Inquiry Into the Origin and Course of Political Parties in the United States

by Martin Van Buren

Exceptional Countenance given by the Democratic Party to the Federalist Doctrine of the Supremacy of the Judicial over the other Departments on the Occasion of the Dred Scott Decision—Former Acquiescence of the Country as to the Power of Congress over Slavery in the Territories—That Power brought in question by General Cass, in 1848—The Result a Rupture in the Democratic Party and Defeat of Cass—The subsequent Election of Pierce—Repeal of the Missouri Compromise—Dangers of that Step—The Kansas-Nebraska Act—Opinions of the Judges in the Dred Scott Case how far extra-Judicial—Probable Motives of the Chief Justice and his Brethren—The Author's Recollections of Taney—The Motives of the Judges Good, but their obiter dicta a Mistake—The Course of President Buchanan, with respect to the Dred Scott Decision, an Abandonment of the Democratic Principle of the Independence of each of the three great Departments in deciding Constitutional Questions—Subsequent Action of the Democratic Party on this Subject—Importance of returning to original Doctrines of the Party.

IF this essay shall be ever published, the censures I have bestowed upon the old Federal party and its successors for their persevering efforts to destroy the balances of the Constitution, in this respect of the relative powers of the departments, will doubtless be met by those who still sympathize with its opinions, by a reference to the proceedings in the case of Dred Scott. Of this no one will have a right to complain, so long as those who so refer confine themselves to facts; for truth is truth, whatever may be the circumstances under which it is applied, and wrong is wrong, by whomsoever it may be committed and by whatever party it may be sustained. It will be alleged that the Supreme Court, now composed of gentlemen who are acknowledged members of the Democratic party, has in that case set up the right to guide the official action of the executive and legislative departments of the Government upon a great constitutional question,—that the Executive has recognized that right, and has promised to conform his own course to it when exercised, and that these proceedings have received the approbation and support of the Democratic party.

In the notice I propose to take of that case, it is not my intention to discuss the correctness or incorrectness of the decision that was made in respect to the power of Congress to legislate upon the subject of slavery in the Territories. I will however state in advance and in few words the view I now take of the general subject.

The acquiescence of the country in the power of Congress referred to, from the Presidency of Washington to that of Polk inclusive, is well known. Every President signed bills for carrying it into effect, when any such became necessary and were presented for their approval, and the other great departments of the Government not only complied with the rule but, in innumerable instances, recognized its validity. This continued until the year 1848, when a point, which had so long been considered settled, was brought in question by an opinion expressed by General Cass, then being a candidate for the Presidency, in a letter to Mr. Nicholson, of Tennessee, adverse to the powers of Congress. The Democratic party, whose candidate he was, adopted his opinions, and the consequences were a rupture in that party, the elevation of an old-school Federalist to the Presidency, and an administration of the Federal Government upon the long exploded principles of Federalism. In 1852 the Democracy of the Union, instructed by experience in regard to the destructive tendency of slavery agitations, resolved to avoid them in future, united on General Pierce as their candidate, supported him on their old and time-honored principles, and elected him by a triumphant majority.

This result, so auspicious to the country, was unhappily followed by the repeal of the Missouri Compromise, and a consequent reopening of the agitation upon the subject of slavery, in a form and under influences more portentous of evil than any which had before attended it.

I received information of that event whilst I was abroad, a sojourner in a country which was under the dominion of an absolute monarch,—circumstances which never fail to increase the attachment of a true-hearted American, however orthodox he may have been before in his devotion, to home and its inestimable institutions. Although forever withdrawn from public life, I could not be indifferent to a measure promising such startling consequences. Having had full opportunities to become acquainted with the evil which the infusion of slavery agitation into the partisan feelings of the country was capable of producing, I felt, in all their force, the dangers to which our political fabric would be exposed by that act, and mourned over its adoption. Whatever may be thought or said of it in other respects, in regard to its influence in exciting sectional animosities to a far more perilous height than they had ever reached before there is not now room for two opinions.

Under the feelings of the moment, I naturally extended to the substitute Congress had provided, the odium which, in my view, belonged to the act of repeal, and could see no adequate relief save in a restoration of the Compromise. But as passion subsided I became convinced of the impracticability of that step, and turned my attention to a more careful consideration of the Kansas-Nebraska Act, and I became satisfied that, if honestly executed, it was all that could, under existing circumstances, be done, or, perhaps, desired. Having been a second time invited by my old political friends of Tammany Hall, before the Presidential election of 1856, to submit my views upon the then state of the question, I gave them in a letter which presented the whole subject in a form and was written in a spirit which many thought well calculated to make favorable impressions on well-intentioned and sober-minded men. It contained a simple and truthful description of the position I had before occupied upon the slavery subject, an exposition of the reasons by which I was yet satisfied that it had been well taken, and of the ground of my expectation that Mr. Buchanan would do all in his power to cause the Kansas-Nebraska Act to be carried into full and fair effect.

I have read all the opinions given by the judges in the Dred Scott case with care, and will state the impressions which they have made upon my mind. I had never examined the question, and learned, with serious misgivings as to its correctness, that the court had decided that a man of African birth, though free and, in the State in which he resided, entitled to all the rights of a citizen, was not also a citizen of the United States. My mind remained in this state, with partial alleviations of my anxiety, derived from newspaper sketches of the subject referring to instances in which the principle had been acted upon in the administration of public affairs, until I read very deliberately the voluminous opinions of the judges. The able, judgelike, and I may add, statesmanlike, views taken by Chief Justice Taney and by Justice Daniel, of that branch of the subject, have satisfied me that the judgment of the court upon it was right. I am now convinced that the sense in which the word "citizen" was used by those who framed and ratified the Federal Constitution was not intended to embrace the African race, whose ancestors were brought to this country and sold in slavery. I shall content myself with stating the result of my reflections, without going into details, as that would be to re-argue the question, which would be foreign to my present object. I do not say that the subject is free from difficulties. No adverse opinion could pass through the ordeal of so subtle and masterly an argument as that of Justice Curtis, who bestowed more attention upon the point than his dissenting brother, and escape unscathed.

The weight of facts and argument is, notwithstanding, in my judgment, on the side of the decision of the court.

A decision in favor of a free black man's right to institute a suit in the Federal court, on the grounds of citizenship and his residence in a different State from the defendant, would undoubtedly establish his right under the Constitution to the enjoyment in a slave State of all the privileges allowed to its own citizens. The extent to which such a construction and the practical operation of the rights which might be claimed under it would increase the difficulties, already so great, of maintaining the unity and harmonious action of the Federal system, will be more and more apparent the deeper the matter is considered. I think it is quite certain that if the Constitution had been supposed to contain a provision legitimately authorizing such consequences, it would not have been agreed to by the slaveholding States, nor, in view of the liberal spirit evinced even by the latter at the time of the formation of the Constitution in regard to the extension of slavery, would such a provision have been insisted upon by their brethren of the States which had the happiness to be comparatively free from the institution. The decision must, therefore, be regarded as fortunate, as I cannot but hold it to be correct. For though the personal rights of individuals, however humble their position in society, are not the less important and their protection no less the duty of government, yet the great community may felicitate itself that claims like these,—the practical enjoyment of which, while of little value, relatively, to the few who assert them, may endanger the peace and welfare of millions,—are extinguished through the agency of the organ of the Government constituted for their adjustment. It is in such cases, when confined to its necessary and legitimate duties, that the salutary influence of that high tribunal is felt by all.