The narrative of the campaign in Herodotus is obviously intended to put Crœsus in the wrong, and burden him with guilt of his own in addition to the offence of his ancestor. Sandanis warns him in vain (p. 5). Cyrus has done nothing to injure Crœsus, and therefore Crœsus is the aggressor. He crosses the Halys, invades the territory of Cyrus, in order to conquer Cappadocia and avenge Astyages on Cyrus; he causes the land of the Cappadocians to be desolated; and Herodotus lays stress on the fact that this nation was quite innocent. Guilt is followed by incapacity, after the indecisive battle. Crœsus disbands his army for the singular reason that it "was inferior in numbers to that of Cyrus." He is then surprised in Sardis; the citadel is naturally ascended in the very place where in old days king Meles omitted to carry the lion which was to make the walls of Sardis impregnable, because he thought it unnecessary, the place being inaccessible. (I. 561). Crœsus is saved from instant death, because the deaf and dumb son receives his speech on a day of misfortune, as Delphi had announced. The son can not only speak, but knows how to address his father by name. The favour of the gods, who turn again to Crœsus when he has expiated the guilt of Gyges and himself by his overthrow, is shown in this miracle, and more plainly still on the funeral pyre. The wisdom of the Greeks, and of Solon, is set in the clearest light, when Crœsus in his deepest distress, on the brink of a terrible death, remembers the warning once given him by Solon. If such a recollection forms the most brilliant evidence of the insight of the Greeks, it might also give the motive for the rescue of Crœsus.
The occurrences on and at the pyre partake so strongly of the miraculous that Herodotus himself is puzzled. What reason could Cyrus, whose gentleness Herodotus himself extols, have for condemning Crœsus to a death by fire, and with him fourteen Lydian youths? Herodotus knows that fire is a god in the eyes of the Persians, and that corpses could not be burnt.[16] He says: "Cyrus either wished to offer first-fruits to some god, or to fulfil a vow, or to ascertain whether Apollo would assist the pious Crœsus." When narrating the astonishing incidents which took place on the pyre, he drops the positive tone, and continues the story with "the Lydians say." The pyre is already kindled when the question is asked by the interpreters, What is the meaning of the cry "Solon"? Crœsus is at first obstinately silent, then answers obscurely; and only after long pressure tells of his meeting with Solon, which could not be done very briefly if it was to be made intelligible to Cyrus, and the narrative had to be translated by the interpreters, as Herodotus himself relates. Then Cyrus is seized with remorse for the execution he has commanded, and the attempt is made to quench the pyre. Impossible as all this is, Crœsus at the last moment confesses that Solon is right, and Solon's deep insight moves the heart of the great sovereign of the Persians, and rescues the once prosperous but now fallen king.
In his minute account of the cremation, which, in his rhetorical manner, he connects with the recovery of speech by the deaf and dumb son, Nicolaus of Damascus felt difficulties like those in Herodotus. The law bidding the Persians not to pollute fire, nor to "burn the dead," is well known to him. He removes the contradiction by representing the cremation as taking place against the will of Cyrus, and remarks that after this incident the regulation was more strictly observed. In his story also the change is made by the mention of Solon's name. When Cyrus had ascertained what Solon had said to Crœsus, he began to weep, and saw that he had done wrong, and the pain of their king touches the heart of the Persians. This movement is assisted in Nicolaus by the sibyl of Ephesus; in which no doubt he follows the legend of Ephesus; Crœsus had made large presents to the temple of Artemis in that city (III. 451).
In Herodotus, as in Diodorus and Nicolaus, it is the rain, by which the pyre is quenched, which causes Cyrus to continue his gentle treatment of Crœsus. Moreover, the excellent advice, which Crœsus with immediate prudence gives, for putting an end to the plunder of Sardis, and other matters in Herodotus, in Diodorus, and Xenophon, co-operate in influencing Cyrus to hold such a wise man in respect. Xenophon knows, or at any rate says, nothing of the burning of Crœsus. Ctesias knows nothing of it: in his account miracles of another kind are vouchsafed to the imprisoned Crœsus by Apollo in his temple; the triple loosing of the bonds, and their final removal with thunder and lightning, determine Cyrus to set him at liberty and make provision for him.
