“Soon after the taking of Andre Washington sent orders to General Greene to put the left wing of the army near Tappan in motion as soon as possible, and march toward King’s Ferry. It was midnight when the express reached Greene’s quarters; before dawn the whole division was upon the march. But I think you are all pretty well acquainted with the story of Andre, his doings and consequent end; so I shall not repeat it here and now.”
“But, papa, won’t you go a little more into the details of the battle of Brandywine?” asked Grace.
“Certainly, if you wish it,” he replied. “Greene’s work was very important there. The British army was very much stronger than ours—they having eighteen thousand men, while ours were only eleven thousand. Washington had a very strong position at Chadd’s and Brinton’s Fords. The British hoped to drive him from it in turning his right flank by a circuitous march of eighteen miles up the Lancaster road and across the forks of the Brandywine toward Birmingham meeting-house. The British were safe in trying to do this, because their force was large enough to enable them to separate the wings of their army with little risk. Cornwallis conducted the movement in an admirable manner, but did not succeed in striking the American flank, because Washington made a new front with his right wing under Sullivan, near Birmingham meeting-house, so that Sullivan received the attack on his front.
“A desperate fight ensued, in which the British army, being so superior in numbers to ours, at length succeeded in pushing Sullivan obliquely toward the village of Dilworth. Had they succeeded in completing that movement it would have cut the American army in two and utterly routed it. But Washington sent a prompt order to General Greene, who commanded the centre behind Chadd’s Ford. Washington’s order was to stop the dangerous gap, and on receiving it Greene immediately obeyed, marching his troops five miles in forty-five minutes, and connecting with Sullivan near Dilworth, he averted the impending destruction of the army. Wayne had time to withdraw the centre and Armstrong the right wing, all in good order, and the whole army was united at Chester in excellent condition.”
“It strikes me,” remarked Doctor Harold, “that was hardly a defeat of our troops—the same careless writers have vaguely described the American army as routed at the battle of Brandywine. Surely an army cannot properly be said to be routed when it is ready to begin to fight again the next day.”
“No,” replied the captain, “and the fact that Washington’s manœuvring prevented Howe’s return to Philadelphia for fifteen days shows that the Americans were not routed; and what saved from that was Greene’s memorable double-quick march to Dilworth and his admirable manner of sustaining the fight at that critical point.
“On the 26th of September, Howe, having eluded Washington on the Schuylkill, entered Philadelphia, stationing the bulk of his army in Germantown, and on the 4th of October the battle of Germantown was fought. Greene, intending to attack the front of the British right wing, was delayed by the difficulties of his route and the mistake of the guide, so did not get to the field as early as was planned, and the ground assigned to him was accidentally occupied by Wayne.
“When victory seemed almost won an unfortunate mishap turned the tide, and General Greene again with wonderful skill covered the retreat.
“In 1778 he was made quartermaster-general, accepting the office at Washington’s earnest solicitation, but reserving his right to command on the field of battle.
“On the 18th of June the British evacuated Philadelphia, and took up their line of march through the Jerseys. Hamilton and Greene urged giving them battle, and on the 28th of June a general attack was made on Clinton’s forces at Monmouth Court House.