The history of the 9th (Scottish) Division, 1914-1919

by M.C. John Ewing

Farther west and to the left rear of the Gordons, the Black Watch and the Seaforths made an attempt to advance towards Pekin Alley, but a German battery, situated about 1000 yards east of the Cabarets, and flanked by machine-guns, inflicted considerable casualties and pinned the men down to their trenches. This ill-starred effort cost the Seaforths their leader, Lieut.-Colonel Gaisford being killed. The situation of the 26th Brigade was not a happy one. It was clear, as the ordeal of the Camerons and Black Watch had foreboded, that the attack of the 28th Brigade had failed. It was necessary to consolidate the line in front of Fosse 8, and to safeguard the left flank; but under the continuous and accurate shell-fire of the enemy, it was practically impossible to accomplish any work. The trenches were in an appalling mess, having been terribly smashed by our artillery; Corons Alley was particularly bad, since the enemy had flooded it before retiring. About 9.30 A.M. the brigade received some welcome artillery support, when the battery commanded by Major C. W. W. McLean moved into position south-west of the Fosse and opened fire on the Cemetery, Cemetery Alley, and Lone Farm in turn.

At 9 A.M. the position of the 26th Brigade was as follows: the Seaforths, Black Watch, and Camerons held the trenches east of Fosse 8 from Fosse Alley to the north end of the Corons de Pekin, and to guard the left flank, a small party was posted at the Railway crossing. Additional protection was afforded by the machine-guns of the Camerons, which were posted at Little Willie, and commanded the ground on the left of the brigade. The enemy was in strength in Pekin Alley, Cemetery Alley, Lone Farm, and Madagascar Trench. About 600 yards to the right front, the remnants of the Gordons and some Black Watch were established in Pekin Trench, not far from Haisnes. Unsupported on either flank, and exposed to a murderous fire, the position of this garrison was most precarious, and could only be maintained with the help of the 27th Brigade.

On the evening of the 24th September, the battalions of the 27th Brigade were assembled in reserve trenches. From this position to the front line there were two routes, by the communication trenches termed Railway Alley and Fountain Alley. Previous reconnaissance had shown that the time required to reach the front line by these routes was 1 and 1½ hours respectively, and the move of the brigade was arranged to enable it to reach the front trenches as soon as they were vacated by the 26th Brigade. But all the previous plans made for the regulation of traffic in the communication trenches broke down during the action, and the men of the 27th found their advance checked by carrying parties, stragglers, and returning wounded. The average progress seemed to be about 30 yards every 20 minutes, and there were many long halts. Not only were the men exhausted by this tedious and tiring passage, but they suffered heavily from the enemy’s shell-fire. It would have kept the men fresher, and would probably have saved casualties, if the battalions had moved out of the trenches and advanced across the open.

The first battalion to cross the front line was the 12th Royal Scots. It should have been followed by the 11th Royal Scots, but this battalion was seriously delayed in the trenches, and the 10th Argylls were the second battalion to pass the line. The order of battalions, however, as arranged by the brigade, was restored during the advance, the Argylls halting to allow the 11th Royal Scots to get into their proper position. Under orders from General Thesiger, the 6th Royal Scots Fusiliers were kept back in the front trenches owing to the failure of the 28th Brigade. On entering “No-Man’s Land,” the 27th Brigade came under intense rifle and machine-gun fire from Cité St Elie, and from north-east of the Fosse. About 11 A.M. the 11th and 12th Royal Scots passed through the Gordons and advanced on Haisnes, but they were scourged by terrific rifle and machine-gun fire, and could make progress only by short, sharp rushes. A few men penetrated into the outskirts of the village, but they could not maintain their position, and were forced to withdraw. Till the evening, the survivors of the Royal Scots lay out in the open about 300 yards east of Pekin Trench, and in the afternoon the situation of the Royal Scots and men of the Seventh Division on their right became intolerable. They were numbed by cold and rain and suffered grievously from the enfilade-fire which the enemy directed on them from Haisnes, so at 4 P.M. the men were withdrawn to the line of Pekin Trench on the right of the Gordons.

