[26] Raoul Rochette, "Mémoires de l'institut," 17, 2, p. 278 ff.
[27] Herod. 1, 87.
[28] Büdinger objects to this view that the Lydian tradition, which would be favourable to Crœsus, could not possibly convert the merit of such a sacrifice into an execution. Whether the tradition of the Lydians was favourable or not to Crœsus is not handed down; that the Greeks were favourable to him we know for certain. It is the tradition of the Greek cities—favourable to Crœsus and unfavourable to Cyrus—which we have in the account of Herodotus. The rescue of Crœsus and the wisdom of Solon were the points of view given in the Greek tradition and guiding it. If Nicolaus of Damascus has used Xanthus, and his account rests on a combination of the Greek and Lydian tradition—it is precisely in his account that the sacrifice, and the prevention of it by rain, comes out more clearly than in Herodotus.
[29] Steph. Byzant. Βαρήνη. The Barce of Justin (1, 7) must be the same city. [Barene in Jeep's ed.] Ptolem. 6, 2, 8; "Vend." 1, 68.
CHAPTER VII.
THE SUBJUGATION OF ASIA MINOR.
However unexpected the attack of the Lydians had been by the ruler of the Medes and Persians, however inconvenient the war with them, he had brought it to a rapid and prosperous decision. Though he had entertained no thought of conquests in the distant West before Crœsus took up arms against him, he resolved to maintain the advantage which the war had brought him to such a surprising extent. Great as was the distance between Sardis and Pasargadae, Lydia was to be embodied in his empire, and the Ægean was to form its western boundary. His army took up winter quarters in Lydia; from Sardis he arranged in person the new government of the land, and the fate of the nations which had been subject to the Lydians. We do not know whether the Phrygians, Bithynians, and Paphlagonians submitted to the change of dominion without resistance. Æschylus represents Cyrus as subjugating Phrygia. According to Xenophon, Phrygia was reduced by Cyrus as he returned from Sardis; the Paphlagonians submitted voluntarily, like the Cilicians; this was the reason why no satraps were sent there, yet the fortresses were occupied with Persian garrisons, and the Paphlagonians and Cilicians had to pay tribute and perform service in war.[30] Cilicia had not been subject to the Lydians; ever since the irruption of the Scyths had broken the cohesion of the Assyrian power, her princes were independent, though they had paid tribute to Assurbanipal (III. 166, 178), They bore the standing title of Syennesis. More than sixty years previously Nabopolassar of Babylon and Syennesis of Cilicia had brought about peace and alliance between Cyaxares of Media and Alyattes of Lydia (V. 295). That Cilicia now voluntarily submitted to Cyrus, if it had not done so previously, can be concluded with certainty from the fact that we subsequently find kings named Syennesis at the head of Cilicia, who are bound to pay tribute to the Persian empire and render service in war.[31]
Cyrus met more vigorous resistance in the west of Asia Minor. The Lycians, who maintained their independence against the Lydians in their mountains to the south, were not inclined to submit to the Persians, nor were their neighbours in the south-west, the Carians. The cities of the Greeks, who possessed the entire western coast, hesitated which course to take. After their ancestors had set foot on this coast, 400 years previously, they had succeeded in maintaining their ground for a century and a half against the rising power of the Lydians under the Mermnads; indeed it was during this period that they had extended their trade and colonisation, and risen to be a second naval power beside the Phenicians,—the centre of a commerce, which on the one hand included the Black Sea and the Maeotis, and on the other almost all the Mediterranean—which included in its empire Cyprus and Sicily and Corsica, Egypt and the mouths of the Po and Rhone, and even extended to the banks of the Bætis. Along with the trade and wealth of these cities, poetry had burst into a new bloom, plastic art and architecture were eagerly cultivated, the foundations were laid for Greek science, natural history, geography, history, and philosophy. Life was pleasant and luxurious; no doubt the morals of the Lydians had found their way into the cities, but the old vigour still remained in the inhabitants by sea and land. At last they had succumbed to Crœsus, not because they did not know how to fight, but because they had not followed the advice of Thales of Miletus, who urged them to carry on the war in common, and place at their head a council with dictatorial powers (III. 450). But the supremacy of Crœsus, to which they did not submit for much more than a decade, had not been of an oppressive character. It had left the cities unchanged in their internal trade, and in fact had increased rather than destroyed it. Crœsus had contented himself with yearly tributes from the cities, and we have seen to what a large extent Greek art and manners found protection, favour, and advancement at the court of Crœsus. Now these cities suddenly found themselves in the presence of a power of which they had hardly heard the name, and which had prostrated with a mighty blow the kingdom of Crœsus. As they were not pledged to provide soldiers for the king of the Lydians, they had looked on in irresolute neutrality during the war. And they had paid no heed to the request of Cyrus that they would join his side. Previously it might have been to their interest to weaken the power of Lydia, in order to regain their full independence, but when Cyrus marched upon Sardis it became much more imperative to prevent a stronger power from taking the place of the Lydians. A diversion on the part of the Greek cities when Cyrus was besieging Sardis, would have delayed the fate of the city, and might have rendered possible the arrival of the allies. But they had done nothing, and now found themselves alone in the presence of the conqueror. Their danger prompted them to offer submission to the king of the Persians on the same terms as those on which they had served Crœsus. Cyrus rejected the offer which the ambassadors of the Ionian and Aeolian cities brought to Sardis. Mere recognition of his supremacy and payment of tribute he did not consider sufficient to secure the obedience of cities so remote, and he was strong enough to insist on a more dependent relation without great efforts. But ever cautious and provident, he took means to separate the cities. To Miletus, the strongest, he offered a continuance of the relations in which she had stood to Lydia. When Miletus, "from fear," as Herodotus remarks, accepted these conditions, Cyrus had already won the victory. The cities were divided, robbed of their strongest power and natural head.
Conscious that their submission on the conditions proposed had been refused, the cities of the Ionian tribe took counsel at their old common place of sacrifice on the shore of the sea, opposite Samos, under Mount Mycale. Miletus, it is true, was absent; but among the Ionians there was far too much pride, far too great a sense of freedom, to offer unconditional submission to Cyrus. The defection of Miletus seemed to be compensated when ambassadors of the cities of the Aeolian tribe appeared on the same day as the Ionians, which had never occurred before, and declared their common resolution "to follow the Ionians wherever they led."[32] It was resolved to fortify the cities, to make a resistance to the Persians, and for this object to call as quickly as possible on the mother country for help. A common embassy of the Ionian and Aeolian cities went to Sparta, in order to ask aid of the Dorians there, the leading state in the peninsula. But in vain did Pythermus of Phocaea, the mouthpiece of the embassy, put on his purple robe in order to manifest the importance and wealth of the cities, when the ephors introduced the legation before the common assembly. Though the Spartans at that time were at the height of their power, and had promised help to Crœsus, though the ships had been equipped and the contingent was ready to embark when the news came of the capture of Sardis, Sparta now refused to send aid, regardless of the fate of her countrymen. She merely resolved to despatch ambassadors to Cyrus with the request that he would leave the Greek cities in peace. A ship of fifty oars carried the embassy to Asia, with the real object, as Herodotus supposes, of ascertaining the position of affairs in Ionia and with Cyrus. It landed at Phocaea. Lacrines, the spokesman of the ambassadors, found Cyrus in Sardis, and there warned him in Sparta's name, "to do no harm to any Hellenic city, for Sparta would not allow such conduct to go unpunished." Without the support of an army this warning was an empty and foolish threat, which Cyrus treated as it deserved.[33]