The boundaries within which the Ninth was to advance consisted of two parallel lines running slightly south-east from the flanks of our sector, and giving us a frontage of 1500 yards; but as our left wing was bent back and faced north-east, the jumping-off line measured nearly 2000 yards. It was therefore advisable to straighten the line and this could best be done by bringing our left up to the Menin-Roulers Railway, along which our right already ran. But to eliminate the risk of the right being barraged by the enemy while waiting for the left to come up, it was arranged that the whole line should advance simultaneously, and that the right would pause for thirty minutes on the light railway, 1000 yards east of the main railway, to enable the left to come into line and to give the Twenty-ninth Division time to clear the village of Ledeghem.
Apart from the enemy, the greatest obstacles seemed likely to be the Wulfdambeek stream, the village of Rolleghem Cappelle and dense masses of wire. Information about the width and depth of the stream was conflicting and scanty, but in order to run no risks eight light foot-bridges were prepared and carried by infantry parties, but, as it happened, they were not required, all the bridges having been left intact. The German wire was intensely strong; close in front of the left flank a belt over 100 yards in depth protected Mogg Farm and one or two “Pill-boxes” near it, and behind Rolleghem Cappelle four continuous bands stretched across our front from south-west to north-east. A similar barrier of equal depth extended along the reverse slope of a low but prominent ridge 4000 yards from our right flank. This ridge could be clearly seen from our line, and was at the extreme range at which the infantry could be covered by the gunners from their original positions; for this reason it was given as the first objective of the Ninth. Whether further progress could be made without artillery support would depend upon the tactical situation after the ridge was won. The advance to the objective was to be covered by the Ninth’s usual barrage. A forward section of 18-pounders was detailed to work with each of the two assaulting battalions, and two 6-inch trench mortars, mounted for the first time on wheels, were to operate in conjunction with the infantry.
The attack was entrusted to the 28th Brigade, with the Newfoundlanders and Royal Scots Fusiliers in line, and for the purpose of maintaining liaison with the Belgians, a company of the Black Watch was to operate on the left of the 28th Brigade. The 27th Brigade was in reserve. One company of the 9th Machine-Gun Battalion was attached to each infantry brigade, the remaining one and a company of the 104th Battalion being detailed to barrage certain points to cover the infantry advance, and then to form part of the divisional reserve. The assault was to be delivered at 5.35 A.M.
On the night of the 12th/13th the 28th Brigade A.F.A. and four guns of each battery of the 50th and 51st Brigades moved up to forward positions, the rest of the sections following on the night of the 13th/14th. All the battery positions were within about 1500 yards of the front line, and forward guns of the 51st Brigade were to deal with “Pill-boxes” and farms at a range of 700 yards. Supplementary to the two mobile 6-inch trench mortars, five others were placed in position. The 27th Brigade moved up by battalions from the rest area near Ypres to Keiberg Spur on the 13th, and that night the 28th took over the line except the portion held by the liaison company of the Black Watch. There was great artillery activity during the relief, the enemy sending over a good deal of gas, and the Newfoundlanders and the Royal Scots Fusiliers had over fifty casualties on the way up to their assembly positions.
CHAPTER XVI
FROM LEDEGHEM TO THE SCHELDT
14th October to 27th October 1918
The barrage opened at 5.32 A.M. on the 14th October and three minutes later the infantry moved forward. The Black Watch company and the left of the Royal Scots Fusiliers experienced sharp fighting from the beginning. Mogg Farm, wire-bound, was obstinately defended, but regardless of losses the Black Watch pressed on and ejected the enemy from this stronghold. The wind was light and from the south-east, and the smoke of the barrage, adding density to the haze of a fine autumn morning produced an impenetrable fog about 500 yards from our line. As a result our troops found it difficult to keep direction, and some confusion arose but was speedily rectified. Though our troops lost the barrage it had a most salutary effect upon the enemy, and after the first resistance had been overcome the infantry made rapid progress. Rolleghem Cappelle, the first belt of wire, Neerhof, and the Wulfdambeek were carried with much less trouble than had been expected, and the abject failure of the Germans to offer any opposition worth the name behind such defences was a convincing proof of their loss of moral.
At the conclusion of the initial barrage the 28th Brigade A.F.A. reverted to Corps reserve, while the 50th and 51st Brigades moved forward to give further support to the infantry. Owing to difficulties of observation and communication they were not able at first to take much part, but the mobile trench mortars dealt effectively with a single field-gun and machine-guns which were opposing our troops on the east bank of the Wulfdambeek. No sooner were the infantry checked on the ridge south-west of Steenen Stampkot than the 50th Brigade came into action and helped them to capture the ridge by 9.30 A.M., and all the field-guns were moved up behind it.
On our left the 26th Brigade gradually became involved in the battle, partly by reason of the vigorous resistance offered by the German garrison of Mogg Farm, and partly owing to a gap developing between the 28th Brigade and the Belgians. North-east of Rolleghem Cappelle the Highlanders had a stiff time and during their advance several field-guns, firing over open sights, were enveloped and taken. Shortly after the capture of the ridge by the 28th Brigade, which was in touch with the Twenty-ninth Division, the Highlanders and Belgians entered Winkel St Eloi. By this time the Camerons as well as the Black Watch were in the fighting line.
About noon the infantry resumed their advance, supported at close range by the 50th and 51st Brigades R.F.A., but the enemy had rushed up a reserve division (6th Cavalry) to hold Laaga Cappelle Wood and Steenbeek and a desperate combat ensued. Forward patrols of the Newfoundlanders pressed the enemy so closely that they came under our own rifle-fire—luckily escaping casualties—and forced the Germans to continue their retirement. Hostile groups could be seen retreating through Laaga Cappelle Wood, and towards the north a solitary German, mounted and towing a machine-gun cart behind him, helped to fill in the landscape. The Highlanders, passing partially through the left of the 28th Brigade, which, after its long advance of the morning, was naturally somewhat exhausted, fought their way forward, with all three battalions in line, gained a footing in the wood and established a line on the western slope of a low hill to the north of it, but beyond this point progress was barred by fire from Hill 40, 500 yards east of the wood. Near the village of Steenbeek, amply furnished with machine-guns, the enemy managed to stem the advance of the 28th Brigade, the right flank of which was now ahead of the Twenty-ninth Division and was exposed.