Forestry—The forest situation in South Korea is unfavorable. Before the war, effective programs of reforestation and erosion control were under way, but dining the war the annual cut averaged 168 million cubic feet as compared with annual estimated growth of only 113 million cubic feet. Furthermore, over two-thirds of South Korean requirements of lumber, fuel wood, and pulp were formerly supplied by North Korea. With this source cut off and coal imports and production drastically reduced, hills and mountains around the Urge cities have been literally denuded. Unless North and South Korea are united or substantial imports are provided, the needs of South Korea for fuel wood, lumber, railroad ties, and telephone and telegraph poles, make it inevitable that overcutting and denuding of forest land in South Korea will continue, with resulting increased erosion and flood damage to agricultural land.
Mineral Resources—Mineral resources of Korea are varied and rather extensive, but with a few exceptions are of low grade. There is a large deposit—over one billion metric tons—of low grade (35 per cent magnetic) iron ore at Musan in Northeastern Korea which the Japanese mined extensively before and during the war. Capacities are said to have been developed for the production of over 800,000 tons of pig iron and 350,000 tons of steel annually, but operations were possible only by large imports of bituminous coal from Manchuria and Japan.
In both North and South Korea, gold and copper were also mined, the latter as an adjunct of the former, and some lead and zinc, and a large quantity of graphite, the latter, however, of low quality. There is enough developed tungsten production in South Korea to make it an important export commodity.
Industries—The prospects for Korean industry, even in the event of early unification, are not bright. Before 1931 Japan exploited Korea primarily as a source of raw materials, rice and cheap labor. Thereafter Korea became Japan’s bridgehead to the Asiatic mainland, and with Manchuria, was developed as the mainland portion of Japan’s war potential. By 1938 there were 7,000 factories, mostly small, employing 183,000 workers, principally in the production of chemicals, textiles and processed foods. Main industrial concentrations were in the north, near hydroelectric power plants and the larger mineral deposits. This rather impressive industrial plant was not damaged by bombing, but it would be a mistake to assume therefore that Korea possesses a ready-made industrial plant which could quickly be turned to full and efficient peacetime operations. Production, at perhaps 20 per cent of capacity, was restored after the occupation, but output has dwindled as stocks of raw materials have been exhausted, and as machinery has stopped functioning for lack of spare parts and competent maintenance and operating personnel. The dearth of competent administrative supervisory and technical personnel, practically all of whom were formerly Japanese and are now evacuated, is the outstanding deficiency in Korean industries, power, and transportation systems. The unification of North and South Korea would make some of the required raw materials available, and spare parts may eventually be obtainable from Japan, but the serious deficiency of competent personnel is an unresolved problem.
Railways—Korea has an excellent standard-gauge railway system including a double-track main line from Pusan on the southeast coast to Antung on the Manchurian border, which adequately serves the country with the exception of the eastern half of Kangwon Province. However, trackage, rolling stock except locomotives, and railway communications are badly in need of rehabilitation as a result of years of undermaintenance because of wartime shortages of materials. The railways in common with the country as a whole have been badly crippled by the evacuation of the Japanese administrative, supervisory, and technical personnel. The right-of-way is excellently engineered and constructed and characterized by a profusion of concrete and masonry structures, but all of the seven million ties in South Korea will require replacement within the next seven years, and quantities of rails and fishplates are also needed. One hundred and one new locomotives of the 2-8-0 type have been provided by the Military Government, but much of the other rolling stock requires overhaul. Railway communications also require considerable rehabilitation.
Highways—There are no modern roads in Korea. The highways of South Korea are practically nonoperable for automotive traffic except from Seoul to Inchon, Kaisong, and Chunchon. Practically all supplies must be distributed throughout Korea by rail.
Shipping—The only shipping of South Korea consists of eight Baltic vessels, and 12 LST’s, operated by the Military Government coast-wise and for some trade with Japan.
Ports—There are two major ports in South Korea; Pusan, an excellent deep-water port with four large piers at the Southeast end of the peninsula, and Inchon, west of Seoul, a much smaller tidal-basin port which can accommodate four three-quarter-thousand-ton ships at dockside in the basin and larger trans-Pacific cargo and passenger vessels in the anchorage outside. Two other deep-water ports, Masan and Yosu, were mined and are little used at present. Mukko on the east coast is the export terminal for Sam Chok, the largest anthracite mining area in South Korea. The other ports of Mokpo, Pohang, Chinhae, and Kunsan are limited by unfavorable factors of nigh tidal range, and a lack of berths and port clearance facilities.
In North Korea, there are two first-class warm water commercial and naval ports at Wonsan and Chungjin on the east coast, the latter particularly desirable from a Russian viewpoint, and other ports Oongki, Rashin, Eungjin, Chinnanpo, and Simhu, the latter two handicapped by the 25- to 30- foot tides of the Yellow Sea.
Withdrawal of Japanese Personnel