The history of the 9th (Scottish) Division, 1914-1919

by M.C. John Ewing

The plans of the Western Allies were marked by compromise and strategic vacillation, and this was particularly unfortunate, because 1917 was the period that was expected to produce the greatest disparity between the forces of the Entente and those of the Central Powers in favour of the former. The principal scheme of the British Higher Command was indefinitely postponed, and it would probably have been wise to replace it by another plan, which, while assuring the support promised for the schemes of General Nivelle, would yet offer a prize worthy of a big effort. This end would have been fulfilled by fixing Lens, and perhaps Douai, as the objective of the British Army. If the former place were carried before the summer, its possession by us would probably turn the north end of the Drocourt switch line, and would certainly give us control of the Douai plains and enable us to menace La Bassée from the south. The tremendously high moral of the British Army, stimulated greatly by the common talk about 1917 as the year of victory, deserved to be harnessed to ambitious and even heroic schemes. Events in Russia also, culminating in the Revolution while the preparations for the battle were being carried on, seemed to demand a big effort. It was futile to wait to see what the effect of the Revolution would be, and it was desirable to endeavour to affect it by events in France. An important success at the beginning of the year would probably strengthen the moderate elements in Russia, and preserve it as an effective ally for the Entente. But the Passchendaele project, which undoubtedly held out the most alluring prospects if successful, obsessed the British Higher Command too much to lead to any drastic alteration of plan. It is impossible to doubt the cordiality and genuineness of the co-operation between the British and the French armies, but both the schemes and the events of 1917 demonstrated that the strategical unity of plan necessary for success could be secured only by a single Command directing both forces towards a single end.

A perplexing point in the preparations for the battle lay in the fact that there was no approach to the trenches except through Arras, which was an obvious mark for artillery. In the town reasonable safety was provided by improving and strengthening the system of underground vaults and catacombs, which were capable of accommodating large bodies of troops. It was not so easy to form roads and routes in sufficient number to allow of a smooth distribution of stores and munitions, but in this respect the work of the Staff was so well performed that there was virtually no delay or congestion. With similar attention to details of organisation, communication trenches were dug and allotted, so that the attacking troops could reach their assembly position without hindrance. By the end of March the preparations on the front of the Division were practically completed with little interference from the enemy’s artillery, though numbers of trench mortar emplacements were repeatedly hit.

The rôle of the XVII. Corps was to capture the enemy’s third system of defences, running north from the Scarpe at Feuchy through the Point du Jour. After this was accomplished, a further advance was to be made south of the Point du Jour to secure the fourth system and the village of Fampoux. Three divisions were to lead the assault, the Ninth on the south, Thirty-fourth in the centre, and Fifty-first on the north, while the Fourth was to be in reserve. On the right of the Ninth the attack was to be carried on by the Fifteenth Division.

The Ninth was required to take the enemy’s third system from the Point du Jour to the Scarpe and to consolidate a line leading from the eastern end of the village of Athies to the Point du Jour. There were three objectives, marked on the map as the Black, Blue, and Brown Lines. From our front line the ground rose gently to the summit of the ridge, on the reverse side of which was the German main trench of the first system, protected by a triple row of strong wire, as our air photographs showed. This trench, called Obermayer, extended to the east end of the village St Laurent-Blangy and formed the Black Line. From this point the ground dipped to a shallow valley and rose again to the line of the Arras-Lens Railway (Blue Line), which on the left ran through a deep cutting, but towards the Scarpe went over a high embankment. From the Railway the ground sloped up to the plateau of the Point du Jour (Brown Line) thickly covered with wire. The fourth objective (Green Line), which included Fampoux, was to be secured by the Fourth Division. The attack, to be covered by a creeping barrage, was ultimately arranged for the 9th April and was to be preceded by a preliminary bombardment commencing on the 5th.

