The history of the 9th (Scottish) Division, 1914-1919

by M.C. John Ewing

HAVRINCOURT

The front line was taken over from the Fifty-eighth Division on the night of the 26th by the 26th Brigade, the South African and 27th Brigades coming in on its left on the 28th and 30th. The sector held at first lay south of the Canal du Nord at Havrincourt, but on the 4th August the 27th Brigade was transferred from the south of the line to the north. The country was undulating, with ridges and alternate valleys lying north-north-east. The excavated channel of the Canal du Nord, which after an easterly course turned off in a northerly direction past Moeuvres, formed the boundary between the 27th and the other two brigades. South of the Canal the line lay on the slopes of the spurs that ran out from Havrincourt Wood under observation of the enemy, though the wood itself provided a covered approach to within 1500 yards of our front line. Some of the spurs had originally formed part of the forest, but they had been cleared by the enemy, who used the timber for engineering purposes, and they were now covered with a low thick scrub, which afforded concealment for small groups. On the southern bank of the Canal was a spoil heap which, as the greater part of it was in our possession, gave us observation along our entire front. The position was well adapted for defence, since machine-guns, placed on a spur, could bring flanking and cross-fire to bear on the adjoining spurs. The trench system consisted of outpost, front, support, and reserve lines.

On the front of the 27th Brigade, the Canal, of which the channel was more than 50 feet below the surface, separated friend from foe except at a spoil heap on the west bank, which the enemy held as an outpost to his main system. Havrincourt village, red-tiled and attractive in the sun, occupied a commanding position, while to the north-east behind the German front line could be seen the dark cloud of Bourlon Wood. The enemy’s defences along the whole front were strongly entrenched and lavishly wired.

A comparatively uneventful month was passed in this quiet spot, less discomfort being caused by the enemy than by the unusually heavy rainfall of August. The most active of the brigades was the 26th, and it afforded some diversion by carrying out a number of raids. Several posts, which the enemy held only during the night, were located, and on the 18th August a patrol of the 7th Seaforths, crossing the wire guarding one of these by means of a sheet of expanded metal, lay in wait for the garrison, who, though taken unawares, put up a stiff fight. Four of the enemy were killed or wounded and one was taken prisoner, the casualties of the Seaforths being one wounded and two missing. After dusk on the same evening the Argylls sent out strong patrols, which met with strenuous resistance; several Germans were killed and one was captured, while the Argylls had two officers and eleven men wounded, and one officer and three men missing. The object of the patrols had been to sweep the enemy from his position on the spoil heap, and though they failed to accomplish this, the Germans were so shaken that they evacuated the heap, which was found to be clear when the Argylls made another raid on the 30th. The scope for adventure by the 27th Brigade was necessarily limited to the hostile positions on the west bank of the Canal, and on the 25th, 2nd Lieut. Mosscrop with three men of the “Rifles” entered a night post shortly after dusk and captured one of the garrison when it arrived. The prisoner belonged to the 89th Grenadier Regiment (17th Division), a sturm truppen lot, and this seemed to indicate that the enemy had aggressive designs on hand, so the troops were warned not to relax their vigilance.

A proposal by the IV. Corps that the Division should undertake a big raid against the main entrenchments of the enemy was vetoed as impracticable, since the amount of gun-fire necessary to cut the wire was bound to advertise our intentions. It led however to an interesting suggestion by Brig.-General Tudor, which he submitted to the Corps after satisfying himself, with Brig.-General Kennedy’s help, of its practicability on this front, and it formed the basis of the scheme carried through in the same region by Sir Julian Byng during the Battle of Cambrai in November 1917. Artillery preparation, he pointed out, could be dispensed with if tanks were employed, and thus surprise, the value of which had been fully grasped by the Ninth, might be obtained. The tanks, protected by a smoke-barrage, would cut the gaps to allow the infantry to enter the enemy’s positions, and the probability was that the Germans would be so completely surprised that large captures would be made and much ground gained at a trifling cost. The infantry were to advance towards Flesquières Ridge, but half of the tanks were to wheel to the north and roll up the German front system to the Scarpe, the aim being not to break through in depth but to destroy the enemy’s forces on a wide front. This, with some modifications, was the plan carried out by the Third Army in the following November.

But the Division was not destined to participate in the Cambrai offensive. By the end of August it was relieved by the Thirty-sixth (Ulster) Division, recently engaged in the Battle of Passchendaele, and this spot the Ninth surmised was to be its next destination. The first sojourn was in the shell-torn region near Achiet le Grand, where the nature of the training gave the men a fair idea of what would be expected of them later, and on the 12th September the Division moved north by rail to camps between Poperinghe and Ypres in the V. Corps’[85] sector.

As already indicated, the principal campaign planned by Sir Douglas Haig was in the north. His design was to carry the Passchendaele Ridge and secure the command of the Belgian coast, as this would threaten the enemy’s communications, and at the same time restrict appreciably his submarine warfare. But the British Field-Marshal was favoured with little luck, and it was not till the beginning of May, after the failure of General Nivelle’s offensive in the Aisne, that his plans were approved at a conference held in Paris on the 4th and 5th May. This comparatively late start proved to be a fatal handicap, and in other theatres the rosy hopes of the beginning of the year were dispelled by the tragic events in Russia. The Revolution eliminated Russia as a German enemy, rendered the position of Roumania practically hopeless (though in the days of its stress it fought with admirable and heroic resolution), and prevented General Maude from garnering the full fruits of the fine campaign that had resulted in the capture of Bagdad on the 11th March. The Egyptian offensive broke down at Gaza, the Salonica front remained stationary, and Italy, engrossed in Trieste and Albania, was scarcely pulling her weight. Moreover, as the Germans were cognisant of our aims, and had made dispositions to defeat them, it was regrettable that G.H.Q. did not excogitate a fresh plan, which, carried out in the same manner as the Cambrai offensive later, would have disconcerted the foe and led to extensive gains without a heavy sacrifice of life.

The preliminary of the attack on Passchendaele was the capture of the Messines-Wytschaete Ridge, which overlooked our lines and a large portion of the hinterland. This was brilliantly accomplished by the Second Army on the 7th June, the enemy’s position being blown into the air and the ridge passing into our hands with slight loss. The preparations for the assault on Passchendaele were then taken in hand, but for some yet unexplained reason the first blow was not struck till the 31st July. During the interlude the Germans, delivering on the 10th July an attack against the bridgehead north-east of the Yser between Nieuport and the coast, were so far successful that they prevented the projected co-operation between the Fourth Army and the Navy, which they dreaded above all things.

The first assault launched by the Fifth Army began well, and the greater part of the ridge overlooking Ypres was stormed, but the German scheme of defence, based on holding their forward positions lightly, depended chiefly on counter-attack, and before the end of the day many of our gains, including St Julien and Westhoek, were recaptured. Above all, the key of the enemy’s position on the Menin road remained in his hands. On the same day the fatal rains made their appearance, and torrential downpours transformed the battlefield into a quagmire. The continuance of the wet weather, which made August of 1917 one of the most disastrous months in the war, was all in favour of the Germans; it delayed our preparations, and should indeed have led to the abandonment of the campaign; but with the pertinacity of the true gambler, the British resumed the attack on the 16th August, but made little progress south of St Julien, the Germans defying all our efforts in the neighbourhood of the Menin road.