Moral Certainty is a Species of Knowlege whose Proofs are of a compounded Nature, in part resembling those which belong to Science, and partly those of Faith. We do not make the whole Process our selves, but depend on another for the immediate Proof, but we our selves deduce the Mediate from Circumstances and Principles as Certain and almost as Evident as those of Science, and which lead us to the immediate Proofs and make it unreasonable to doubt of ’em. Indeed we not seldom deceive our selves in this matter, by inclining alternately to both extremes. Sometimes we reject Truths which are Morally Certain as Conjectural and Probable only, because they have not a Physical and Mathematical Certainty, which they are incapable of. At another time we embrace the slightest Conjectures and any thing that looks with Probability, as moral Certainties and real Verities, if Fancy, Passion or Interest recommend them; so ready are we to be determin’d by these rather than by solid Reason.
In this enumeration of the several ways of Knowing. I have not reckon’d the Senses, in regard that we’re more properly said to be Conscious of than to Know such things as we perceive by Sensation. And also because that Light which we suppose to be let into our Ideas by our Senses is indeed very dim and fallacious, and not to be relied on till it has past the Test of Reason; neither do I think there’s any Mode of Knowlege which mayn’t be reduc’d to those already mentioned.
Now tho there’s a great difference between Opinion and Science, true Science being immutable but Opinion variable and uncertain, yet there is not such a difference between Faith and Science as is usually suppos’d. The difference consists not in the Certainty but in the way of Proof; the Objects of Faith are as Rationally and as Firmly Prov’d as the Objects of Science, tho by another way. As Science Demonstrates things that are Seen, so Faith is the Evidence of such as are Not Seen. And he who rejects the Evidence of Faith in such things as belong to its Cognizance, is as unreasonable as he who denies Propositions in Geometry that are prov’d with Mathematical exactness.
There’s nothing true which is not in it self demonstrable, or which we should not pronounce to be true had we a Clear and Intuitive View of it. But as was said above we see very few things by Intuition, neither are we furnish’d with Mediums to make the Process our selves in Demonstrating all Truths, and therefore there are some Truths which we must either be totally ignorant of, or else receive them on the Testimony of another Person, to whose Understanding they are clear and manifest tho not to ours. And if this Person be one who can neither be Deceiv’d nor Deceive, we’re as certain of those Conclusions which we prove by his Authority, as we’re of those we demonstrate by our own Reason; nay more Certain, by how much his Reason is more Comprehensive and Infallible than our own.
Science is the following the Process our Selves upon Clear and Evident Principles; Faith is a Dependance on the Credit of another, in such matters as are out of our View. And when we have very good Reason to submit to the Testimony of the Person we Believe, Faith is as Firm, and those Truths it discovers to us as truly Intelligible, and as strongly Prov’d in their kind as Science.
In a word, as every Sense so every Capacity of the Understanding has its proper Object. The Objects of Science are things within our View, of which we may have Clear and Distinct Ideas, and nothing shou’d be determin’d here without Clearness and Evidence. To be able to repeat any Persons Dogma without forming a Distinct Idea of it our selves, is not to Know but to Remember; and to have a Confuse Indeterminate Idea is to Conjecture not to Understand.
The Objects of Faith are as Certain and as truly Intelligible in themselves as those of Science, as has been said already, only we become persuaded of the Truth of them by another Method, we do not See them so clearly and distinctly as to be unable to disbelieve them. Faith has a mixture of the Will that it may be rewardable, for who will thank us for giving our Assent where it was impossible to withhold it? Faith then may be said to be a sort of Knowlege capable of Reward, and Men are Infidels not for want of Conviction, but thro an Unwillingness to Believe.
But as it is a fault to Believe in matters of Science, where we may expect Demonstration and Evidence, so it is a reproach to our Understanding and a proof of our Disingenuity, to require that sort of Process peculiar to Science, for the Confirmation of such Truths as are not the proper Objects of it. It is as ridiculous as to reject Musick, because we cannot Tast or Smell it, or to deny there is such a thing as Beauty because we do not hear it. He who wou’d See with his Ears and Hear with his Eyes may indeed set up in Bedlam for a Man of an extraordinary reach, a Sagacious Person who won’t be impos’d on, one who must have more Authentick proofs than his dull Fore-fathers were content with. But Men of dry Reason and a moderate Genius, I suppose will think Nature has done very well in allotting to each Sense its proper employment, and such as these will as readily acknowlege that it is as Honourable for the Soul to Believe what is truly the Object of Faith, as it is for her to Know what is really the Object of her Knowlege. And were we not strangely perverse we shou’d not scruple Divine Authority when we daily submit to Human. Whoever has not seen Paris has nothing but Human Authority to assure him there is such a place, and yet he wou’d be laugh’d at as ridiculous who shou’d call it in question, tho he may as well in this as in another Case pretend that his Informers have designs to serve, intend to impose on him and mock his Credulity. Nay how many of us daily make that a matter of Faith which indeed belongs to Science, by adhering blindly to the Dictates of some famous Philosopher in Physical Truths, the Principles of which we have as much right to examine, and to make deductions from ’em as he had?