The Argylls, who followed close behind the Royal Scots, established themselves in Fosse Alley. Observing that the left flank of the men in Pekin Trench was exposed, they sent forward a company to protect it, but it was held up by unbroken barbed wire, and, after the company commander had been shot down while trying to cut it, the remainder fell back on Fosse Alley. Haisnes was now strongly held by the enemy, and there was little chance of taking it without strong artillery support. Brig.-General Bruce received orders at 3.30 P.M. to secure the village, and, leaving instructions for the 6th Royal Scots Fusiliers to follow on, he left Central Boyau and went forward to Fosse Alley to reconnoitre the position. As both Haisnes and Cité St Elie were strongly garrisoned by the enemy, and as his brigade had been very heavily punished, he considered that an attack[15] on Haisnes was out of the question. The decision was sound. Even if the village had been captured, the strength of the Division would have been too dissipated to offer any chance of effective defence against a resolute attack.

The presence of Brig.-General Bruce steadied the garrison of Pekin Trench, and under his direction two companies of the Royal Scots Fusiliers were sent forward to support the Royal Scots by occupying the trench on their left. The position at Pekin Trench, however, needed more reinforcements than Brig.-General Bruce had at his command in order to make it secure, and the small garrison had a very bad time. The men were exposed to a continuous and merciless fire, and the trenches were full of dead, dying, and wounded. To add to their misery rain fell heavily, the rifles became clogged with mud and could not be fired, and the fuse-lighters of the Bethune bombs were so damp that it was impossible to ignite them.

The initiative now rested with the enemy,[16] whose numbers were being hourly augmented, and numerous bombing attacks were made on the garrison. Against the most desperate odds a brilliant defence was made. “C” Company of the Gordons, under Captain J. E. Adamson, beat off three powerful and determined attacks from the railway and the village; but with diminishing numbers and want of food, water, ammunition and bombs, it was not possible for it to hold on indefinitely. The great majority of the officers were dead or wounded, and most of the bombers had become casualties. The men could do no more, and during the late afternoon and evening the Gordons retired to Fosse Alley, but here their right flank was attacked by German bombers from Cité St Elie, and they were compelled to fall back on our front line.

The position of the Royal Scots in Pekin Trench became untenable when the Gordons were forced back, and the longer they held on the more dangerous became the situation; for both flanks were exposed, and the enemy was becoming more confident and aggressive. The Germans with abundance of bombs made numerous attacks against the Royal Scots, so to avoid being surrounded, the garrison fell back to Fosse Alley in the evening. After organising the remnants of his brigade along Fosse Alley and satisfying himself that it was in touch with the Seventh Division on the right, Brig.-General Bruce established his H.Q. in the Quarries. This was an unfortunate choice, for though he was now in close touch with the Seventh Division he was too far away for General Thesiger to get quickly into communication with him.

Meantime the main body of the 26th Brigade maintained its position. In spite of rain and a deluge of shells, the sappers of the 90th Coy. R.E., assisted by infantry and pioneers, rapidly improved the trenches and made them stronger for defence. The behaviour of the men was beyond all praise; their dogged endurance and marvellous cheerfulness raised them above the misery of their surroundings. The sappers were always ready to lend a hand to the infantry whenever the enemy counter-attacked, and when the shelling became too severe for any work to be done, they gave invaluable aid by manning the trenches on the flanks of the infantry. More effective artillery support was now available for the harassed brigade. At 10.30 A.M. No. 7 Mountain Battery R.G.A. came into action near Fosse 8 and engaged targets near the Railway and Les Briques; while the whole of the 52nd Brigade R.F.A. and one Howitzer battery under the command of Lieut.-Colonel Perreaux, were in action south-west of the Dump by 4.30 P.M.