Ten Years Near the German Frontier: A Retrospect and a Warning

by Maurice Francis Egan

Danish diplomatists seemed to think that Germany, now that she had created the Kiel Canal, had no further designs on Denmark, whom the Pan-Germans continued, however, to call, 'our Northern province.' This was the opinion of Hegermann-Lindencrone, of Raben-Levitzau, and I have heard a similar opinion credited to the present Danish Minister at Berlin, Count Carl Moltke, though he did not express it to me. My old friend, Count Holstein-Ledreborg, was not altogether of that opinion. 'In case of war with England, Denmark would be seized by our neighbour, naturally,' he said; 'unless we go carefully we are doomed to absorption.' Count Holstein-Ledreborg knew Germany well. He had lived in that country for many years, having shaken the dust of his native land from his soles because many of his friends and relatives—in fact, nearly all the aristocratic class in Denmark—had practically turned their backs on him on account of his political Liberalism. This he told me. He had returned, with his family, to his beautiful estate at Ledreborg, and, for a short time, became prime minister, in order to do what seemed impossible—to unite the factions in Parliament in favour of a bill for the defence of the kingdom. Against England? England had no designs. Against Russia? Russia was allied to France, and she could hardly join hands with Germany. The intentions of the Kaiser? But the Kaiser seemed to be a peaceful opportunist. Even the acute Lord Morley had more than once, in conversation, put him down as a lover of peace; but—There was always a 'but' and the General Staff of the German Army!

Study the personality of the important personages as one might, there were always these things to be considered as obstacles to clear vision:—the growing corruption of principle in the Reichstag and among the German people, if Hamburg represented them, and the point of view of the military caste. In 1911 the increasing riches—the thirst for money had become a veritable passion—of the German people seemed to indicate that one of the principal obstacles to aggression which would involve war was being rapidly removed. The difference between the American desire for money and the German was, as I was often compelled to point out, that, while the German desired great possessions to have and to hold, the American wanted them in order to use them; and, in spite of the industrious 'muck rakers,' it was evident that our enormously rich men were not hoarding their wealth for the sake of greed and selfish power as the German rich were doing. Possibly, as our Government does nothing for art or for music or for the people in need, there is a greater necessity for private benevolence than in countries where the Government subsidises even the opera. Nevertheless, the fact remains; the European rich man hoarded more than the American. And Germany, in spite of the extravagance of Berlin and the great cities, was hoarding. It was a bad sign for the world.

Of Slesvig, Prince Bismarck said in 1864, 'Dat möt wi hebben.' He was terribly in earnest, and he spoke in his own Low German. At any moment, the Kaiser might say of Denmark, 'Her must we have.' But how foolish this statement must seem to the Pacifists and all the more foolish in the mind of a Minister who ought not to be carried away by rumour or guesses or to be determined by anything but the exact truth!

It would have been foolish if, in 1911, a serious man behind the scenes could have trusted any country in the European concert to act in any way that was not for its own national ends. A damaging confession this, but the truth is the truth. We all know how amazed some statesmen were when President Roosevelt refused the Chinese spoil, when Cuba was restored, and promises to the Filipinos began to be kept. If Denmark should be 'assumed,' the Danish Antilles would be the property of the nation that 'assumed' it. As it was apparently to the interest of the Pan-Germans to keep the Danes in suspense, and, as most of the Danes distrusted the intentions of their neighbours, it was not well to assume that there was smoke and no fire.

Besides, were there not other powers who might find it to their advantage to prevent the Danish West Indies from falling into our hands? We were not, from 1907 to 1914, in such a state of security as we imagined, in spite of our system of peace treaties. Dans les coulisses of all countries, there was a certain amount of cynicism as to the effect of these peace treaties, and very little belief, except among the international lawyers, that anything binding or serious had been accomplished by them. After all, my business was to hoe my own row, but I listened with great respect to such men as my colleague, now the Norwegian Minister at Stockholm, Mr. Francis Hagerup, and other legal-minded men. However, I determined to make the task of saving the Islands from 'assimilation' as easy as possible for my successor or his successor. I hoped, of course, for the chance of doing something worth while for the country seemed to be mine, and President Wilson—I shall always be most grateful to him—gave me the happiness of doing humbly what I could.

In 1907 I found that the irritation caused by the attitude of our Government in the matter of the Islands had not worn away. The majority of the Danes had really never wanted to sell the [Islands]. 'Why should a great country like yours want to force us to sell the Danish Antilles? You pretend to be democratic, but you are really imperialists. It is not a question of money with us; it is a question of honour. Your country has approached us only on the side of money—and when you knew that our poverty consented.'

