The Russian Advance

by Marr Murray

At the end of the preliminary phase of the campaign, the Russians had already gained a footing in Galicia in the neighbourhood of the River Styr, whilst the Austrians had advanced northwards from Cracow and established themselves in Poland. This Austrian army, after being heavily reinforced, so that it amounted to about 500,000 men, began to march northward towards Warsaw. It was then still further reinforced by a German army which had advanced from Posen, and invaded the Polish province of Kalisch. In Poland, therefore, there was a very considerable army which seriously threatened Lublin and Warsaw, and would require heavy and probably extended operations before it could be forced back.

A second Austrian army, smaller than the first, was in Galicia, with Lemberg for its base.

The operations against these two armies constitute the real “Russian Advance,” the movement intended to prepare for the crushing of Austria and a march on Berlin. That it would be slow was obvious. Opposing it were, at the time under review, about 1,500,000 troops, with two first-class fortresses in Cracow and Przemysl and a hardly less strong position in Lemberg. The question remained, how would Russia act? Would she concentrate her attention on driving the first Austrian army on to Galicia, or would she deliver her main attack on the second army, and invade Galicia from the east, trusting on her success and consequent menace to the communications of the first army to force that army back on to its base? The former course would be the safer, for the first Austro-German army was a more formidable force than the second. The latter course, if the more hazardous, had the merit of speed. The Grand Duke Nicholas decided to adopt this plan, much to the surprise of the Austrians. An army was sent from Warsaw to operate against the Austro-German army in Poland, but the main army, under General Russki, had Kiev for base, and immediate preparations began for a vigorous and sweeping movement through Galicia.

It was, however, essential for the success of the plan that the Austro-German army should be held in check until the menace to its rear was strong enough to force it back. If it were to capture Lublin or seriously threaten Warsaw, the whole scheme would be in danger of collapse.

It must not be forgotten that while these operations were in progress Austria was fighting on her southern frontier against Serbia and Montenegro. The war in the south naturally affected to some extent the war in the north. A series of victories in the south would undoubtedly have provided the Austrians in the north with the moral tonic they so sadly needed. As it happened, however, the war in the south was a complete failure. Seven attempts were made to capture Belgrade, an utterly defenceless town, but each was repulsed. The invasion of Serbia ended in the rout of Shabatz. The Austrians thereupon abandoned their operations against Serbia, and threw all their forces into the northern war. Whatever advantage was gained by this increase in numbers was for the time being more than counterbalanced by the shattered moral of the additional troops. Mutiny had already done much to destroy the spirit of the troops. The companionship of men who had been routed by the despised Serbians was not calculated to improve matters. However, Austria needed every man in the north to defend her reputation as a first-class military power.

Her plan of campaign amounted to an attempt to force the reversal of the Russian plan. The main army was to carry out a vigorous invasion of Poland in two directions, towards Lublin on the north-east and towards Lodz on the north. The latter movement would receive help from the Germans operating in the province of Kalisch. The success of these movements would render a determined invasion of Galicia from the east impossible. Russia would have to change her plan and concentrate her efforts on defeating the invading Austrians and driving them back across the frontier. Obviously this would have suited the German plans admirably, because it would have delayed the Russian advance indefinitely, and so relieve the dangerous position resulting from the unexpected success of the Russian mobilisation and the equally unexpected failure of the attempt to crush France in the course of a few weeks. Viewing the war as a whole, therefore, the main object of both sides was to gain time. The Allies wanted to delay the German advance until the pressure of Russia on the east became unbearable. The Austrian object was to hold Russia in check and so enable Germany to maintain an undiminished army in the west. The issue of the whole war now depended on the efforts of Austria, for even if the Allies in the west were able, as the result of a vigorous offensive, to force the Germans out of France and Belgium, it was extremely doubtful whether they would be able to invade Germany itself with anything more than moderate success, unless the Germans were forced to divide their troops more or less equally between the two frontiers.

The most important operations in the east, therefore, were the advance of the main Austrian army on Lublin and the advance of the Germans through Kalisch. Until these were positively checked the projected Russian advance could not be pushed forward. But, once checked, a successful Russian advance would cause the retirement or downfall of these invaders of Poland unless they were heavily reinforced.

The campaign opened with a serious defeat for Russia. The Austrian army crossed the frontier and established contact with the defending forces in the neighbourhood of Krasnik, a little town some fifteen miles across the border. Details of the engagement are very few. Officially, the Russians ignored it, being wholly taken up with the telling the world about their successes in Prussia. What appears to have happened was that the Russians did not expect the enemy to throw forward such strong forces, and were taken by surprise. Heavily superior in point of numbers and well supported by artillery, the Austrians, while unable to break the Russian centre, seem to have successfully carried out a flanking movement. The Russians fought gamely, and inflicted heavy losses on the enemy, but their defeat was inevitable. The Austrians claimed to have captured some thousands of prisoners and much artillery. In view of the results of the battle, it is quite possible that their claims were not exaggerated.

The serious results of this engagement were at once apparent. The heaviness of the defeat made it impossible for the Russians to make a determined resistance against the Austrian advance for some time. The Austrians overran Kelche and pressed forward on Lublin.

In the course of this advance the Austrians made brave attempts to imitate their German allies. The occupation of Kamenetz Podolski was a good example of their efforts to play the Hun. The town was captured after a sharp engagement, in the course of which the Austrian commander had the misfortune to be slightly wounded. His first act was to demand 200,000 roubles, 200 horsed carts, 800 poods of bread and 60 oxen. Unless this levy were forthcoming by eight o’clock the next morning, the mayor was to be hanged and the town sacked. At the best of times this would have been an almost impossible demand on the resources of Kamenetz, which is only a small town. On the approach of the Austrians the Municipal Treasurer, the bankers and all the wealthy families had fled, taking their riches with them. Nobody in the town had so much as twenty-five roubles in his possession.