Lastly, it was incumbent on Herodotus and the Greek narratives to justify the Delphian oracle with regard to the responses given to Crœsus. In Herodotus and Nicolaus this justification is introduced and pointed by the sending of the fetters, which Crœsus had worn, as the first-fruits of the promised victory to Delphi, and the question whether it was the manner of the Greek gods to deceive those who had done them kindness. Following, no doubt, the legend of the Delphic priesthood, Herodotus then gives the defence of the priestess, that Crœsus had not rightly understood the oracles,—though as we shall see, he had understood them correctly enough. The priestess further tells Crœsus, that he was destined to pay the penalty for the offence, which his ancestor Gyges had committed against Candaules, though the Delphic oracle had sanctioned this crime and carried it out. Then destiny has to bear the blame. No man can escape his doom; the god of Delphi had deferred the fall of Crœsus for three years, and saved him from the flames of the funeral pyre. The god of Delphi had thus announced the truth (to prove this Cyrus is made the son of a Median mother), and had shown his gratitude for the gifts of Crœsus by delaying his overthrow, and rescuing him from the flames, as Crœsus must himself confess. Xenophon dwells yet more on the justification. Crœsus had placed himself in the wrong with the god, by putting it to the test whether he could tell the truth; then he hopes that he has appeased him by rich presents, but he misunderstands the further response of the god, "that he will be happy when he knows himself," for in descent, bravery, and generalship he holds himself the equal of Cyrus. In Herodotus and Nicolaus the gift of speech to the deaf and dumb son, the quenching of the pyre,—in Herodotus also the delay of destiny, and in Ctesias, the miraculous loosing of the fetters,—are proofs that the dedicatory gifts of Crœsus and his piety had not been in vain. They could not avert his doom, but they had alleviated it; the god of the Greeks, whom he serves, has at the last saved him from the most cruel fate, and brought it about that Crœsus ends his days, if not as a ruler, yet in peace and dignity.
In spite of all the national and individual points of view which mark Herodotus' account of the fall of Crœsus, and the legends which he has woven into it, and used for his own purposes—the fanciful colours which stamp it as fabulous—it nevertheless contains a nucleus of historical truth, and we can give it a place before the rest as a narrative of facts. We have seen above how suddenly the successful rebellion of Cyrus put an end to the close relations between Babylonia, Lydia, and Media; how Lydia was touched by this change, how clearly the intervention of Lydia was needed, and what reasons could induce Crœsus to defer it. Crœsus was obviously brought to abandon his delay by the successes which Cyrus achieved in establishing his dominion over the Medes, and extending it to North and South, but above all by his conquests in the West and the advance of the Persian border to the Halys. Herodotus' account shows us very clearly that Cappadocia had become subject to Cyrus. When, on a previous occasion, the Medes reached the Halys, Alyattes, the father of Crœsus, had taken up arms; was he to fall short of this example, in the presence of a power which had grown up more rapidly and threatened greater danger than the Medes? As Herodotus told us, it was his intention to attack Cyrus before he became too powerful. We may conclude with certainty from what Herodotus relates, that Crœsus did not hide from himself the importance and difficulty of the undertaking. Above all he sought to win the favour of Sandon the national deity (I. 564). The Lydians offered large burnt-sacrifices to this deity, their sun-god; on a huge pyre they burnt numerous victims, gold and silver vessels, and costly robes in his honour. Herodotus tells us that Crœsus bade the Lydians sacrifice from their own stores on that occasion; hence the great sacrifice, the gold of which Crœsus dedicated to the god of Miletus and Delphi, was a national offering, which Crœsus presented to Sandon. We have already shown that the Greeks recognised in the sun-god of the Lydians their own Apollo and Hercules, while the Lydians found their solar deity in the Apollo of the Greeks. When Gyges undertook to overthrow the old royal family which claimed to spring from this sun-god, and could not succeed in his attempt, an answer was sought from the sun-god of Delphi. The god of the Greeks then dethroned the descendants of the Lydian deity. In the year 556 B.C.