But shall we on this account blame the judges in the case? Assuredly not; they have but done their necessary duty in interpretation. Shall we say the court was not competent, or the decision not binding, or in any way attempt to resist its legal effect? Assuredly not; or we overthrow all principles of law and order. Nevertheless shall we say that this judgment convicts of cruelty or double dealing the framers of the measure, or the parliament which passed it? Assuredly not; because it is much easier; much more accordant with common sense and experience; much more agreeable to charity and reason, to believe that the subtleties of language introduced an unintentional ambiguity, which the judge’s eye was obliged to search out and judicially recognize, than to believe that Mr. Fielden, or Lord Ashley, or even parliament at large, when they professed to relieve young persons working in factories, intended to “palter with them in a double sense and keep the word of promise to the ear but break it to the hope.”
Does any one then, I ask again, now feel justified in charging those parties with cruelty, whose bill is nevertheless found capable of a cruel working. Do we charge them with the intention of such ambiguity, and such consequences, though they are found both to exist in the act of parliament? Do we infer the animus from the wording, and say that such as the bill is practically, such must have been the intention of its framers?
The application is so obvious, I fear to be tedious in drawing it out ever so briefly. But, for Parliament read, Church; for The Ten Hour Factory Bill, read The Formularies bearing upon Baptism; for Doubledealing and Cruelty read False Doctrine and Heresy: and if in both cases, there be an ambiguity, and yet we charge no such double-dealing or cruelty on the one, as believing no such animus existed, or need be suspected in the parties who framed the one document, may we not equally acquit of false doctrine or heresy those who drew up the others because, though these may perchance be latent in the wording of them, no such animus is shown, or need be suspected in their authors: i.e. the Church which has sanctioned and used them.
There is another point in this analogy which will carry us a step further, and in a most practical direction.
If the legislature now, knowing all these circumstances, and having the power to correct the error, if so it regard that to which the ambiguous or careless wording of the Act of Parliament has led, yet take no measure for correcting it, and for re-asserting the humane principle which we are told it was intended to embody, this conduct will surely commit parliament now to the adoption of the bill as last interpreted. It would be too much to say even so, that it would convict the framers of the measure some four or five years ago, or the then parliament of either fraud or cruelty: but it might well fasten those charges upon the present parliament if they believe the act was intended to work otherwise but will not restore it to its efficiency. And so now, in our parallel case. If the Church of this our day, knowing all the circumstances of such an interpretation as we have been supposing in the matter of baptismal regeneration, do not use the powers she may have to correct the ambiguity which permits heresy to be lodged within her, she will acquiesce in and adopt that heresy as her own. It would indeed here again be too much to say that such conduct now would prove there had been a double-mind; an intended ambiguity for an heretical purpose in those who drew up our formularies; for they might still have no more intended heresy, than Lord Ashley and the late Mr. Fielden cruelty to the factory children. But this, however it might clear the respective characters of men of another day, would be nothing at all as to establishing a claim to soundness now, or preserving the Church of England as a living branch of the Church of Christ. If we now adopt the heretical interpretation: if we now knowingly and wilfully continue the ambiguity; if we do not strive to remove the blot on the face of the Spouse of Christ; we shall be answerable as a body for the heresy, and must take the consequences both here and hereafter.
What then is the practical thing to be done in this exigence, supposing the decision now about to be given to be one admitting heresy?
No doubt there is much difference between our case here, and that in the analogy we have been using. The State can, beyond all question, take up its doubtful matter, and re-word it, in another meaning, too plain to be denied. The Church (among us) alas! has no freedom of speech: no direct power of action; no immediate method by which to correct the ambiguity.
But nevertheless she must do all she can, according to the means she has, or she will not be clear in this matter; and the most evident of all the steps for her to take is at once, and in earnest, and with her whole heart, to petition the throne to be permitted to meet in convocation to take these points into practical consideration. If she do all she can, she will not be to be judged, that she can do no more; but at any rate, I think any one of us may, nay every one of us should, suspend our judgment as to her being committed to heresy until we see what it is she will do.
Having gone thus far in considering our position and duties, I will venture a little further, (I trust without presumption offering it merely as a suggestion,) to state what appears to me, the first actual step to be taken.
Though as a Church we cannot meet in synod until called together by the Crown, yet as Englishmen, as mere subjects of the empire we may meet and petition the throne that convocation may be licensed to deliberate upon the momentous questions which now affect the Church. As soon then as conveniently may be after the decision of the Privy Council shall be given, (and I may as well say here, that it appears to me to make very little practical difference as to the necessity of such a step, whatever that decision may be:) as soon then as conveniently may be after, a meeting should be called in London of all persons clerical and lay alike, who desire to see a freer action of the Church, for this one specific purpose to address the throne praying her Majesty graciously to concede to the troubled hearts and perplexed consciences of so many of her subjects, that convocation may be summoned for dispatch of business. The day should be carefully chosen: that it be not too soon nor too late: not too soon for it to be thoroughly and widely known, and for all who may be anxious to be present to make their arrangements accordingly; not too late, so as to beget any suspicion of lukewarmness. The Archbishop of Canterbury or the Bishop of London, should unquestionably with all duty and reverence be asked to preside; and all our Right Reverend Fathers in God, be requested to give us their help and blessing in this endeavour. All Churchmen who feel in these dangerous days it would be a great comfort and advantage to hear the Church’s voice distinctly indicating the course to be pursued, within any reasonable reach of that gathering, ay, and beyond it, would, it is to be hoped, attend. No extraneous matter should be gone into, and if possible the speaking, (at least so it appears to me,) should be but brief, allowing, if it may be, several hours afterwards for the sole purpose of those actually present to sign the address before leaving the room. I cannot doubt myself that the largest room in London would be insufficient for the numbers who would make a point of coming, and each man as he went away might say, with a heart of thankfulness, “Liberavi animam meam,” and “God defend the Right.”