[12] Those opposite the Ninth Division belonged to the One hundred and seventeenth Division.
[13] Under the circumstances there could be nothing stronger than “belief”; it was impossible to go to the German lines to find out how many had been killed or wounded.
[14] The wire was fairly well cut by the 18-pounders wherever it was possible to observe it, but the stretch opposite the front of the 28th Brigade was invisible from any point on our side. It was, therefore, the more essential that the result of the artillery-fire in this part should have been ascertained by patrols.
[15] Brig.-General Bruce sent back by the machine-gun officer of his brigade an important account of the situation to Brig.-General Ritchie.
[16] In the course of the battle the Germans brought up the 2nd Guards Reserve Division, the 10th Bavarian Regiment, and a battalion of the 123rd Division.
[17] There is a good deal of obscurity as to what actually happened, but as the front of the Quarries had been wired by the sappers of the Seventh Division, and as troops of the Seventh Division were still holding out in the east of the Quarries when the western portions were in the hands of the enemy, it is certain that the Germans could have effected a lodgment only from the rear.
[18] The gallant record of the Twenty-fourth Division in the war after the Battle of Loos is a sufficient proof, if any were needed, that the failure of the 73rd Brigade at Loos was entirely due to inexperience.
[19] The machine-gun team never yielded a yard; the gun was destroyed by shell-fire, and all the members of the team were killed or wounded.
[20] Five officers and 168 other ranks were captured by the Division.
[21] Two German guns were left near the cottages at the Fosse. After dark on the 26th B/50 Battery took two limbers up to the cottages and brought back one of the guns; the other could not be found.