[17] Crœsus had already sent to Delphi, and given dedicatory offerings to the god of Delphi and to the Ismenian Apollo at Thebes; and at the present time, when he had resolved to enter on a severe struggle for his throne and kingdom, he called to mind the god, to whose oracle his house owed its position; he would now receive by his favour both kingdom and crown. So Apollo of Miletus and Delphi received silver and gold which had been consecrated by the fire. The bricks into which it was formed were intended to bear the lion which was also fashioned out of the same gold—the symbol of the burning sun, the image of the Lydian god. The four golden bricks formed the uppermost steps. The total amount of the gold dedicated at Delphi and Miletus reached 270 talents. For the presents at Miletus Crœsus used the property of Sadyattes, which he had confiscated at the beginning of his reign, dedicated, and applied as an offering.[18] When Crœsus sent the gifts to Delphi, he inquired of the oracle, as Gyges had previously done. At this time—about 140 years before Crœsus—the question had been who was to ascend the throne of Lydia; now the question was, whether the descendant of Gyges would maintain it in the conflict against Persia. The answer of the priestess, which Aristotle and Diodorus have preserved in metre,[19]—"That Crœsus by crossing the Halys would destroy a great kingdom"—is genuine, and was certainly given in the meaning that Crœsus should undertake the war and would destroy the kingdom of his opponent. The object of Crœsus in asking the question was to know whether he would be fortunate in his attack on Persia. If it was the object of the priesthood to give a dubious answer to this question, they could not possibly have answered the further question—whether he should take allies to help him,—with the command that he must take the "most powerful of the Hellenes." At that time the Spartans were beyond all question the most powerful of the Hellenes. How could the priests of Delphi, who owing to the close connection in which they stood to Sparta were well aware that the oracle would be a law to that state, send the Spartans to defeat and destruction, if they foresaw such a thing?[20] That at Delphi, owing to the impression made on the Greeks by the power, greatness, and splendour of the Lydian empire, the remote and unknown Persians were underrated is quite probable, and indeed sufficiently proved by the subsequent embassy of the Spartans to Cyrus. The first response did not entirely remove the doubts of Crœsus, so he asked a second time—"whether his dominion would continue long," and this question received a thoroughly satisfactory answer, i. e. an answer which, in the obscure form purposely adopted by oracles, deferred the defeat of the Lydians to distant times, and impossible conditions.
Crœsus had not waited for the oracle to provide himself with sufficient support in his undertaking. Yet it suited him to enter into negotiations with the Spartans, who after a series of successful contests against the Pisatae, Argos, and some cantons of Arcadia, had obtained the foremost place in the Peloponnesus. At an earlier time Crœsus had sent the Spartans a considerable present for the erection of a statue of Apollo, and their grateful feeling towards him would certainly be strengthened by the authority of the Delphian oracle, whose response was known to the Spartans, as Herodotus expressly states (p. 9). Even in Xenophon's account they declared themselves ready to send auxiliary troops to Sardis.[21] Crœsus did not stop here: he sent Eurybatus to obtain yet more troops in Hellas. Herodotus told us that Crœsus was in league with Egypt and Babylonia against Persia before he made the treaty with Sparta. Amasis, king of Egypt, had determined to support Crœsus, perhaps in return for the service which Gyges had once rendered to Psammetichus, when he sent soldiers to aid him against his fellow-princes, the vassals of Assyria (III. 301). The attitude of Babylonia must be decisive. If Lydia and Babylonia, who were both equally threatened by the new power, united in a firm military alliance, they might hope to contend successfully with the prince of the Persians. At Babylon, after the accession of Nabonetus in the year 555 B.C., the royal power was again in strong hands. According to Herodotus, there was a league between Crœsus and Nabonetus against Persia. Xenophon represents Crœsus as coming to the aid of the king of Babylon. Justin states that Cyrus was at war with Babylon when Crœsus attacked him; Cyrus drove him back, came to terms with Babylonia, and carried the war to Lydia. From all this we may assume that Lydia and Babylonia were united, and that they undertook the war against Persia in common.
Crœsus then might consider that careful preparations had been made for his enterprise, when in the year 549 B.C., and as we may pre-suppose with certainty, in the spring of the year, he took the field.[22] He crossed the Halys, and directed his course to the commanding plateau of Pteria, which Herodotus rightly regards as the strongest position in those regions. He took Pteria, and the neighbouring cities, and laid waste the land, with the view no doubt of making it impossible for the Persian army to support itself. There he remained, either because he shrank from going further, and seeking a decisive conflict at a distance from his own borders, or because he expected a diversion on the part of the Babylonians.
