the sacraments administered, or whether they should die without them. The bishops who had been brought over by the court and the parliament, were of opinion, that they could not be refused this assistance. Those who expected nothing of the King, and who hated the parliament, maintained on the contrary, that they should be refused them like heretics. At length, after many debates, they seemed inclinable to leave this great affair to the determination of the Pope.
I learnt this news with pleasure. Benedict XIV. then filled the papal chair. Many persons who had been at Rome, gave me a very favourable opinion of this pontiff. He despised his predecessors, refined policy of turning every thing to their own advantage; the first steps he took upon his obtaining the pontificate, made me conceive a real esteem for him. He had abolished at Rome those wretched equivocations, which in serving as food for superstition, dishonour the Christian religion. He knew that God sometimes wrought miracles, but that he does not daily alter the course of nature. This prince of the church preferred the title of an honest man to that of a holy one, and this quality raised him above all the Popes that ever existed upon earth. Benedict XIV. had so much understanding and so little prejudice, that his decision could not fail to restore tranquility to the Gallican church.
The administration of the sacraments was not the only disquisition which engaged the clergy; the grand affair for which they were convened, and in which the whole body were unanimous, was to deny the authority of the parliaments, or any other body of laymen whatever. Lewis XV. who could not begin the war without oppressing his people, was willing to set them an example of œconomy, by diminishing his household expences. He reduced his hunting equipages, and the number of his hunting horses in both stables. The expences of his little journies were regulated and diminished: it was resolved that there should be no diversions this year at court, and the works of the Louvre were suspended, &c.
The Count D’Argenson said, “that these savings are so small an object, that they will scarce enrich a commissary of stores during the war.”
I was myself often inclined to have an eye to œconomy; but M. de Belleisle had told me that it was scarce possible to benefit the state by such frugality; he added, “if it were an evil, it was impossible to remedy it; but that all those who served the King would enrich themselves; that a reform would produce no advantage; that it was better to continue employing the old officers who were already opulent, than to replace them with new ones, who would endeavour to become so.”