September 8, to General Webster after the capture of Atlanta: “Don’t let any citizens come to Atlanta; not one. I won’t allow trade or manufactures of any kind, but you will remove all the present population, and make Atlanta a pure military town.” To General Halleck he writes: “I am not willing to have Atlanta encumbered by the families of our enemies.” Of this wholesale depopulation, General Hood complained, by flag of truce, as cruel and contrary to the usages of civilized nations and customs of war, receiving this courteous and gentlemanly reply (September 12): “I think I understand the laws of civilized nations and the ‘customs of war;’ but, if at a loss at any time, I know where to seek for information to refresh my memory.” General Hood made the correspondence, or part of it, public, on which fact, General Sherman remarks to General Halleck: “Of course, he is welcome, for the more he arouses the indignation of the Southern masses, the bigger will be the pill of bitterness they will have to swallow.”
About the middle of September, General Sherman, being still in Atlanta, endeavored to open private communication with Governor Brown and Vice-President Stephens, whom he knew to be at variance with the administration at Richmond on certain points of public policy. Mr. Stephens refused to reply to a verbal message, but wrote to Mr. King, the intermediary, that if the general would say that there was any prospect of their agreeing upon “terms to be submitted to the action of their respective governments,” he would, as requested, visit him at Atlanta. The motives urged by Mr. King were General Sherman’s extreme desire for peace, and to hit upon “some plan of terminating this fratricidal war without the further effusion of blood.” But in General Sherman’s despatch of September 14, to Mr. Lincoln, referring to these attempted negotiations, the humanitarian point of view is scarcely so prominent. He says: “It would be a magnificent stroke of policy if I could, without surrendering a foot of ground or principle, arouse the latent enmity to Davis.”
On October 20, he writes to General Thomas from Summerville, giving an idea of his plan of operations: “Out of the forces now here and at Atlanta, I propose to organize an efficient army of 60,000 to 65,000 men, with which I propose to destroy Macon, Augusta, and it may be, Savannah and Charleston. By this I propose to demonstrate the vulnerability of the South, and make its inhabitants feel that war and individual ruin are synonymous terms.”
Despatch of October 22, to General Grant: “I am now perfecting arrangements to put into Tennessee a force able to hold the line of the Tennessee, while I break up the railroad in front of Dalton, including the city of Atlanta, and push into Georgia and break up all its railroads and depots, capture its horses and negroes, make desolation everywhere; destroy the factories at Macon, Milledgeville and Augusta, and bring up with 60,000 men on the seashore about Savannah and Charleston.”
To General Thomas, from Kingston, November 2: “Last night we burned Rome, and in two more days will burn Atlanta” (which he was then occupying).
December 5: “Blair can burn the bridges and culverts and burn enough barns to mark the progress of his head of columns.”
December 18, to General Grant, from near Savannah: “With Savannah in our possession, at some future time, if not now, we can punish South Carolina as she deserves, and as thousands of people in Georgia hope we will do. I do sincerely believe that the whole United States, north and south, would rejoice to have this army turned loose on South Carolina, to devastate that State in the manner we have done in Georgia.”
A little before this he announces to Secretary Stanton that he knows what the people of the South are fighting for. What do our readers suppose? To ravage the North with sword and fire, and crush them under their heel? Surely it must be some such delusion that inspires this ferocity of hatred, unmitigated by even a word of compassion. He may speak for himself: “Jefferson Davis has succeeded perfectly in inspiring his people with the truth that liberty and government are worth fighting for.” This was their unpardonable crime.
December 22, to General Grant: “If you can hold Lee, I could go on and smash South Carolina all to pieces.”
On the 18th General Halleck writes: “Should you capture Charleston, I hope that by some accident the place may be destroyed; and if a little salt should be sown upon its site, it may prevent the growth of future crops of nullification and secession.” To this General Sherman replies, December 24: “This war differs from European wars in this particular—we are not only fighting hostile armies, but hostile people; and must make old and young, rich and poor, feel the hard hand of war, as well as their organized armies. I will bear in mind your hint as to Charleston, and don’t think salt will be necessary. When I move, the Fifteenth corps will be on the right of the right wing, and their position will naturally throw them into Charleston first; and, if you have studied the history of that corps, you will have remarked that they generally do their work up pretty well. The truth is, the whole army is burning with insatiable desire to wreak vengeance upon South Carolina. I almost tremble for her fate, but she deserves all that seems in store for her.