In one other respect the seizure of these sums may have seemed an act of arbitrary tyranny. The sum seized at Apamea was said to be one hundred pounds of gold—about 72 English pounds—and must have equaled about 75,000 Roman denarii or Athenian drachms. As the temple tax was a didrachm, that would imply over 35,000 heads of families, or a total Jewish population for Apamea of 170,000. That number is quite impossible. It is, however, very likely that the Jews of the various synagogae paid their didrachm with their other dues to the corporation arca, or treasury, and that it was the whole treasury that was seized. That would give the Jews of these cities a very real grievance, and make their animus against Flaccus easy to explain.
The importance of the passage, however, is in no way concerned with the justice or injustice of the accusation against Flaccus. It lies first in its picture of the Jewish community at Rome, and secondly in its indication of Cicero’s personal views.
The very insertion of the charge proves that a considerable Jewish element existed, whose aid the prosecution was anxious to enlist. Cicero’s own statements show this directly. Here and here only in his speech he refers to the popular odium sought to be incited against his client, and speaks of the number and power of the Jews in contionibus,[[240]] “in the political meetings,” and in the crowd about him. Part of this, the summissa voce, “low tone,” for example, is the veriest acting. Cicero was really not afraid to say loudly what he wished to say, and if the jury could hear him, part of the crowd could hear as well. But although the Roman Jews were probably not so redoubtable as Cicero would have his jury believe, they must have formed a large contingent. Where did they come from?
We have the statement of Philo that it was not until the capture of Jerusalem by Pompey in 63 B.C.E. that Jews were brought to Rome in large numbers.[[241]] These, it is supposed, were enfranchised shortly after, and are the people here referred to. That may be said to be the general view.
There are, however, serious difficulties in it that escape those who hold it, simply because they fail to follow in detail the implications of their view. Pompey did not arrive in Rome till January, 61 B.C.E. His army had been previously dismissed, but was to assemble for the great triumph that took place in September, 61. The trial of Flaccus was held in August, 59 B.C.E. Some months must have been spent in preparing the case against him. Accordingly we are to suppose that thousands of Jewish captives were brought to Rome, sold there, enfranchised, learned Latin, became politically organized, and developed formidable voting strength, all within less than two years! The mere question of language makes the hypothesis impossible. Pompey’s captives were Palestinian Jews, of most of whom the native language was Aramaic, not Greek.[[242]] Without command of Greek or Latin the ready acquisition of either was nothing short of miraculous, and the immediate political activity is only less so.
But the chief difficulty lies in another matter. The phrase “taken prisoners” immediately suggests the conditions of modern warfare, in which whole armies are surrendered and transferred in bulk great distances for safe-keeping. It is to be feared that some such idea was suggested to modern writers by the words of Philo. But that is not at all what occurred in ancient times. Prisoners taken on the field of battle were sold immediately at the nearest market. Slave-dealers followed the army. Caesar’s account of his campaign in Gaul affords numerous instances of this immediate disposal of captured foes; e.g. the case of the Atuatuci and Veneti.[[243]] If they were assigned as loot to individual soldiers, they were disposed of in the same way. Here and there a soldier would, for one reason or another, retain his prisoner as a personal slave, but in general he had almost no facilities for providing or caring for a number of them. A few of the distinguished captives were reserved by the commander for a triumph.
Now Pompey’s army had just finished a five years’ campaign. It had marched through Asia and Syria, winning battles that were not very bloody, but must have been immensely lucrative. The Jews formed only a small portion of the total prisoners taken. If all those prisoners actually accompanied their captors to Rome, the question of transportation and provision for such a horde must have been tremendous. What could have induced a general or private to assume this enormous expense and care, when the greatest slave-market in the world, viz. that at Alexandria, was relatively near by, is inconceivable. If they got to Rome, the city’s population must have swelled visibly under the process. There is no record that it did, and it could scarcely have escaped notice, had such a thing taken place.
And finally, even if we assume that such a wholly unprecedented and inexplicable incident occurred, how are we to explain the immediate and wholesale enfranchisement of so large a number? Ransom by wealthy coreligionists at Rome is excluded by the hypothesis. Similar action by Jews outside the city would demand a much longer time. The reasons generally assigned are based upon the assumed uselessness of Jewish slaves for ordinary purposes because of their dietary laws and religious intransigeance. But that is a purely dogmatic assertion. Papyri and inscriptions have shown that in spite of a bitter racial opposition and perhaps economic strife as well, Jew and non-Jew could live quite peaceably together. The dietary laws would not render his master’s meals obnoxious to a Jewish slave, because he did not eat at his master’s table, and might consume his scanty vegetable food where and how he pleased. If a master actually chose to force attendance at the sacrifice, the compulsion of necessity would have been a valid excuse for all but those of martyr stuff, and we cannot suppose that every Jewish soldier had in him the zeal of a martyr. Besides, for such compulsion the slave would in no sense be responsible, and it is with disadvantages moving from him that we are concerned.
It is simply impossible to imagine what could have induced Pompey’s soldiers or those who purchased from them to enfranchise immediately slaves transported from such a distance and at such expense.
Philo’s statement is at best a conjecture, made without any better acquaintance with the facts than we ourselves possess, and contradicted by the necessary inference from Cicero’s words.