The attack of Crœsus was unexpected by Cyrus. He was also engaged with another enemy. These conclusions we may draw from the fact that it was autumn according to Herodotus before the armies stood opposite each other. Herodotus further remarks that Babylon, the Bactrians, and the Sacæ caused Cyrus to return out of Asia Minor.[23] By lingering in Cappadocia Crœsus had given Cyrus time to collect his army and add to it the troops of the countries through which he passed on his march to the West. With his usual circumspection he sought to avail himself of the weak points in his enemy. He sent ambassadors to the Greek cities subject to Crœsus, on the West coast, to urge them to revolt that he might raise up enemies in the rear of the Lydians. Crœsus awaited the attack of the Persians in the neighbourhood of the conquered Pteria. Herodotus tells that the contest was severe. In spite of the considerable superiority of numbers on the Persian side, the Lydians did not give way. The battle was not decided, when night came on. In truth the victory was with the Lydians, whose bravery made such an impression on Cyrus that he would not renew the battle. But the timidity of Crœsus put in his hands all the advantages of a victory. After the bloody day it seemed better to Crœsus, as is the case with men of weaker mould, not to risk everything, but to put off the final decision; he thought it safer to retire, in order to strengthen his army and so fight with equal numbers. Under the supposition that Cyrus would not venture to advance "as the winter was at the gate," he retired to Lydia. He intended to use the winter for collecting the forces of his confederates at Sardis. He requested Nabonetus of Babylon, the Lacedæmonians and the Pharaoh, to embark their forces on the Syrian coast, the Laconian Gulf, and at the mouths of the Nile, in time for them to reach Sardis in the fifth month, i. e. in the early spring. To the want of resolution which had suggested the thought of retreat, Crœsus, when returning, added another great act of folly. He disbanded "the mercenaries" of his army (Alyattes had made use of hired soldiers), bidding them come again to Sardis in the spring, and returned home with the Lydians alone. Such a series of blunders could not go unpunished in the presence of a general like Cyrus. In no case could he remain in the devastated country of the Cappadocians. He must go either forwards or backwards. To choose the latter was voluntarily to abandon the advantages which the retreat of Crœsus offered. Yet he did not content himself with slowly following the unexpected retreat of the Lydians. He appears to have been informed of the plans of Crœsus by Eurybatus of Ephesus, whose treason is not only mentioned by Diodorus after Ephorus, but alluded to by Plato, Demosthenes, and Aeschines.[24] By a rapid march upon the enemy's metropolis Cyrus intended to cripple the Lydian forces, hit Crœsus in the very centre of his power, and bring the war to an end at a blow. He came so quickly, that, as Herodotus says, he announced his own arrival. The sudden appearance of the Persian army in the neighbourhood of Sardis completely startled and terrified Crœsus. He retired in order to be able to place in the field a number of warriors equal to the army of Cyrus, and now he was compelled to shut himself up in the walls of Sardis or fight with far smaller numbers than took the field at Pteria. He chose the latter, and awaited the attack on the plain of the Hermus, which was large enough to provide a field for his excellent cavalry.
Though he had a great advantage in his forces, and in the consciousness of his superiority to his enemy, Cyrus omitted no means for securing the victory. He had experienced at Pteria the attack of the Lydian horse, their superiority to his own cavalry, in spite of the practice in riding which the Persians underwent from their youth up, and the excellence of the Median horse. To render useless the attack of these horsemen, Cyrus caused the camels which carried the baggage and supplies of his army to be mounted, and placed them in the first line. This arrangement is mentioned not only by Herodotus but also by Xenophon. No doubt the Lydian horse would be frightened by the noise and unwonted aspect of these animals. Though robbed of their best arm and mode of fighting, the Lydians nevertheless resolved to dismount and carry on the battle on foot. They pressed courageously on the Persians, and could only be driven into the gates of Sardis after a bloody battle. Crœsus was now limited to the walls of his city, and compelled to defend them. He hoped to be able to hold the city till his confederates should come, to whom on the approach of Cyrus he had sent with appeals for immediate assistance. But on the fourteenth day after the investment of the city, as Herodotus maintains, Cyrus brought matters to a decision. Then the Mardian climbed the steep rock on the Pactolus, on which the citadel lay, at a place where no guard was set, the citadel and city were taken, and Crœsus became a prisoner. A picture at Pompeii exhibits Cyrus before his tent, and Harpagus beside him, at the moment when Crœsus is brought forward.