The history of the 9th (Scottish) Division, 1914-1919

by M.C. John Ewing

“What we have, we hold” might be said to be the keynote of the limited objective method. It was solid and substantial rather than brilliant and inspiring, and it had certain defects which became clear in the course of the battle. It encouraged the infantry to depend so completely upon the artillery, that the tendency of the former was to lack confidence when unassisted by the latter. This led to a decline of initiative, which was further emphasised by the very fact that the objective was limited. Though the troops were exhorted to lose no opportunities of exploiting success, it was only natural for them to consider that they had done all that was wanted when they had accomplished the definite task assigned to them. Undoubtedly many opportunities were lost, as the Germans noted with thankfulness, and places, which we could have had for the mere trouble of walking up to them, fell into our hands later only after desperate and sanguinary fighting.

Moreover, after the first shock, the element of surprise was lost, as the terrain once selected was fixed, and the enemy was able to fathom our plans and arrange his defence accordingly. The periods between the stages of our advance gave him valuable time in which to reorganise his forces and strengthen his fortifications. With the enemy’s moral high and his forces well trained and disciplined, the cost of progress was bound in any case to be heavy; but with the limited objective system, it was probably heavier than it would have been under a more flexible and elastic one. It is possible, too, that the method of proceeding by slow stages caused us to miss the chance of dealing a paralysing blow.

Prudence is a virtue in military matters as in other things, but excess of prudence is not without danger, especially in the case of coalitions. The exaggerated caution of Marshal Daun in the Seven Years’ War is both an example and a warning. If at that time the continuance of the Austrian coalition could have been guaranteed, Daun’s tactics would have led to the humiliation and probable dismemberment of Prussia; but before they had time to work their effect, the defection of Russia ruined all the hopes of Austria. The general tendency is for coalitions to be weakened rather than strengthened by time, and this should be taken into consideration even in military affairs.

It can easily be seen that the task of Sir Douglas Haig was not a light one, and two substantial reasons weighed him strongly to the side of caution; he was conscious that his margin of numerical superiority[36] was small, and he had a suspicion[37] that his armies had not yet developed the efficiency essential for the carrying out of a campaign with far distant objectives.

On the eve of the battle the attitude of the Germans was one of assured confidence. From the high ground they occupied to the south of Arras they could not fail to detect the signs of an imminent offensive, and though the preliminary bombardment, which commenced on the 25th June, was supplemented by artillery demonstrations at Ypres and Arras, they had realised that the great attack would take place in the Somme, and in this district their defences were the strongest on the whole battle front. For eighteen months there had been no operation of any magnitude in the sector, and the enemy was given time to make his defences as perfect as they could be made. The front line trenches were protected with broad belts of wire entanglements, which had to be swept away before the attackers could come to grips with the defenders, and numerous and elaborate dug-outs had been constructed to protect the garrison during a bombardment. Most of these shelters went down into the earth for at least thirty feet, and some were so strong that even the most powerful shell could not penetrate them. While such shelters are excellent for protection, they have special dangers of their own. To one in a deep dug-out the noise of a bombardment overhead has a peculiarly sinister and terrifying sound; even a shell that bursts a hundred yards away seems to fall at his door. In such a case a man who thinks more of his own skin than of his duty is loth to leave his refuge, and there were many instances during the battle of enemy garrisons being trapped in their dug-outs before they had time to man their parapets. The Germans had also erected skilfully concealed machine-gun posts, strengthened by concrete, and they had several similarly protected posts for snipers. It was therefore with good reason that the Germans believed their positions to be impregnable.

As the time for battle drew near, the Division was moved closer to the front line, and on the 23rd it was concentrated near Corbie, where D.H.Q. were established. All the sappers and pioneers were busy on roads and dumps. Numerous conferences in connection with the battle were held by the G.O.C. On the next day the Ninth moved to Etinehem, and on the 27th to Grovetown, a city of dumps.

The Division was not to take part in the first day of battle, but it was instructed to be ready to do so when called upon. The A. & Q. Staff worked continuously to supply the men with all that was necessary for the fight. Two hundred rounds of S.A.A. per man were carried, except in the case of signallers, orderlies, and Lewis Gunners. The establishment of Lewis Guns per battalion had been doubled, each company having two and for the carriage of these weapons hand-carts had been issued, but they were of little use except in fine weather and on good roads. It was decided by G.H.Q. that each battalion should have a nucleus of officers for reorganisation; 20 were to go into the battle, and the remainder, including the second in command, was to be left at the First Line Transport. To simplify reorganisation during the engagement, each company wore shoulder bands of a distinctive colour.[38] For the carriage of stores, such as Stokes shells, machine-gun ammunition, R.E. Stores, and tools, parties were formed in each brigade from its several units.

The most scrupulous care was given to the question of communications. These form the nerve system of the military body, and if they do not work properly the whole machine is thrown out of gear, and delay in the transmission of messages may lead to the chance of a victory being missed. Communications had not been good at Loos, but the development and extension of the functions of the aeroplane opened up a new and more rapid means of communication. Men were to carry flares, which when lit on the objective would indicate to an observer from the air the general line reached by the troops, and special machines, known as contact aeroplanes and distinguished by streamers, were allotted the task of maintaining communication with the infantry. Should it be impossible to light the flares on account of damp or other causes, the men were to indicate their position by flashing mirrors. In addition, a code of signals was arranged between a battalion H.Q. and the aeroplanes, the messages from the battalion being signalled by means of ground signalling sheets. Further, to allow observers in the rear to distinguish our men from the enemy, each man wore on his back a square of yellow cloth or metal disc, which was attached to the flap of the haversack.

An enormous advantage possessed by the British on the eve of the offensive was the command of the air. At no time during the war were the signs of our air superiority so obvious to the infantry as in the summer of 1916. The passage of an enemy plane over our lines was then an event. The Germans were virtually confined to the observation they secured from their possession of the higher ground, and even the extra observation they got by means of their balloons was denied them. On the first day of the preliminary bombardment our planes crossed the German lines and swooped down on their balloons, which disappeared in wisps of flame as they were hit. The enemy was practically blinded.