Dunsterville, as he was popularly called, was a frequent visitor at the bungalow. The original of Kipling's "Stalky," he rode easily and without straining on the anchor of his reputation. He is keen-witted, with an illimitable fund of dry, racy humour, and no drawing-room was ever dull when the General was having his fling. As a retailer of bon mots the G.O.C. had no compeer in Hamadan. His shafts were never envenomed, and his victims laughed as heartily as anybody else, as, for instance, once when rations were running low and cannibalism was in vogue among the poor of the city, Dunsterville, turning to a very youthful A.D.C. whose cheeks were the colour of a ripe apple, said in his droll way, "I shall never starve, my lad, while you are about!"
One of his obiter dicta was that every British officer in Persia should be compelled to pass a qualifying examination in "Hadji Baba"—the Oriental Gil Blas—for he would then know more about the Persians, their manners and customs, than could be acquired by months of travel and unaided observation.
"Stalky" had no fear of personal danger. He was an optimist who always saw a diamond-studded lining to the blackest of clouds. It is related of him that at his fateful interview with the Bolsheviks on the occasion of his raid on Resht he told the "Red Committee" so many amusing stories in their own mother-tongue that they quite forgot the principal business of the evening, which was to sentence him (Dunsterville) to death.
CHAPTER XII
DUNSTERVILLE STRIKES AFRESH
Official hindrances—A fresh blow for the Caucasus—The long road to Tabriz—A strategic centre—A Turkish invasion—Rising of Christian tribes—A local Joan of Arc—The British project.
By the middle of May Dunsterville began to feel his feet. Reinforcements were trickling in, officers and N.C.O's., but no fighting men, and always in the petits paquets so beloved by the parsimonious-minded officials who sat at General Headquarters down in Bagdad.
Dunsterville's own position was not an enviable one. His path was beset by difficulties of every description, and, much against his wish, he found himself engaged in a kind of triangular duel with British officialdom at home and abroad. First the Minister in Teheran, and apparently also the Foreign Office, were wringing their hands in despair, asking what he was doing in Persia at all, and urging him to "move on" towards the Caucasus. Next there was Bagdad, who, deeply incensed that Dunsterville had an independent command, and was in direct communication with the War Office, never lost a chance of putting a retarding spoke in his wheel, even going to the extent of telegraphing up the line that no member of "Dunsterforce" was to be furnished with supplies from the military canteens. Then, finally, there was the War Office, who had sent him to Persia in the first instance because it was the most direct route to the centre of Bolshevik activities in the Caucasus. For some time they continued to support him against the pretensions of Bagdad, but ultimately they yielded, and Dunsterville and his force became subordinate to the Bagdad command. Of course, there were, in addition, the malcontents amongst the Persians, notably the Democrats and their Turkish-German sympathizers, who had more than a passing interest in all this bickering and wrangling. They, too, were anxious that a British force should not sit down indefinitely in Persia.
At last it was determined to do something and to strike a fresh blow for the Caucasus; but the initiative no longer rested with Dunsterville. It had passed to Bagdad. New difficulties arose immediately. How were the Caucasus to be reached—by the Caspian Sea and thence by steamer to Baku? Or overland from northwards, through the province of Azarbaijan to Tabriz and railhead?