This was the substance of conservative opinion. There was a widespread distrust, especially among the upper classes in Denmark, as to our intentions. The title of a brochure written by James Parton in 1869 was often quoted against us, for the Danes have long memories. It was entitled The Danish West Indies: Are we Bound in Honour to pay for Them? 'An arrogant nation, no longer democratic' because we had seized the Philippines! It must be said that a minister desiring to make a good impression on the people had little help from the press at home. Foreign affairs were treated as of no real importance in the organs of what is called our popular opinion. The American point of view, as so well understood over all the world now, was not explained; but sensational stories describing the exaggerated splendours of our millionaires, frightful tales of lynching in the South, the creation of an American Versailles on Staten Island, which would make the Sun King in the Shades grow pale with envy, the luxuries of American ladies, were invariably reproduced in the Danish papers. President Roosevelt was looked upon as the one idealist in a nation mad for money, and even he had a tremendous fall in the estimation of the Radicals when he spoke of a Conservative democracy in Copenhagen. It was necessary to overcome a number of prejudices which were constantly being fostered, partly by our own estimate of ourselves as presented by the Scandinavian papers in extracts from our own.

Then, again, the real wealth of our people, our art and literature—which count greatly in Denmark—were practically unknown. Everything seemed to be against us. The press was either contemptuous or condescending; we were not understood.

It is true that nearly every family in Denmark had some representative in the United States, but their representatives were, as a rule, hard-working people, who had no time to give to the study of the things of the mind among us. In spite of all their misconceptions, which I proposed to dissipate to the best of my ability, I found the Danes the most interesting people I had ever come in contact with, except the French, and, I think the most civilised. There was one thing certain:—if the Danish West India Islands were so dear to Denmark that it would be a wound to her national pride to suggest the sale of them to us, no such suggestion ought to be made by an American Minister. First, national pride is a precious thing to a nation, and the more precious when that nation has been great in power, and remains great in heart in spite of its apparently dwindling importance. It was necessary, then, to discover whether the Danes could, in deference to their natural desire to see their flag still floating in the Atlantic Ocean, retain the Islands, and rule them in accordance with their ideals. Their ideals were very high. They hoped that they could so govern them that the inhabitants of the Islands might be fairly prosperous and happy under their rule. They were not averse to expending large sums annually to make up the deficit occasioned by the possession of them. The Colonial Lottery was depended upon to assist in making up this budget. The Danes have no moral objections to lotteries, and the most important have governmental sanction.

Under the administrations of Presidents Roosevelt and Taft it was useless to attempt to reopen the question. All negotiations, since the first in 1865, had failed. That of 1902, and the accompanying scandals, the Danes preferred to forget. President Roosevelt's opinion as to the necessity of our possessing the Islands was well known. In 1902 the project for the sale had been defeated in the Danish Upper House by one vote. Mr. John Hay attributed this to German influence, though the Princess Marie, wife of Prince Valdemar, a remarkably clever woman, had much to do with it, and she could not be reasonably accused of being under German domination. The East-Asiatic Company was against the sale and likewise a great number of Danes whose association with the Islands had been traditional. Herr Ballin denied that the German opposition existed; he seemed to think that both France and England looked on the proposition coldly. At any rate, he said that Denmark gave no concessions to German maritime trade that the United States would not give, and that the property of the Hamburg-American Line would be quite as safe in the hands of the United States as in those of Denmark. In 1867 Denmark had declined to sell the Islands for $5,000,000, but offered to accept $10,000,000 for St. John and St. Thomas, or $15,000,000 for the three. Secretary Seward raised the price to $7,500,000 in gold for St. Thomas, St. John and Santa Cruz. Denmark was willing to accept $7,500,000 for St. Thomas and St. John; Santa Cruz, in which the French had some rights, might be had for $3,750,000 additional. Secretary Seward, after some delay, agreed to give $7,500,000 for the two islands, St. Thomas and St. John. The people of St. John and St. Thomas voted in favour of the cession. In 1902 $5,000,000 was offered by the United States. Diligent inquiries into the failure of the sale, although the Hon. Henry White, well and favourably known in Denmark, was sent over in its interest, received the answer from those who had been behind the scenes, '$5,000,000 was not enough, unaccompanied by a concession that might have deprived the transaction of a merely mercenary character.'