CHAPTER IV
The Preliminary Phase
Apart from the initial handicap of having to fight on the defensive because of the comparative slowness of her mobilisation, Russia is the most advantageously situated of all European Powers for war on the grand scale. Britain is dependent on her command of the sea for her food and trade; the existence of both France and Germany more or less depend on supplies from the outer world. But Russia is self-contained. Her vast “lump” of empire can supply all her needs, from food and trade to an unlimited store of first-class fighting material. Mainly agricultural and possessing a comparatively small foreign trade, Russia could face with equanimity a war of any duration. Until the end of the seventeenth century Russia was the Tibet of Europe, and practically cut off from the rest of the world. She could, with very little inconvenience, retire again behind her frontiers and bid defiance to the world. Time has always been her greatest ally, and her strategy is based upon utilising that ally to the utmost.
The boundaries between the Tzar’s dominions and those of Germany and Austria are, for the most part, purely artificial. They follow no distinct line of demarcation. The great Russian plain extends far into Prussia and Austria, and along the whole length of the frontiers the only obstacles to the advance of an invading army are forests, marshes and the fact that generally speaking the roads are very poor.
Each country has had, therefore, to take defensive measures to remedy the deficiencies of nature. Russia has the chain of fortresses and fortified positions, extending from Kovno to Radom, which are intended to hold an invading force in check until the mobilisation can be completed. Special attention has of late years been given to the defence of the north-western frontier. Plans have been drawn up for the construction of more fortresses and of strategic railways and military roads. But these works are not yet in a sufficiently advanced state to serve any practical end in the present war.
Germany, realising the significance of Russia’s military reorganisation, has recently spent huge sums on strengthening her eastern frontiers. The works are by no means complete, but they are more advanced and of more practical service than those on the Russian side of the frontier.
To the south where Russia and Austria meet, neither Power has taken or contemplated taking any such extensive measures for defence. Cracow, Lemberg and Przemysl are the only fortresses of any value in Galicia, and they are faced by fortifications of about equal strength on the Russian side.
Russia, however, possesses a very great advantage over Austria, and in lesser degree over Germany, in that the inhabitants of Galicia and Eastern Prussia are mostly of Slavonic origin and therefore more or less strongly in sympathy with Russia. The Poles being members of the Catholic Church and having strong nationalistic aspirations, the bond is less strong in their case. But reference has already been made to the results of the Russian Proclamation, and it will be seen therefore that both Germany and Austria are under the disadvantage of having to defend hostile territories.
At the moment when war was declared, Russia had nine army corps, or about 400,000 men guarding her western frontiers. Three corps were stationed at Warsaw, and one each at Vilna, Grodno, Bialystok, Minsk, Lublin, Rovno and Vinnitza. In addition to these troops, there were three army corps at Kiev and one at Odessa. There was thus available for immediate hostilities a total of about 600,000 men. Against these Germany and Austria could muster about 400,000 men. There were German army corps at Königsberg, Dantzig, Posen, Breslau, Allenstein and Stettin. The Austrian corps were at Cracow, Lemberg and Przemysl. This numerical advantage on the side of Russia was further increased by the withdrawal of some of the German corps for service in the western campaign. Russia might, therefore, have made an immediate attack on Prussia with every prospect of success. But she refrained. In the first place, time was not of such particular importance as to warrant the taking of any risks. In the second place Russia needed all her energies for the successful completion of the mobilisation. And finally there was the Austrian menace.
Theoretically Austria could muster her two and a half million men, and invade Russia long before the latter’s mobilisation was complete. To Austria, then, was assigned the task of maintaining the prestige and reputation of the Mailed Fist in Eastern Europe. Russian Poland was to be invaded, Warsaw captured and the Russian army kept at bay until the conquerors of France could come and complete their victorious work. Unfortunately for the success of the plan, however, Austria could not get her rheumatic knuckles into the famous gauntlet. Even Serbia, exhausted though she was after two hard-fought wars, proved more than a match for Austria. And when the latter attempted to advance into Russia, she found herself more or less paralysed by her old enemy—internal dissension.
In Russia the war was the signal for all internal animosities to vanish and to leave the nation pulsating with one determination. In Austria the reverse was the effect. All semblance of unity and loyalty in the eastern provinces disappeared, the crisis tore aside the artificial bonds and Austria stood revealed for what she was and always has been—a ramshackle collection of wrangling races and creeds.