ARTILLERY HEAD-QUARTERS NEAR ST. JULIEN
The first company of the Seaforths, sadly depleted by fire from parties of Germans[97] in organised shell-holes, advanced and filled the space between the two leading ones of the Black Watch. The 12th Royal Scots, following close behind, became mingled with the Seaforths. There was some opposition from Inch Houses, and in numerous cases clusters of Germans offered resistance until they were taken in flank; in one case two of our sergeants, both of whom had been wounded, charged a group of nine and killed every one. Small parties of our men were seen in the dim light to pass Banff Houses and Source Trench, and some may even have reached Source Farm and Vat Cottages. A mixed body of Black Watch, Seaforths, and Royal Scots entered the eastern end of Wallemolen, but being heavily enfiladed from both flanks had to fall back on the Cemetery-Inch Houses line.
On the left, matters were even worse; for the ground in some places was impassable, and as a consequence the Argylls were unable to keep pace with the barrage. The right company and its supporting company maintained direction, but the others swung to the left and some of the men, crossing the Lekkerboterbeek, so churned up by shell-fire that it was unrecognisable, entered the sector of the Eighteenth Division. On the right a “Pill-box” near the front line stopped the leading company and held up the whole advance, with the result that parties from the rear battalions, the Camerons, 11th Royal Scots, and 6th K.O.S.B.[98] became involved in the firing-line. A combined assault by men of all units on the “Pill-box,” the occupants of which had shown the white flag but continued firing, eventually mastered the defence, the garrison being killed and four machine-guns captured. But by this time the barrage was far ahead, the troops were exhausted and disorganised, and the leading ranks were able to proceed only 150 yards or so from the “Pill-box,” where they consolidated a line of shell-holes. The men of the left company who crossed the Lekkerboterbeek advanced for some 80 yards, but were stopped by machine-gun fire from Beek and Meunier Houses. The left rear company, which could make no headway, formed a defensive flank and gained touch with the Eighteenth Division on its old front line.
Except on the extreme right the advance had come to a halt about 100 yards from the starting-point. The New Zealanders on our right flank had made some progress, but the Eighteenth Division, as was the case with our left battalion, had been handicapped by the spongy nature of the ground and was back in its original position. Several unfortunate men had been drowned in the deep, water-filled shell-holes, and rifles and machine-guns were clogged with slime. The barrage having gone far ahead, nothing was to be gained by persisting in the attack, and the line taken up by the Ninth at the close of the battle ran from the Cemetery near Wallemolen in front of Inch Houses, thence to Oxford Houses and back to our original front system. Though the 26th and 27th Machine-gun Companies had been roughly handled during the action, they were able to provide efficient protection for the position now held.
During the night the front was reorganised in three sectors; the right, garrisoned by the 12th Royal Scots, the Seaforths and Black Watch, the centre held by the Camerons and Argylls with the “Rifles” in support, and the left occupied by the 11th Royal Scots and K.O.S.B. Patrols were sent out during the dark hours with orders to join up with the leading men of the Black Watch, who had been seen near Source Farm, but not until next day was touch established with a few of them in Source Trench, and these were relieved during the night of the 13th/14th. On the same night the South Africans took over the whole of the front, and the 26th and 27th Brigades were withdrawn from the line.
Rain and mud constitute the chief explanation for the failure of the Division in this battle, which should not have been fought; no man could progress at more than a snail’s pace, and sheer exhaustion was a factor more potent than the enemy in bringing the advance to a standstill. The breakdown in communications was understandable and largely unavoidable, since the pigeons were unable to fly against the strong wind that prevailed, and the men who had charge of the messenger dogs all became casualties. The barrage was not up to the usual standard of the Divisional Artillery, but its lack of density and its raggedness were due to the short period that had elapsed since the last action and to the weather. Many of the guns stuck in the mud, all the men were dead-beat, and Brig.-General Tudor could not get the quantity of the smoke-shells he wanted. Since the horses could not leave the roads, it was only by means of light railways that field-guns could be brought into action off the roads and supplied with ammunition. The Sappers, under Lieut.-Colonel Hearn, always a strong advocate of the light railway, gave the greatest possible assistance to the gunners by constructing a very useful railway system east of Springfield.
Serious errors were undoubtedly committed by the infantry, but when officers and men were engaged in a long and cruel struggle against ineluctable conditions, cool leadership could scarcely be expected. As on the 3rd May, there was a deplorable loss of direction at the very start leading to confusion of units, but at the same time the vast length of the attacking frontage—1500 yards for two battalions—with wide gaps between each section, and the absence of conspicuous landmarks made the maintenance of direction a difficult matter. Leadership, marked more by valour than by discretion, caused an unnecessary number of battalions to be involved in wasteful and confused fighting. If the mixing up of the supporting and leading units of the 26th Brigade can be understood and condoned, it was none the less regrettable, but there was less reason for throwing the battalions of the 27th into the fight. Of battalion commanders Lieut.-Colonel Lumsden alone, seeing that the attack of the 26th Brigade had been checked, kept his men back, and the net result of over-zealous leading was that General Lukin, instead of a brigade, had only one battalion intact. But even in this respect there was some excuse. It was at least a venial fault that officers and men refused to accept a check without making a desperate effort, and Lieut.-Colonel Sir J. Campbell and Major Innes Browne regarded our line as unsatisfactory, if not untenable, while the “Pill-box” that caused the left of the attack so much trouble remained in the hands of the Germans. Possibly heroism on a grander scale has never been shown than in the brutal fighting on the foul quagmires of Flanders. Often neck-deep in mud, the men floundered forward until their overtaxed limbs could no longer support them, and to wrest victory under such appalling conditions was a task beyond the power of man.
Few people at Passchendaele had a more thankless and trying time than the Sappers and personnel of the R.A.M.C. The former were constantly engaged in maintaining the shelled duckboard tracks, making plank roads, repairing paths and constructing shelters and tramways. Three hundred infantry had been attached to the latter for stretcher-bearing; they were all needed, and it was only by sheer hard work and much nervous strain that the wounded were satisfactorily evacuated from the dreary swamps of Passchendaele.
The line was held by the Division until the 24th October and during this time the hostile artillery periodically barraged the back areas and approaches, causing serious losses to reliefs and working-parties between St Julien and the front trenches. A great deal of material was carried up to the front for the Sixty-third (Naval) Division and many yards of cable were buried to ensure a rapid and reliable signal service. Advance posts were thrown out by the 27th Brigade, and the assembly areas for the Sixty-third Division were marked by tape. On the 22nd a feint attack in our sector, carried out by men of the XVIII. Corps Cyclist Battalion who manipulated dummy figures, assisted the Eighteenth Division in bringing its position into line with that of the Ninth. On the 24th the 27th was relieved by the 188th Brigade (Sixty-third Division) and the Ninth[99] was concentrated in the various camps near Ypres.