The history of the 9th (Scottish) Division, 1914-1919

by M.C. John Ewing

Delville Wood, in the shape of a rough pentagonal, overshadowed the village of Longueval. It was divided into a northern and southern portion by the grassy ride known as Princes Street. From this ride towards the north, and at right angles to it, ran auxiliary paths named Strand, Regent Street, and Bond Street; in the opposite direction similar pathways, Buchanan Street, Campbell Street, and King Street, led to the southern margin. About 200 yards south of Princes Street and parallel to it was the ride called Rotten Row.

The execution of the attack was entrusted by Brig.-General Lukin to Lieut.-Colonel Tanner. The forces available were the 2nd and 3rd and two companies of the 4th South African Infantry. Of the remainder of the brigade the 1st Regiment was involved in the fighting in Longueval, and two companies of the 4th were to assist the 26th Brigade against Waterlot Farm.

The assailants moved up from Montauban before dawn. Patrols having reported the enemy to be still in possession of the village, the South Africans assembled in a trench on the south-west corner of Delville. All the wood south of Princes Street was cleared in two hours, the only strong resistance coming from isolated snipers. In the eastern portion 138 prisoners, including 3 officers, and one machine-gun were captured, but the most difficult part remained to be accomplished. Owing to the situation in Longueval, Lieut.-Colonel Tanner decided to clear the northern portion from the east as far as the Strand, and this work was entrusted to three companies of the 2nd South African Infantry. The resistance was surprisingly weak, the garrison having been thinned-out on account of the shelling to which the wood was persistently subjected. The chief obstacle was the wood itself. The profligate undergrowth and the tangle of trees and branches brought down by our artillery-fire rendered the laborious work of penetrating it most exhausting. When at length the perspiring and breathless South Africans reached the margin, the enemy’s artillery opened a fierce bombardment on the whole place, and rifle and machine-gun fire prevented progress beyond the perimeter.

Shortly after 2 P.M. that afternoon Lieut.-Colonel Tanner was able to report that he had taken the whole of Delville Wood except the north-west corner. The problem now was how to hold our gains. In ordinary circumstances small posts with machine-guns would have been the least costly and the most effective method; for Bernafay had shown that for large bodies of men a wood is only a death-trap. But it was impossible to do this. The wood was 159 acres in extent, and part of it was held by the enemy. Moreover, the Germans were exceptionally well situated for a counter-attack. They were able to direct an accurate fire on the wood from their batteries in the north, east, and south-east; their trenches lay round its perimeter and commanded all its approaches; and the possession of Longueval ensured them a covered approach whenever they chose to deliver their stroke. Under these circumstances a strong garrison and constant vigilance were essential.

After the posts were established along the perimeter, the most urgent matter was the provision of shelter for the troops. A plentiful supply of tools had been carried up by the South Africans, and it was impressed upon the men that notwithstanding their weariness there could be no rest until trenches had been dug. But they had grasped the situation; it was only too obvious that their lives depended upon the speed with which they could dig themselves in. But the spendthrift undergrowth and tangled roots that crawled profusely in the soil of Delville Wood were hard to cut, and while the men toiled they were harried unceasingly by shell and machine-gun fire. An attempt to wire the edge of the wood was frustrated by a counter-attack, which men of the 10th Bavarian Division delivered against the north-east corner about 3 P.M. This attack was easily repulsed by rifle-fire, but the situation was critical, and between 12.45 P.M. and 1.15 P.M. reports from the 26th Brigade and the 52nd Brigade R.F.A. having stated that the Germans were massing on the north-west of the wood, the artillery put a protective barrage round it. In spite of this the foe made persistent attempts to drive the South Africans from the perimeter, but all attacks were defeated with loss by the 2nd South African Infantry, and by 4.40 P.M. the enemy drew off. The heavy casualty list of the South Africans was due mainly to shell-fire.

General Furse gave instructions that the utmost efforts should be made to strengthen the defences during the night, and a company of the Seaforths (Pioneers) was sent up to wire the wood. In a remarkably short time numerous trenches were dug by the garrison, for a man works with a will when his life is at stake. Arrangements were also made to send up large supplies of stores and ammunition. Six and a half companies were posted round the perimeter with three in support. The western portion of Princes Street was held by a half company of the 2nd South African Infantry, and two companies of the 1st formed a defensive flank on the side of the village. The H.Q. of Lieut.-Colonel Tanner were at the junction of Princes Street and Buchanan Street.

Meanwhile Longueval defied all assaults. Throughout the night of the 14th/15th the 1st South African Infantry had been engaged in a grim house-to-house combat without making headway, and the 12th Royal Scots were called on to make another attack. After a preliminary bombardment of the oblong by the artillery and the Stokes mortars, they moved forward at 8 A.M., when a desperate and plucky effort was made to clear the village. For a time progress was made, and word reached D.H.Q. that the whole of the village was in our hands. The report was wrong. Two sections of the Royal Scots worked up North Street, moving from house to house, each of which was secured only after a stern bombing fight. Small garrisons were left in three houses, and the party reached more than midway to Duke Street. At the same time another section tried to penetrate the orchards from the west, but failed to get beyond Piccadilly. The first party on venturing into the open was subjected to heavy fire from concealed machine-guns and compelled to retire to the shelter of the houses; even the posts that had been established in the houses could not be maintained, for the garrisons were shelled out and forced to withdraw. If doggedness and grit could have won Longueval, the 12th Royal Scots would have had it. Undaunted by their previous reverses, they made another attack in the evening at 7.30. Three sections advanced from Clarges Street, but could not get beyond 50 yards; two other sections pressing on up North Street found the enemy alert and strongly reinforced, and were forced back to the point from which they had started, after inflicting severe losses by Lewis Gun fire. The men, utterly exhausted, could do no more.

On the 15th encouraging progress was made by the 26th Brigade, though it failed to secure Waterlot Farm. As soon as day broke, parties of the Seaforths and Camerons dashed forward and succeeded in establishing themselves in enemy trenches to the east of the farm; but, before they were able to consolidate these positions, they were compelled to withdraw to the northern end of Longueval Alley, owing to intense shelling from both our own and the enemy’s artillery. As the brigade had suffered many casualties and was holding a widely extended line, reinforcements consisting of two companies of the 4th South African Infantry were sent to its assistance. With the support of these two companies, two platoons of the Camerons again attacked the farm and reached the trenches to the east of it before noon. The captured trenches were then taken over by the South Africans, who commenced to consolidate, but were driven out by the concentrated artillery-fire of the enemy. As we could not occupy the farm, we determined to prevent the Germans gaining access to it, and machine-guns were posted by the 26th Brigade and by the South Africans in Delville Wood so as to command all its approaches.

Thus at the close of the 15th the task of the Division had not been completed. Continuous fighting, involving serious losses, had resulted in the capture of all Delville Wood except the north-west corner. The men not actually engaged in fighting were busy consolidating positions and erecting strong points and keeps in the southern portion of Longueval, and all work had to be done under accurate and galling artillery-fire. The position occupied by the Division was peculiarly exposed to the enemy’s artillery; it formed an elbow beyond the British line and was open to fire from the north, south, and east. On the night of the 15th there was a marked increase in the enemy’s shelling; a hurricane of fire swept Delville Wood, and a fierce bombardment was concentrated on the southern and south-western portions of Longueval. In addition, hostile artillery searched the whole region from our front line to the back areas, causing trouble to our batteries and seriously interrupting the work of the transport and of carrying parties.