A cordial understanding with England lasted till the Restoration in 1660, far more cordial, indeed, than with France.
Up to this time, almost from the commencement of its existence, it had been the policy of the Dutch Republic to maintain an alliance with France. But the French had come to consider this alliance so necessary to the Republic that they had felt themselves able to treat their allies in a most supercilious manner. Their armed ships had for some time been in the habit of seizing and plundering Dutch merchantmen. It had been impossible to obtain redress till, in 1657, Admiral de Ruyter had orders from his Government to make reprisals, and took two of the King’s ships. A French envoy was sent to demand satisfaction. A rupture seemed imminent, but matters were smoothed over, and the United Provinces came out of the difficulty without loss of credit.
In the meantime much alarm had been created in Holland by the ambition of Charles Gustavus of Sweden, who had engaged in a successful war with Poland, and afterwards attacked Denmark. Denmark was in alliance with the United Provinces, and, moreover, it was necessary for the trade of Holland in the Baltic, which was very considerable, that the balance of power in the North should be preserved. After many negotiations, and an abortive attempt to make a treaty with Sweden, the Dutch assisted Denmark with a powerful fleet and a small body of troops. They had an obstinate naval engagement, by which Copenhagen was saved, and in the following year they destroyed some of the largest of the Swedish men-of-war, which they succeeded in surprising and outnumbering. Charles Gustavus died suddenly, and peace was soon afterwards made.
A desultory war had all this time been going on with Portugal, in order to obtain compensation for losses sustained by the Dutch in Brazil, which does not come within our limits to describe. This war was chiefly carried on in the East Indies, where the Dutch conquered the rich island of Ceylon. Peace was finally made with Portugal in 1661, Portugal paying a heavy indemnity for the Brazil losses.
In all these matters De Witt had become more and more the principal mover. As to home affairs, his reputation, and the power which was derived from it, were not confined to his own province of Holland, for we find him about this period chosen by the nobility, first of Friesland, and then of Overyssel, to settle their internal disputes.
The office of Grand-Pensionary was a five years’ appointment. It had been renewed to De Witt in 1658, and in 1663 it had become such a matter of course that he should fill it, that even his opponents gave a tacit consent to his remaining. Having proved himself necessary, it was impossible that he should not continue to hold the most honourable place in the Government. Not that his place as Grand-Pensionary gave him any real power. I have already remarked, and it is important to bear in mind, that by the strange system now prevailing, no official whatever possessed more than a moral influence. Whenever anything of importance was to be done, some person was appointed for that particular purpose, and this person was now almost always either De Witt or his brother, generally the former. For instance, there was at this time a dispute between the Prince of East Friesland and his subjects, which threatened to be serious. John de Witt was at once appointed to go at the head of a deputation to mediate between the contending parties. I need hardly add that his mediation was at once successful; and there was soon to be a still greater scope for the display of his abilities, as a war with England was impending.
Charles II. was now on the throne of England, and there was a natural antagonism between him, as uncle to the Prince of Orange, and the party which now governed Holland. Besides this, the English nation had always been jealous of the commercial prosperity of the Dutch, and they had not yet become sufficiently aware of the extent to which the power of France was increasing, or the necessity for a Dutch alliance in order to check it.
We cannot be surprised, therefore, that this war should have broken out; it began on the coast of Africa, and soon became general. De Witt was, of course, at once appointed Chief Commissioner for the direction of the navy, and by his personal exertions at Amsterdam and other places he succeeded in fitting out a considerable fleet, very differently equipped and provisioned to what had been the case in the war with Cromwell. This fleet, however, under the command of Opdam, engaged the English in the beginning of June 1665, and suffered a tremendous and most disastrous defeat. Opdam was killed, and the other admirals were at daggers drawn with each other. Such was the general confusion and discouragement, and such the general instinct to turn to De Witt in any great emergency, that though he had never yet had any military or naval experience whatever, the chief command was at once thrust upon him. He knew well how invidious his position would be, and it was in spite of the earnest persuasion of his personal friends to the contrary, that, at the call of duty, he accepted the office.
The fleet had been driven into the Texel, and was shut in there by a contrary wind. To Holland, who depended for her very existence upon supplies from abroad, and whose East Indian ships at this very moment required protection for their safe passage, it was absolutely necessary that the fleet should at once put to sea. But the seamen unanimously represented that as the wind then stood this was impossible. De Witt, though no sailor, was a great mathematician. He had read deeply and written ably on the subject, and he was now to put his knowledge to practical use. He proved by calculation that it was just possible, even with this adverse wind, to sail out by one passage, then called the Spaniards’ Gat. The pilots now declared that in the Spaniards’ Gat there was not more than ten feet of water, and that this was not sufficient. De Witt took a boat, personally sounded it, and found everywhere a depth of at least twenty feet. He himself superintended the carrying out of the largest ship in the fleet, and was followed by all the rest.
He now had to exercise his diplomatic abilities in order to reconcile the two admirals under his command—De Ruyter and the younger Van Tromp. He succeeded in smoothing down their mutual animosities, and in attaching them both personally to himself. But the sailors still grumbled, not unnaturally, at being commanded by an unknown and inexperienced landsman, and it was not till a violent storm arose that he had an opportunity of winning their esteem. For two days and two nights, without food and without rest, he remained on deck, infusing courage into others, as only a really brave man can do, working himself, and, what seems to have been unusual, forcing his officers also by his example to work with their own hands. He gradually became the idol of the men, showing particular concern for their comfort and welfare, while, at the same time, by his tact and good management, he avoided giving any offence to the officers.