All three brigades, the 26th on the right, the South African in the centre, and the 27th on the left, were to take part, each on a frontage of approximately 600 yards. Two battalions in each brigade were to take the first and second objectives, after which the other two were to pass through and carry on the attack. Four tanks were to assist the Division by helping to clear the two villages of St Laurent-Blangy and Athies. No battalion was to attack with its full strength. Since the time of Loos never more than 20 officers per battalion had gone into battle, the remainder along with some men being left at the Transport Lines. The pamphlet S.S. 135 laid down the proportion of men and officers to be left out of action, so that even if a battalion received a shattering blow in battle there would be the nucleus of a new organisation.

The preparations of the C.R.A. were marked by unflagging industry and ingenuity. As the result of months of toil, the gunners had constructed positions that enabled the batteries to function under almost ideal conditions. There were no natural hidden positions to serve as emplacements for the guns, so ridges of screens were built up to conceal emplacements, situated in such a way that of the seven[73] brigades under the command of Brig.-General Tudor only one was more than 2000 yards from the enemy’s line. Arrangements were also made to construct emplacements in one of the forming-up trenches, so that when the infantry advanced batteries could move up in close support. Moreover, all the guns were virtually square with their tasks, so that the barrage would be formed by shells falling at right angles to the line of advance. The R.F.A. Brigades were in St Catherine, St Nicholas, and Roclincourt Valley.

Ingenuity and initiative were shown in the arrangements for the creeping barrage, which was to be formed by a combination of H.E. and smoke-shell. Brig.-General Tudor had consistently upheld that a smoke-screen offered the best form of support for infantry, and though smoke had received a bad name at Loos owing to men losing direction, he believed that this was due to the fact that on that occasion the smoke had been produced by candles and had necessarily been started on our own parapets. If the smoke-screen could be put down on the enemy’s line it would guide our men instead of confusing them, while it would still blind the enemy. At the end of 1915 he pressed for the manufacture of smoke-shells, but nothing was really done until General Furse took the matter up; as a result of his importunity smoke-shells were made, and they began to arrive in France about the autumn of 1916. The supply was limited, but as no other division desired them, the Ninth was able to get the whole quantity issued to the Third Army, about 4000 rounds. Smoke-shells were employed by the Canadians to cover their raids, and also by Brig.-General Tudor on the 6th January to support the raid of the Black Watch and the Argylls, but the 9th April was the first occasion on which they were used in a creeping barrage.

Zero was to be 5.30 A.M., and at that hour the barrage was to open 50 yards in front of the German front line trench. Where “No-Man’s-Land” was 200 yards or more in extent, the assaulting troops were to leave their trenches and form up in the open. One minute after zero the barrage was to lift on to the front line, where it was to remain for three minutes. The rate of advance between lifts varied from 50 yards every one and a half minutes to 100 yards every four minutes. The infantry was expected to reach the Black Line at 6.40 A.M., and the barrier-fire would then advance 300 yards beyond it, where it would remain until 7.36 A.M., by which time the leading battalions would be ready to resume the advance. In similar fashion the Blue Line was to be secured by 8.13 A.M., and the Brown Line by 1.20 P.M. At that time the Fourth Division was to pass through and go on to the Green Line. To prevent the enemy in the rear seeing the creeping barrage and countering it, a distant smoke-barrage was to be formed by two 18-pounder batteries.

The artillery bombardment was to be supplemented by a trench-mortar and machine-gun barrage. Forty 2-inch and fourteen 9·45-inch mortars and twenty machine-guns were to take part. The Division had been vastly strengthened both in Lewis and Vickers Guns; each battalion had now sixteen of the former, and the arrival of the 197th Machine-Gun Company had brought the Vickers Companies up to four. All machine-gunners had received constant training in indirect fire while in this sector, and during the battle the German positions were to be drenched by showers of machine-gun bullets. One hundred and twenty-six 18-pounders, forty-two 4·5 howitzers, and forty-seven guns of heavier calibre were to support our attack.