But our Ideas are then said to be False, or rather Wrong, when they have no Conformity to the Real Nature of the Thing whose Name they bear. So that properly Speaking it is not the Idea but the judgment that is False; we err in supposing that our Idea is answerable to something without us when it is not. In simple Perceptions we are not often deceiv’d, but we frequently mistake in Compounding them, by Uniting several things which have no Agreement, and Separating others which are Essentially United. Indeed it may happen that our Perceptions are faulty sometimes, thro the Indisposition of the Organs or Faculties, thus a Man who has the Jaundice sees every thing ting’d with Yellow, yet even here the Error is not in the Simple Idea but in the Compos’d one, for we do not mistake when we say the Object appears Yellow to our Sight, tho’ we do, when we affirm that it does, or ought to do so to others. So again, when the Mind does not sufficiently Attend to her Ideas nor Examine them on all sides, ’tis very likely she will Think amiss, but this also is a false Judgment, that which is amiss in the Perception being rather the Inadequateness than the Falshood. Thus in many Cases we enquire no farther than whether an Action be not Directly Forbidden, and if we do not find it Absolutely Unlawful, we think that sufficient to Authorize the Practise of it, not considering it as we ought to do, Cloathed with the Circumstances of Scandal, Temptation, &c. which place it in the same Classes with things unlawful, at least make it so to us.
Rational Creatures shou’d endeavour to have right Ideas of every thing that comes under their Cognizance, but yet our Ideas of Morality, our thoughts about Religion are those which we shou’d with greatest speed and diligence rectifie, because they are of most importance, the Life to come, as well as all the Occurrences of This, depending on them. We shou’d search for Truth in our most abstracted Speculations, but it concerns us nearly to follow her close in what relates to the Conduct of our Lives. For the main thing we are to drive at in all our Studies, and that which is the greatest Improvement of our Understandings is the Art of Prudence, the being all of a Piece, managing all our Words and Actions as it becomes Wise Persons and Good Christians.
Yet in this we are commonly most faulty; for besides the deceits of our Passions, our Ideas of Particular Vertues and Vices, Goods and Evils, being an assemblage of divers simple Perceptions, and including several Judgments are therefore liable to mistake, and much more so considering how we commonly come by them. We hear the Word that Stands for such a Thing, suppose Honor, and then instead of enquiring what it is at the Fountain-head the Oracles of GOD, and our own, or the Impartial Reason of the Wisest and the Best, Custom and the Observations we make on the Practice of such as Pretend to it forms our Idea, which is seldom a Right one, the Opinions and Practices of the World being very fallacious, and many times quite opposite to the Dictates of Reason wou’d we but give ear to them. For what a strange distorted Idea of Honor must they needs have, who can think it Honourable to break a Vow that ought to be Kept, and Dishonourable to get loose from an Engagement that ought to be Broken? Who cannot endure to be tax’d with a Lye, and yet never think fit to keep their Word? What do they think of Greatness who support their Pomp at the Expence of the Groans and Tears of many Injur’d Families? What is their Idea of Heaven, who profess to Believe such a thing, and yet never endeavour to Qualifie themselves for the Enjoyment of it? Have they any Idea at all of these things when they speak of ’em? Or, if they have, is it not a very false one?
Now that we may avoid mistake the better, and because we usually join Words to our Ideas even when we only Meditate, we shou’d free them from all Equivocation, not make use of any Word, which has not a Distinct Idea annex’d to it, and where Custom has join’d many Ideas to one Word, carefully separate and distinguish them. For if our Words are Equivocal, how can we by Pronouncing such and such, excite the same Idea in another that is in our own Mind, which is the End of Speech, and consequently how can we be Understood? And if sometimes we annex one Idea to a Word, and sometimes another, we may for ever wrangle with those who perhaps wou’d be found to agree with us if we Understood each other, but can neither Convince them, nor clear up the Matter to our own Mind. For Instance: Shou’d I dispute Whether Evil were to be Chosen? Without defining what I mean by Evil, which is a Word customarily apply’d to things of different Natures, and shou’d conclude in the Affirmative, meaning at the same time the Evil of Pain, or any Corporal Loss or Punishment, I were not mistaken, tho’ another Person who annexes no other Idea but that of Sin to the word Evil, might Justly contradict me and say that I was. Or if in the Process of my Discourse, I shou’d without giving notice of it, substitute the Idea of Sin instead of that of Pain, when I mention Evil, I shou’d argue falsly. For it is a Maxim that we may Chuse a less Evil to avoid a greater, if both of them be Corporal Evils, or if one of them be so, and we chuse it to avoid a Sin, between which and the Evil of Pain there is no Comparison: But if the two Evils propos’d to our Choice be both of them Sinful, that Principle will not hold, we must Chuse neither, whatever comes on’t, Sin being Eligible no manner of way.
