In spite of these mishaps the operation met with almost complete success. The South African Brigade easily subdued all opposition except on its extreme left, where a pocket of Germans in a shallow trench behind a wired hedge offered a stout resistance, but this was adroitly overcome by the Royal Scots Fusiliers. The whole objective on the right was secured to time, numerous losses being inflicted on the enemy, especially behind the hedges running north and south on the west side of Meteren. Fortunately the course of the advance took the hedges in flank and discounted the protection which the Germans hoped to obtain from these obstacles. When the protective barrage ceased a company of South Africans advanced and captured an enemy trench running north-east from the Meteren Becque towards Alwyn Farm.
The Highland Brigade had a more strenuous time. The Camerons clearing the German front passed on through the ruins of Meteren, where the enemy was found holding a hedge in considerable force. After a brisk combat they seized the hedge and reached their objective in time. But the Black Watch on the left were not so happy. A portion of the right company won its objective along with the Camerons, but the remainder of the battalion was at once checked by a thick hedge on the left flank. Previously a successful raid had been effected at this place, but the enemy had since then appreciably strengthened the defences, and now there was a belt of wire behind as well as in front of the hedge covering the hostile infantry and machine-guns. Lying too near our lines to be bombarded by the gunners, it had been dealt with by Stokes mortars, but these had failed to cut the wire. Dogged pluck and persistent efforts were of no avail against this strong point, and after serious losses the left half of the Black Watch retired sullenly to their original trenches. The gap between the two portions of the Black Watch was filled by two platoons of the Seaforths, who on the following day turned the enemy’s defences by advancing from the west and drove him from the hedge.
After the capture of the objective, patrols moved forward as soon as the protective barrage ceased. Near Alwyn Farm and the hedges north and east of it there was some spasmodic resistance, but our patrols during the 19th and 20th succeeded in establishing a line on a slight ridge south of the Brahmin Bridge-Gaza Cross Roads. The battlefield was rapidly cleared, but the stretcher-bearers had great difficulty in finding the wounded, who were hidden by the corn. In the days following the attack, the 26th Brigade gained all its objectives, and came into line with the advanced troops of the South African Brigade.
The operation of the 19th July was a brilliant triumph, and increased immensely the enthusiasm and confidence of the young soldiers, to whose dashing fearlessness the victory was mainly due. Our losses, with the exception of the Black Watch, were small compared with our gains; many of the enemy had been killed, while 6 officers and 348 men, with a considerable amount of material,[120] fell into our hands. The Germans had been taken entirely by surprise. They had become so accustomed to bombardments of H.E. and smoke accompanied by gas that they regarded our barrage of the 19th July as another of the same, and a great many of the prisoners were wearing their gas-masks when captured. The unusual hour of zero was another factor in the surprise, and prisoners stated that all expectation of an attack that day had been abandoned after “stand-to.” Our enterprise apparently anticipated a hostile offensive on our front; the enormous quantity of trench-mortar ammunition which was found close in rear of the enemy’s front positions clearly indicated that the Germans were preparing to deliver an attack in this sector.
The capture of Meteren was the last operation of the Highland Brigade conducted by Brig.-General Kennedy. He had led the brigade through some of the stormiest and most critical fighting of the war, and of his many fine achievements perhaps the most outstanding was his daring and skilful handling of his men during the very trying days of the Somme retreat. After three years of continuous strife he had well earned the rest which an appointment in England now secured for him. His successor was Brig.-General the Hon. A. G. A. Hore Ruthven, V.C., who came from the Staff of the VII. Corps with a reputation already established, and assumed command on the 27th July.
The right sector was now taken over by the Lowland Brigade. Before daybreak on the 25th the enemy sought to gain some compensation for his recent reverse by raiding our lines. At 2 A.M., under cover of a trench-mortar and artillery bombardment, hostile parties attacked trenches held by the K.O.S.B. and 11th Royal Scots. The raid was utterly repulsed, and the enemy left behind two corpses and two unwounded prisoners. From the identifications we learned that the Germans had relieved the battered and demoralised 81st Reserve by the 12th Division, which had a good fighting record. An even more formidable raid was made in the early hours of the 26th. But the Germans were driven off by the K.O.S.B., and though on the right they succeeded in entering a trench held by the 11th Royal Scots, they were expelled by an immediate counter-attack, nine prisoners being taken.
The period from the 26th July till the 18th August was marked by raid and counter-raid. On the 30th July the Australians took Merris. On the 31st a raid by the K.O.S.B. just failed to secure prisoners, but Lieut. C. Campbell and Sergeant Smith killed nearly a dozen of the enemy in a fierce hand-to-hand encounter. Next day the Germans made a strong effort to seize a post held by the 12th Royal Scots, but were easily repulsed. On the 3rd August Captain Grant and a party of Camerons rushed a hostile post, and after killing six and wounding one other, returned without loss to our lines. On the 5th and 14th other raids made by the Germans were driven off.
Since the fear of a hostile offensive was fading away battalions out of the line enjoyed quite a comfortable time. Training, especially of officers, carried on diligently and uninterruptedly, produced a marked improvement in efficiency and discipline. Occasionally, however, the ordinary routine was broken. On Sunday the 4th August, the fifth anniversary of the entry of Britain into the war, a Parade Service, attended by detachments of all divisions in the Second Army, was held at Terdeghem, the detachments of the XV. Corps being under the command of Lieut.-Colonel Smyth of the 6th K.O.S.B. At this time the Ninth adopted the practice, generally followed by most divisions in France, of distinguishing its personnel by a special mark. This consisted of a white metal thistle on a small circular disc of royal blue cloth worn on the upper part of both arms, and the first unit to be completed with the sign was the 6th K.O.S.B., who had the honour of marching past His Majesty the King near La Brearde on the 6th August. Most fortunately this ceremony saved the Lowland Brigade some casualties; for while a company of the 12th Royal Scots lined the road a shell passed through its vacant billets.
Hoegenacker Ridge, lying beyond Meteren, was clearly the next task of the Division, and instructions for its seizure were received from the XV. Corps on the 10th August. A general plan of attack had been drawn up previously, and was in fact being practised by the Lowland Brigade then in reserve. Since the Meteren Becque was an awkward obstacle to an advance from the west it was decided, while simulating preparations for an attack from this direction, to make the assault from the north. The Ninth was to take the ridge and all the ground east of the Becque as far south as Terrapin House; but as this would give it a frontage of 3000 yards on the objective, while the space for forming-up amounted to only 1500 yards, two companies of the Twenty-ninth Division were to follow in rear of the right flank of the Ninth and take over the front from the Becque to Terrapin House as soon as it had been captured. The Twenty-ninth Division by means of patrols was to follow up any success gained, and if possible secure the village of Outtersteene.
The attack was to be supported by machine-guns and trench mortars and was to be covered by the favourite Ninth barrage. A German document had been captured in which the enemy, attributing our success at Meteren to the use of smoke, instructed his machine-gunners to open fire at once on our parapets when a smoke-barrage came down. It was therefore necessary to give the foe as little time as possible to bring his machine-guns into action, and our barrage was to be put down at one minute after instead of one minute before zero, as originally intended, while the infantry were to count ten after the barrage came down before leaving their trenches.