To sum up all: We may know enough for all the purposes of Life, enough to busie this active Faculty of Thinking, to employ and entertain the spare Intervals of Time and to keep us from Rust and Idleness, but we must not pretend to fathom all Depths with our short Line, we shou’d be Wise unto Sobriety, and reckon that we know very little if we go about to make our Own Reason the Standard of all Truth. It is very certain that nothing is True but what is conformable to Reason, that is to the Divine Reason of which ours is but a short faint Ray, and it is as certain that there are many Truths which Human Reason cannot Comprehend. Therefore to be throughly sensible of the Capacity of the Mind, to discern precisely its Bounds and Limits and to direct our Studies and Inquiries accordingly, to Know what is to be Known, and to Believe what is to be Believ’d is the property of a Wise Person. To be content with too little Knowlege, or to aspire to over-much is equally a fault, to make that use of our Understandings which GOD has Fitted and Design’d them for is the Medium which we ought to take. For the difference between a Plow-man and a Doctor does not seem to me to consist in this, That the Business of the one is to search after Knowlege, and that the other has nothing to do with it. No, whoever has a Rational Soul ought surely to employ it about some Truth or other, to procure for it right Ideas, that its Judgments may be true tho its Knowlege be not very extensive. But herein lies the difference, that tho Truth is the Object of every Individual Understanding, yet all are not equally enlarg’d nor able to comprehend so much; and they whose Capacities and Circumstances of Living do not fit ’em for it, lie not under that obligation of extending their view which Persons of a larger reach and greater leisure do. There is indeed often times a mistake in this matter, People who are not fit will be puzling their heads to little purpose, and those who are prove Slothful and decline the trouble; and thus it will be if we do not throughly understand our selves, but suffer Pride or Ease to make the estimate.
§. II. It is therefore very fit that after we have consider’d the Capacity of the Understanding in general, we shou’d descend to the view of our own particular, observing the bent and turn of our own Minds, which way our Genius lies and to what it is most inclin’d. I see no reason why there may not be as great a variety in Minds as there is in Faces, that the Soul as well as the Body may not have something in it to distinguish it, not only from all other Intelligent Natures but even from those of its own kind. There are different proportions in Faces which recommend them to some Eyes sooner than to others, and tho All Truth is amiable to a Reasonable Mind, and proper to employ it, yet why may there not be some particular Truths, more agreeable to each individual Understanding than others are? Variety gives Beauty to the Material World and why not to the Intellectual? We can discern the different Abilities which the Wise Author of all things has endow’d us with, the different Circumstances in which he has plac’d us in reference to this World and the Concerns of an Animal Life, that so we may be mutually useful, and that since each single Person is too limited and confin’d to attend to many, much less to all things, we may receive from each other a reciprocal advantage, and why may we not think he has done the like in respect of Truth? that since it is too much for one, our united Strength shou’d be employ’d in the search of her. Especially since the Divine Being who contains in himself all Reality and Truth is Infinite in Perfection, and therefore shou’d be Infinitely Ador’d and Lov’d; and If Creatures are by their being so uncapable of rendering to their Incomprehensible Creator an Adoration and Love that’s worthy of him, it is but decorous that they shou’d however do as much as they can. All that variety of sublime Truths of Beautiful and Wondrous Objects which surround us, are nothing else but a various display of his unbounded Excellencies, and why shou’d any of ’em pass unobserv’d? Why shou’d not every individual Understanding be in a more especial manner fitted for and employ’d in the disquisition of some particular Truth and Beauty? ’Tis true after all our researches we can no more sufficiently Know GOD than we can worthily Love him, and are as much unable to find out all his Works as we are his Nature, yet this shou’d only prompt us to exert All our Powers and to do our best, since even that were too little cou’d we possibly do more. We can never offer to him so much Praise as he deserves, and therefore it is but fit that he shou’d have All that Mankind can possibly render him. He is indeed immutable in his own Nature, but those discoveries we daily make of his Operations will always afford us somewhat New and Surprizing, for this All-glorious Sun the Author of Life and Light is as inexhaustible a Source of Truth as he is of Joy and Happiness.