Thus many times our Ideas are thought to be false when the fault is really in our Language, we make use of Words without joyning any, or only loose and indeterminate Ideas to them, Prating like Parrots who can Modify Sounds, and Pronounce Syllables, and sometimes martial them as a Man wou’d, tho without the use of Reason or understanding any thing by them. So that after a long Discourse and many fine Words, our Hearer may justly ask us what we have been saying? And what it is we wou’d be at? And so a great part, of the Good Breeding of the World, many Elegant Complements pass for nothing, they have no meaning, or if they have, ’tis quite contrary to what the Words in other Cases signifie.
From the Companion of two or more Ideas clearly Conceived arises a Judgment, which we may lay down for a Principle, and as we have occasion Argue from. Always observing that those Judgments which we take for Axioms or Principles, be such as carry the highest Evidence and Conviction, such as every one who will but in the least Attend may Clearly see, and be fully convinced of, and which need not another Idea for their Demonstration. Thus from the Agreement which we plainly perceive between the Ideas of GOD and of Goodness singly consider’d, we discern that they may be joyn’d together so as to form this Proposition, That GOD is Good: And from the evident disparity that is between GOD and Injustice, we learn to affirm this other, That he is not Unjust. And so long as we Judge of Nothing but what we see Clearly, we can’t be mistaken in our Judgments, we may indeed in those Reasonings and Deductions we draw from them, if we are Ignorant of the Laws of Argumentation, or Negligent in the Observation of them.
The First and Principal thing therefore to be observed in all the Operations of the Mind is, That we determine nothing about those things of which we have not a Clear Idea, and as Distinct as the Nature of the Subject will permit, for we cannot properly be said to Know any thing which does not Clearly and Evidently appear to us. Whatever we see Distinctly we likewise see Clearly, Distinction always including Clearness, tho this does not necessarily include that, there being many Objects Clear to the view of the Mind, which yet can’t be said to be Distinct.
Les Princip. de la Philos. de M. Des Cartes. Pt. I. §. 45.
That (to use the Words of a Celebrated Author) may be said to be “Clear which is Present and Manifest to an attentive Mind; so as we say we see Objects Clearly, when being present to our Eyes they sufficiently Act on ’em, and our Eyes are dispos’d to regard ’em. And that Distinct, which is so Clear, Particular, and Different from all other things, that it contains not any thing in it self which appears not manifestly to him who considers it as he ought.” Thus we may have a Clear, but not a Distinct and Perfect Idea of GOD and of our own Souls; their Existence and some of their Properties and Attributes may be Certainly and Indubitably Known, but we can’t Know the Nature of our Souls Distinctly, for Reasons too long to be mentioned here, and less that of GOD, because he is Infinite. Now where our Knowlege is Distinct, we may boldly deny of a subject, all that which after a careful Examination we find not in it: But where our Knowlege is only Clear, and not Distinct, tho’ we may safely Affirm what we see, yet we can’t without a hardy Presumption Deny of it what we see not. And were it not very common to find People both Talking and Writing of things of which they have no Notion, no Clear Idea; nay and determining Dogmatically concerning the intire Nature of those of which they cannot possibly have an Adequate and Distinct one, it might seem impertinent to desire them to speak no farther than they Apprehend. They will tell you Peremptorily of Contradictions and Absurdities in such matters as they themselves must allow they cannot Comprehend, tho others as Sharp sighted as themselves can see no such thing as they complain of.
As Judgments are form’d by the Comparing of Ideas, so Reasoning or Discourse arises from the Companion or Combination of several Judgments. Nature teaches us when we can’t find out what Relation one Idea bears to another by a Simple view or bare Comparison, to seek for a Common Measure or third Idea, which Relating to the other two, we may by Comparing it with each of ’em, discern wherein they agree or differ. Our Invention discovers it self in proposing readily apt Ideas for this Middle Term, our Judgment in making Choice of such as are Clearest and most to our purpose, and the excellency of our Reasoning consists in our Skill and Dexterity in Applying them.