The brigadiers received their orders in person from General Tudor. The 28th Brigade was to lead the attack; the 27th and 26th, following in rear of the right and left of the 28th respectively, were to reinforce and carry on the assault without waiting for orders in the event of progress being checked. To give the men as much rest as possible and to allow the Thirty-sixth Division to come up into line, 9 A.M. was the hour fixed for the resumption of the forward movement.
The steady downpour under which the attack had begun was still falling at 9 A.M. on the 29th. The autumn night had been not only wet but very cold, and as practically no shelter was available great discomfort was endured by the men. Fortunately the sky showed signs of clearing when the 28th Brigade, with the “Rifles” and Newfoundlanders in line, and the Royal Scots Fusiliers in reserve, passed through the outposts of the 26th Brigade and began its advance on the Keiberg Spur. There was no creeping barrage, but our guns fired smoke to cover the movement of the troops across the shallow valley separating Keiberg from Broodseinde Ridge. Amid desultory shell and considerable machine-gun fire Brig.-General Jack’s men pressed on, and by 10 A.M. the Newfoundlanders with the Belgians on their left had captured the Keiberg and had broken through the Passchendaele-Terhand line; by 11.25 A.M. they were reported to be entering Waterdamhoek. One section of the 50th Brigade R.F.A. reached the Spur and was soon followed by the remainder of the battery.
From the outset the “Rifles” met firm opposition and were constantly enfiladed by machine-gun fire from the south, though the Thirty-sixth Division had gone through the outposts of the 27th Brigade about 9.30 A.M. For a brief space our men were checked by the Passchendaele-Terhand line, but this was quickly carried, and about 1 P.M. both the “Rifles” and Newfoundlanders were facing a strongly-wired line running east of Moorslede and Waterdamhoek, and west of Strooiboomhoek and Dadizeele, called the Flanders I. Stellung. Here they suffered grievously through machine-gun fire from the front and from the right wing, where Terhand had not yet been captured. There was now a gap between the 28th Brigade and the Belgians, and the Highland Brigade was ordered to send a battalion to fill it.
The Camerons accordingly moved forward, but after they had passed well over the Keiberg Spur, the Belgians, who were experiencing obstinate resistance near Moorslede asked for assistance, and General Tudor commanded Brig.-General Hore Ruthven to use his whole brigade if necessary, and press on south of Moorslede with the utmost speed.
Meanwhile Brig.-General Croft had instructed his battalion commanders to follow close behind the “Rifles” and to join in the attack if the advance showed any sign of being checked. Finding that the leading troops had been brought to a standstill, Lieut.-Colonel Smyth, who had been reconnoitring well ahead of the brigade, consulted with Lieut.-Colonel Sir J. Campbell, and they sent forward two companies each of the K.O.S.B. and the 11th Royal Scots. The additional momentum thus thrown into the onset carried the whole line forward about 2.30 P.M. On a front of nearly 4000 yards men of the 27th and 28th Brigades broke through the Flanders I. Stellung position and entered Dadizeele about 4 P.M., just as the enemy was hurriedly evacuating it. Pushing forward, they established themselves on the Menin-Roulers road as dusk was falling. North of them the Highlanders, whose dash had materially assisted the Belgians to carry Moorslede, took up a position about 300 yards west of the Menin-Roulers road, extending north almost to St Pieter, which the Belgians wrongly reported as being in their hands. The latter did not forget the assistance given them by the Highlanders on this day, and it was referred to in terms of great appreciation by the King of the Belgians when he reviewed the Division on the 5th November.
This concluded the operations for the day. On our right the Thirty-sixth Division, encountering stiff opposition, did not secure Terhand until 3.45 P.M., and at night the enemy was still holding Wijfwegen and Hill 41, a very important tactical feature, which dominated our right flank. On our left the Belgian line ran back for fully 1000 yards parallel to and south of the St Pieter-Moorslede road, north of which they had failed to penetrate a thick belt of wire.
The line of the Ninth was thus well ahead of that held by the divisions on both wings, our frontage being about 3500 yards, 1500 of which were south of the divisional boundary. Owing largely to the skilful leading of regimental officers casualties had on the whole been few, the “Rifles” being hardest hit. Lieut.-Colonel Kelso of the Royal Scots Fusiliers was blown up by a shell, but though severely shaken refused to leave his battalion. In the evening the 28th Brigade was withdrawn into divisional reserve about Potterijebrug, with the exception of three and a half companies which were left in the line until the following night to reinforce the 27th Brigade.
After a dry spell, rain commenced again at 6 P.M. and continuing to fall throughout the night added enormously to the difficulties of keeping open the Ypres-Zonnebeke road, where traffic was constantly blocked by huge Belgian drays, slowly hauled along by one or two miserable horses.
Orders were received from Corps to resume the advance on the 30th, but in view of the fact that the Ninth was already holding a difficult salient, General Tudor decided to await news of the attack by the divisions on our wings before giving any orders. Brigades, however, were instructed to be ready to move at 9 A.M.
At 8 A.M. General Tudor presided over a conference of brigadiers at Waterdamhoek. Our patrols had reported strong opposition east of the Menin-Roulers road, and he therefore ordered his brigade commanders, pending news from the divisions on our flanks, to look for weak parts in the hostile line and to push on if opportunity offered.