Now you can see that until Harper’s Ferry fell it was necessary that the cavalry should hinder the advance of the Federal army under McClellan until Jackson could join Lee. This was especially difficult, because an order from General Lee to General D. H. Hill, explaining fully the commanding general’s plans and the location of all his forces, had fallen into the hands of General McClellan and he was advancing a tremendous army toward Sharpsburg as rapidly as possible.
As General McClellan’s forces advanced, General Stuart retreated slowly, contesting every inch of ground. His retreat across Catoctin Mountain was through Braddock’s Gap, along the same road where eighty-seven years before, the young patriot, George Washington, had accompanied General Braddock on the fatal expedition against Fort Duquesne. In this gap, Stuart had a sharp encounter with the Federals. He and Major Von Borcke who was commanding a gun on the height above the pass, narrowly escaped being captured by Federal skirmishers who, under cover of the dense forest, had worked their way around behind the gun.
Another sharp encounter took place on Kittochtan creek at Middletown, half way across the valley, where General Stuart delayed the retreat of his forces so long that they barely escaped capture and reached the foot of South Mountain just in time to protect the two principal passes,—Turner’s Gap which led directly through Boonsboro to Sharpsburg, and Crampton’s Gap which led through Pleasant Valley to Harper’s Ferry.
It was necessary to hold these gaps and delay the enemy until Jackson could capture Harper’s Ferry and unite his division with the remainder of the army under General Lee. A heavy part of this work fell on the cavalry and the artillery. The retreat of Generals Longstreet and Hill, who had held Turner’s Gap until the afternoon of Sept. 14, was covered by General Fitz Lee’s brigade which held the Federals in check at every possible point. There was a sharp encounter at Boonsboro, where, in charging, General W. H. F. Lee was ridden down by his own men and narrowly escaped capture.
At Crampton’s Gap, which led through Pleasant Valley to Harper’s Ferry, Colonel Munford gallantly checked the Federal advance until the evening of Sept. 14, when the troops sent to assist him broke and retreated in bad order through Pleasant Valley. General Stuart had been at Harper’s Ferry conferring with General McLaws; when they heard of the engagement at Crampton’s Gap, both generals rode quickly forward to meet the routed and panic-stricken troops which they rallied and formed into line of battle. The position that they held the next morning was so strong that the advancing Federals hesitated to attack; just as the first shots were being exchanged, the news of the surrender of Harper’s Ferry caused the attacking party to begin a hasty retreat along the road that they had come.
General Stuart at once reported to General Jackson, who requested him to convey the news to General Lee at Sharpsburg. But even now Lee was in great peril. He had with him, on the evening of Sept. 14 when the gaps were stormed, only about 20,000 men; and McClellan’s army of more than 87,000 was advancing rapidly to attack him. Lee had now either to recross the Potomac or to fight a battle north of that river.
He decided to make a stand, and on the night of Sept. 14, drew his army across Antietam creek and took a strong position on a range of hills east of the Hagerstown turnpike. Here he waited for Jackson who, by a forced march, came up in time to take position on the left wing on the morning of September 16. Even when reenforced by Jackson, Lee had a much smaller force than McClellan.
On the evening of Sept. 16, McClellan attacked Jackson’s wing at the left of Lee’s army, but was repulsed. At early dawn the next day, the attack was renewed and the combat raged all day. When night ended the bloody contest, the Confederates not only held their position, but had advanced their lines on a part of the field. During the entire battle, Stuart with his horse artillery and a small cavalry escort had guarded the open hilly space between Jackson’s left and the Potomac river.
General Jackson in his report of this battle said: “This officer (General Stuart) rendered valuable service throughout the day. His bold use of artillery secured for us an important position which, had the enemy possessed, might have commanded our left.”
The next day, Lee waited for McClellan to attack, but no movement came from the hostile camp. Finding out through Stuart’s scouts that large bodies of fresh troops were being sent to McClellan, Lee withdrew that night to the south side of the Potomac, and by eleven o’clock the next morning, he was again ready to give battle should the Federals pursue. He had brought off nearly everything of value, leaving behind only several disabled cannon and some of his wounded.