Books already have been written about the Korean situation. Although it is one spoke in the great Asiatic wheel, Korea is very important, but China still remains in the hub of the wheel. One of the greatest tragedies of this whole chain of events is that General Douglas MacArthur had the difficult—the impossible—task of trying to rescue the Korean chestnut from the fire—a fire which might not have ignited had his counsel and advice, along with that of Lieutenant General Albert C. Wedemeyer and others, been heeded in the first place.
The Communist-inspired invasion of South Korea by the North Korean Communists was a trial balloon let loose by the Soviet and Chinese Communists to determine how far the United States and the United Nations would go before buying an all-out Asiatic war. It was a trick from the start, to draw U. S. and UN forces foremost into the area from which the U. S. had withdrawn in 1949. Once committed, and once having dispatched American—and a trickle of UN soldiers into South Korea, the chances were that they could be kept there indefinitely. We were permitted, early in the conflict, to cross the arbitrary 38th parallel, and to proceed at great difficulty and even greater loss of life, to the borders of Manchuria. Then, in typical Communist fashion, they struck back in the evening, almost, of our declaration of all but total victory. One need only to glance at a map of Korea to realize that the Communists, Soviet and Chinese, are in a position to pour millions of men into North Korea, dressed as Koreans or otherwise, at their will. How could we hope to do anything of a permanent nature in unifying Korea against the Communists? The Korean patriot Kim Koo, shortly before his assassination and replying to a question put to him by Representative Walter Judd said: “It doesn’t make any difference what you (the U. S.) do now. There just isn’t any way to get Korea so that she can be independent and secure and self-sustaining, until you solve the Communist problem across the border in Manchuria.” We solved that problem by giving that prize to the Soviets. It was Russia’s price for entering the war, the last six days of it, as an ally, even though it was rather generally known that Japan was ready to surrender.
For every life that may have been spared by the signing of the questionable Yalta agreement, thousands of American and Korean GI’s, and Korean civilians are now dead, dying and maimed. This little Florida-shaped country of Korea, cut up by outsiders, is a tragic example of failure to think beyond military objectives. We cannot defend Korea from Russian attack without an all-out war. We can only prolong the agony. If it was right for us to leave Korea in 1949, can we, honestly, justify our re-entry there in 1950—at the price we have paid?
There yet remain other fates to be decided—Formosa, the Philippines and numerous islands of the Pacific, whether we occupy them or not. Have we not already proven that, “It is fantastic to imagine that we can convert our enemies into our friends by treating our friends as if they were our enemies”?
But to understand the overall picture, one must begin with a knowledge of the background that has made China and the United States the estranged bed-fellow nations which they have become. The historic removal of Douglas MacArthur from all of his commands in the Far East, by President Truman at 1 a. m. on April 11, 1951, will have far-reaching effects. Due to this move, disaster looms before us larger than ever, especially for the United States and Great Britain. Nearly a month before the news of the impending MacArthur dismissal by the President “leaked” to the American press, headlines had appeared in Danish newspapers saying: “British Say ‘MacArthur Must go’.”
The average reader, in all probability, sees only a difference of opinion in the policies of the political and military leadership on the conduct of World War III, but the facts go deeper than this. There appears to be a determination on the part of those who are playing international politics, to obtain and control world power. MacArthur, definitely, was the greatest single stumbling block in their path. To be in a position, militarily, to bomb enemy supply sources, and yet forbidden, by political directives from Washington, to do this, put greater handicaps on MacArthur than he was willing to take. With the MacArthur removal, Truman will bend every effort toward silencing all who remain opposed to his Acheson-approved manifesto.
On April 1, 1951, correspondent Kenneth de Courcy (Intelligence Digest—A Review of World Affairs) cabled from London:
“There is no longer even a definite objective in the Korean war. Each nation or organization concerned in it seems to have a different objective; while each high commander seems to have a private idea of what would represent success or victory. If the powers that be cannot agree even in Korea, it is hardly surprising that they cannot devise an agreed strategy for the entire world. Mr. Truman, who is becoming very tired, seems determined to await decisive trends of public opinion. His private views and conclusions are not likely to be pressed unless he is convinced that public opinion is more than ready for them. In fact, American public opinion is far ahead of its leadership. Mr. Truman however, has not yet been convinced of this....
“The Kremlin reckons on a steadily progressive weakening of the Atlantic group of powers. Meanwhile, it is intended to increase the flow of warlike supplies and indirect help to Asiatic Communist forces, rather than to the European satellites. Major developments are timed to take place in Asia before the end of this year, which by the middle of 1952, will give the USSR access to certain valuable and essential raw materials which now have to be purchased from outside the Soviet system.... The Kremlin thinks war with the West will become inevitable ... but hopes to be able to postpone this war until Burma and India have been brought within the Soviet sphere of influence.”
To follow the MacArthur program has been called a “colossal gamble,” but what greater gamble can there be than sitting back and waiting for the enemy to come and destroy us? Was England able to stop Hitler by appeasement? Nor will the present British Labor Government be able to silence the Chinese Communists by promising them Formosa and a hand in the Japanese peace treaty if, indeed, the Japanese accept such a treaty.