The position of the unattached British officers was a difficult one in Baku. They were there in an advisory capacity chiefly, but their counsel and presence were alike resented by all parties, political and military. Suggestions for a more efficient co-operation between infantry and artillery, for the filling up of dangerous gaps in the line, the better siting of trenches, or the establishing of observation posts and the employment of "spotters," were usually received in silence and with a disdainful shrug of the shoulders.
While striving to beat off the Turk outside, the British, too, had to sit on the head of the rabid Bolshevik within, and prevent his regaining his feet and running amuck once more.
The economic situation was also serious. Food supplies were lamentably short, and the available stock was running low. A super-commercial instinct had been developed, and gross profiteering was widely practised. It was true that the pre-war standard value of the paper rouble had suffered a heavy depreciation, but this hardly justified the exorbitant tariff of some of the Baku restaurants. It was no uncommon thing for them to exact five roubles for the bread eaten at meals, and about seventy roubles for the very indifferent meal itself.
Colonel Keyworth, R.H.A., was appointed to the command of the troops in the Baku area. His heavy duties confined him a good deal to the port itself, and he was unable to see very much of the defensive perimeter; but he had excellent coadjutors in Colonel Matthews of the Hants, and in Colonel Stokes of the Intelligence Department, an officer who had been for many years British Military Attaché in Teheran. Then, too, there was Lieutenant-Colonel Warden, a blunt, straight-spoken Canadian, and a very keen and efficient infantry soldier whose permanent telegraphic address in Flanders had been "Vimy Ridge." Warden was generally an optimist, but the Baku problem was responsible for his passing sleepless, unhappy nights; and finally he gave up attempting to instil martial ardour into the non-receptive mind of the Baku soldier. In his own racy speech, redolent, of his native prairie, he summed up his efforts in this direction as being as futile as trying to flog a dead horse back to life.
I am not so much concerned with describing the military operations in detail as I am with laying stress upon the many difficulties that beset the path of the British during their first and short-lived occupation of Baku. The wonder is that, instead of giving in after a few days, they were able to cling to the position for weeks.
On August 26th, the Turks, who had been preparing for days, delivered a heavy attack against the Griazni-Vulkan sector. Their advance took place under cover of destructive artillery fire which caused many casualties. The section of the line where the Turks struck first was held by about one hundred and fifty of the North Staffords, supported by four machine-guns of the Armoured Car Brigade. Despite severe losses, the Turks, being reinforced, pressed home the attack, and the auxiliary troops on the right flank were flung back and forced to retire. At this point two of the machine-guns failed to hear the order to retreat, and fought the Turks until their crew were surrounded and cut off. The other machine-gun section, under Lieutenant Titterington, stuck it to the last, and when they withdrew the Turks were already firing upon them from the rear. But the surviving members of the gun crews managed to "shoot" their way through the ranks of the foe.
The enemy, who had suffered very heavily in the attack of the 26th, resumed the offensive on the 31st, when he bit another slice out of the thinly held line and captured the position known as Vinigradi Hill. After this the Turk advanced from success to success, slowly driving back the garrison on the inner defensive line.
GROUP OF THE STAFFORDS, WHOSE HEROIC ATTEMPT TO RECOVER THE
SITUATION FOLLOWING THE ARMENIAN RETIREMENT WILL ALWAYS BE
REMEMBERED AT BAKU. THE SCENE WAS AT BALADADAR STATION.