The Russian Advance

by Marr Murray

The expected has not happened. In spite of many rumours it may be taken as certain that the Germans have not to any great extent reduced their forces in the west. The fierceness of the fighting there is sufficient proof of this. And instead of being on the very threshold of Berlin, the main Russian armies are still 400 miles away.

It is Russia’s due that this failure to come up to expectation should be explained.

It is quite true that from the most westerly point on the frontier of Russian Poland to Berlin is only a matter of 180 miles. A glance at the map, however, will show that Poland is more or less a wedge driven into German territory. The average distance from the frontier to Berlin is much more than 180 miles. Nevertheless, Russia might have made a dash on Berlin along the route indicated. There would be every likelihood, too, of the dash proving successful. The country would be favourable for a quick advance. The communications are good—well-made roads and direct railway connection with the Russian base at Warsaw. The River Oder would be the only natural obstacle, and the fortress of Posen the only artificial one. And the country being open, it would be easier to attack than to defend.

But apart from the fact that the capture of Berlin would no more crush Germany than the occupation of Brussels has crushed Belgium, such an advance would be doomed to disaster. The invading army might reach Berlin itself, but sooner or later, it would find itself cut off from its supplies. It would necessarily have left behind it large forces of German troops in Eastern Prussia, and equally strong Austrian armies in Galicia. It could only be a matter of time before Russia would meet with a greater and more disastrous Sedan. Such a move would be a terrible blunder of which no general in his senses would be guilty.

It may be objected that the German troops in East Prussia were only Landwehr reserves and that the moral of the Austrians was so bad that it would have been possible for Russians to leave sufficient forces to hold both armies in check. In the first place it has been amply proved, again and again during the present war that the partially trained reserves when capably led, and in sufficiently large numbers, can hold their own with first line troops. In the second place, although the Slav regiments were mutinous, Austria had quite two million Teutons and Magyars in her army. These men were unquestionably loyal and quite capable of giving a good account of themselves.

Before, therefore, they could set off on that 180 mile journey, it was necessary for the Russians to remove all sources of danger to their rear. The Germans must be turned out of Eastern Prussia or safely held in their own territories, and the Austrians swept from Galicia.

The task of capturing Eastern Prussia is one of unusual difficulty. It is a region which it is very much easier to defend than to attack. The greater part of it is covered with marshes, lakes and forests, most difficult country for an army to traverse. The means of communication are poor, the roads—a most important consideration in connection with the movement of the heavy artillery necessary for a successful invasion—are in many instances little better than tracks. Moreover, it is strongly fortified. Königsberg is a first-class modern fortress, whilst those on the line of the Vistula at Thorn, Graudenz and Dantzig are even more powerful. Königsberg and Dantzig, it should also be noted, have the advantage of being ports as well as fortified towns. In other words, they could be used for large supplies of men and material. An invading army, therefore, could not content itself with merely masking the fortresses unless it was supported by a navy enjoying the command of the sea. The Russian fleet was practically a prisoner in the Gulf of Finland. The German navy was in complete command of the Baltic, and, therefore, to be safe, the invading army would have to storm the fortresses and gain possession of the ports.

The German War Staff, of course, knew perfectly well how difficult was Russia’s task of subduing Eastern Prussia. Hence it was not likely that they were in any way panic stricken over Russia’s advance, at least in that direction. Before that advance could become dangerous the whole of Eastern Prussia would have to be in Russian hands and the passage of the Vistula forced. There was every prospect of Russia being busily engaged for weeks to come.

And it must not be forgotten that the mobilisation was not complete at the time that the general advance was ordered. Thousands of troops cannot be gathered from the farthest confines of Siberia and transported across Asia and half-way across Europe. Only the first phase was completed. Time was still necessary before Russia could put her full strength in the field. The army under General Rennenkampf which invaded Prussia did not comprise the million men with which it was credited. It is doubtful whether he had half-a-million men with him. Certainly he had no more during the early stages of the campaign. Besides invading Prussia, Russia had to invade Galicia, drive back the forces invading Poland and generally guard a frontier about seven times as long as that between Germany and France. Another reason why General Rennenkampf’s army was not so large as it was popularly supposed to be was the fact that the Grand Duke Nicholas, the Commander-in-Chief, did not, for reasons that will be subsequently examined, regard the invasion of Eastern Prussia as of such paramount importance as the invasion of Galicia.

In dealing with this campaign, therefore, its secondary importance should not for a moment be forgotten. Both victory and defeat must be tempered with the knowledge that neither will have the far-reaching effect hoped for or feared. Of course, that is not to say that the Russians did not care what happened in Prussia. If it should prove that the defending German forces were weaker than was believed, if it were possible to overcome all transport difficulties, if Rennenkampf should march from victory to victory, driving the Germans back over the line of the Vistula, so much the better. But such an accomplishment would be a feat of arms worthy of Napoleon himself. Rennenkampf was known to be a remarkably clever general and great things were expected of him—otherwise he would not have been chosen for the most difficult command—but there was no reason to credit him with superhuman genius.