[3] Saisset Op. cit. p. 206.
Hirzel and Natorp do not find such a marked contradiction in the two views presented of the theories of Aenesidemus, nor do they think that Sextus has misrepresented them. They rather maintain, that in declaring the coexistence of contradictory predicates regarding the same object, Aenesidemus does not cease to be a Sceptic, for he did not believe that the predicates are applicable in a dogmatic sense of the word, but are only applicable in appearance, that is, applicable to phenomena. The Heraclitism of Aenesidemus would be then only in appearance, as he understood the statement, that "Contradictory predicates are in reality applicable to the same thing," only in the phenomenal sense.[1] Hirzel says in addition, that contradictory predicates are in reality applicable to those phenomena which are the same for all, and consequently true, for Aenesidemus considered those phenomena true that are the same for all.[2] As Protagoras, the disciple of Heraclitus, declared the relative character of sensations, that things exist only for us, and that their nature depends on our perception of them; so, in the phenomenal sense, Aenesidemus accepts the apparent fact that contradictory predicates in reality apply to the same thing.
[1] Natorp Op. cit. 115, 122.
[2] Adv. Math. VIII. 8; Hirzel Op. cit. p. 95.
This explanation entirely overlooks the fact that we have to do with the word ὑπάρχειν, in the statement that contradictory predicates in reality apply to the same thing; while in the passage quoted where Aenesidemus declares common phenomena to be true ones, we have the word ἀληθῆ, so that this explanation of the difficulty would advocate a very strange use of the word ὑπάρχειν.
All of these different views of the possible solution of this perplexing problem are worthy of respect, as the opinion of men who have given much thought to this and other closely Belated subjects. While we may not altogether agree with any one of them, they nevertheless furnish many suggestions, which are very valuable in helping to construct a theory on the subject that shall satisfactorily explain the difficulties, and present a consistent view of the attitude of Aenesidemus.
First, in regard to the Greek expression οἱ περὶ in connection with proper names, upon which Pappenheim bases so much of his argument. All Greek scholars would agree that the expression does not apply usually only to the disciples of any teacher, but οἱ περὶ τὸν Αἰνησίδημον, for instance, includes Aenesidemus with his followers, and is literally translated, "Aenesidemus and his followers." It is noticeable, however, in the writings of Sextus that he uses the expression οἱ περὶ often for the name of the founder of a school alone, as Pappenheim himself admits.[1] We find examples of this in the mention of Plato and Democritus and Arcesilaus, as οἱ περὶ τὸν Πλάτωνα καὶ Δημόκριτον [2] and οἱ περὶ τὸν Ἀρκεσίλαον, [3] and accordingly we have no right to infer that his use of the name Aenesidemus in this way has an exceptional significance. It may mean Aenesidemus alone, or it may signify Aenesidemus in connection with his followers.
[1] Pappenheim Op. cit. p. 21.
[2] Adv. Math. VIII. 6.
[3] Adv. Math. VII. 150.