These parties were organised in groups of thirty-six men for every twelve cylinders, and each group was commanded by an officer. The work was unpopular as well as arduous, for the men had little liking for gas and none cared to handle anything connected with it. The cylinders had to be carried for more than 2000 yards up long and winding communication trenches, and when the weather was wet the heavy burden of the men was aggravated by the difficulty of maintaining their balance on the slippery duckboards. Occasionally shelled areas had to be traversed, an anxious period for any party with cylinders. To ease the work as far as possible, the communication trenches up which the men had to travel were marked by white arrows, and kept clear of unnecessary traffic. Fortunately the weather was favourable. If it had been otherwise, this weight could scarcely have been managed by three men. Altogether 4000 men were employed in the transference of 1200 cylinders. When these were fixed in their emplacements the infantry had no further responsibility concerning them, for they were then under the care of the Special Gas Company, R.E., which was to discharge the gas on the day of the assault.
In addition to the cylinders, each emplacement had four triple and eight single smoke-candles. These were to be lit by the infantry, and used alternatively with the gas, so that the period of discharge for smoke and gas would extend to forty minutes, as it was known that the enemy had, as a protection against gas, oxygen cylinders which lasted for only thirty minutes. Two minutes before the infantry left the front line, all gas was to be turned off and the smoke thickened by means of triple candles to form a screen behind which the infantry could form up and advance.
One Field Company, R.E., and one company of the 9th Seaforths (Pioneers) were attached to each brigade for the rapid consolidation of captured positions, and the digging of new communication trenches. Thus, the 90th Field Company, R.E. and “B” Company, 9th Seaforth Highlanders, were attached to the 26th Brigade, the 63rd R.E. and “D” Company, 9th Seaforth Highlanders, to the 28th, and the 64th R.E. and “C” Company, 9th Seaforth Highlanders, to the 27th. Supplies of ammunition, stores, and tools were placed at intervals along the whole front and, as far as possible, these dumps were made at the junction of the “up traffic” communication trenches, and the support line. As the bomb was to be the principal weapon of the infantry after the first stages of the attack, numbers of special bomb depots were formed. In addition to S.A.A., picks and shovels, water, medical stores, and rations were placed in the forward dumps.
Medical Aid Posts were arranged at convenient points. In order to effect the evacuation of the wounded from the forward areas with the utmost speed, each brigade dug one communication trench for wounded only. These trenches were wider than the usual communication trench, the corners being rounded off, so that stretchers could be carried with comparatively little inconvenience. A loop was made leading off them, about 2000 yards in rear, and in each loop was a dressing-station in a dug-out about the size of an ordinary room. Serious cases were to be brought round the loop, dressed, and then passed out at the farther end into the communication trench. Walking cases were expected to go straight on without passing through the loop.
The maintenance of communication was a most important matter, and every conceivable means, ranging from the pigeon to the human being, was to be used. The ordinary connection by telephone was to be established as far as possible, and visual stations, from which messages could be transmitted by flag or lamp, were to be set up as well as pigeon stations. Between the battalion commander and his company commanders the medium was the runner, the most reliable of all means of communication. The Division had one wireless set, which was worked by four men, and this was attached to the 26th Brigade H.Q.
The question of the men’s equipment for battle was important. A heavy weight would retard progress and exhaust their strength, yet it was necessary to supply them with sufficient material to consolidate their gains and to enable them to beat off enemy counter-attacks. Accordingly packs were dumped, the men going into action with haversacks only, and each one carrying two empty sand-bags, and all, except bombers, signallers, and runners, were to be supplied with 200 rounds of ammunition. Owing to the use of gas, the men on the morning of the attack were to wear their gas helmets like a cap.
All these preparations were satisfactorily accomplished by the evening of the 24th September. During this period of strain, the health of Major-General Landon broke down, and on the 8th September he returned to England and was succeeded by Major-General G. H. Thesiger, C.B., C.M.G. The G.S.O.I. was Lieut.-Col. S. E. Hollond, who joined the Division at the beginning of September, and the A.A. and Q.M.G. was Lieut.-Col. A. A. M’Hardy.
CHAPTER III
BATTLE OF LOOS[11]
25th to 28th September 1915
The terrain, which was the scene of the Division’s first battle, included the feature of greatest tactical importance on the front of the British attack. The general advantage of ground and observation was held by the enemy. East of Vermelles a railway, which ran north-east to join up with the railway connecting Bethune and La Bassée, screened the country west of it from German observation, except from their highest posts at Fosse 8 and the Tower Bridge at Loos, which overlooked the British lines except right down in the Vermelles valley. East of the railway the country was very open and the only trees were those that fringed the Hulluch road; the whole country bore a close resemblance to Salisbury Plain, or the moors of Linlithgow, with mine-heads and slag-heaps dotted about. East of Vermelles, the country ran nearly flat to a slight but important crest, then falling to a shallow dip where the trenches faced each other, rose again through the German trenches to another crest about 700 yards west of Cité St Elie. This crest concealed the second line of the enemy from ground observation.