A History of the Trial of Castner Hanway and Others, for Treason, at Philadelphia in November, 1851 / With an Introduction upon the History of the Slave Question

by Member of the Philadelphia bar

Answer. I was proved to be there, but I was not there.

Question. On the morning of the 11th September last?

Answer. No sir. Kline swore I was there, and at the time I was taken up I told the man I was not there; and they took me to Christiana, and I was frightened, and I didn’t know what to say, and I said what they told me.

The witness was not cross-examined, but, after a threat to prosecute for perjury, was discharged.

The next morning (Dec. 2) an informal conversation took place in regard to the evidence of Scott. In answer to all the imputations of tampering, made by the prosecution and others, it is sufficient to say, that from the time of his arrest till the examination on the first of December, he was confined in the debtors’ apartment of the Moyamensing Prison, in custody of the U. S. officers, and beyond the reach of any person, except such as went there on behalf of the prosecution. Like all liars, when left to himself and his own reflections, he concluded it was best to tell the whole truth, especially when this exculpated him from the difficulty into which his own folly and weakness had plunged him. It had been proved, beyond a doubt, that Scott was not within three miles of Parker’s house on the morning of the 11th, and his declarations made that morning to witnesses who were examined, proved that he was capable of telling the truth, when uninfluenced by fear. As soon as arrested, he was threatened with imprisonment and death; but at first he told a consistent story. Soon the coward’s hope induced him to make false statements. Ignorant, and not gifted with the ordinary intelligence belonging to persons of his condition in life, he knew not the nature and obligation of an oath, and swore as he believed would be acceptable to those whom he supposed to have power over his liberty, and perhaps his life. From the time of the preliminary examinations until brought upon the stand, he was in the care and keeping of the agents of the prosecution; and, as appears by the statements made at the time of his examination, he had been visited in his cell, after the testimony for the prosecution had closed, by some of the counsel for the prosecution, and there told the story which they believed he would repeat under oath. They had their manifest reasons for not calling upon him to give evidence in chief, since they did not dare to do so, even in rebuttal, till he had been visited in prison, and the probable nature of his testimony ascertained!

It was also said, that the day before his examination “he was conversed with by several negroes, in the Marshal’s office, who had to be sent away from him.” This may account for his finally telling the truth. It is certain, that in such a place no one had an opportunity of quite so full a conversation with him as could have been held in his cell at Moyamensing prison. But the sight of his former comrades was sufficient to compel him to exercise even the small amount of conscience which nature had bestowed upon him. But if it were granted, for the sake of argument, that “some negroes” had a conversation with him, by what rule of right or principle of law, could they be condemned for entreating the unhappy man not to degrade himself by committing the loathsome crime of perjury? Mr. Brent’s pamphlet implies the existence of such a code of morals; but if it exist at all, its influence must be confined to the borders of the State he represented.

Dr. Pierce was recalled, to refute the charges of cowardice, which it was said he had, in conversation, made against Kline; and Dickinson Gorsuch, to testify that he saw two of his father’s slaves at Parker’s house.

With this the examination of witnesses closed. Nothing was wanting to complete the trial but the arguments of counsel, the charge of the Judge and the verdict. Those who had attentively watched the testimony, plainly saw that the attempt to sustain the charge of Treason was a failure. The counsel for the prosecution, if rumor is to be depended upon, had for several days abandoned all hopes of a conviction. There were many persons, however, who believed the jury would not be able to agree upon a verdict. Public excitement had subsided, and towards the close of the examination of witnesses, the court room comfortably seated all who chose to assemble to hear the proceedings. The desire to hear the speeches again drew a crowd, and expectation was raised to the highest pitch in regard to one of the counsel, who, when his turn came, considered that it was not necessary for the interest of his client to occupy the time of the Court.

After some preliminary arrangements, Mr. Ludlow began his remarks to the jury and occupied the remainder of the day. He commenced by hastily repeating the part Hanway had taken in the transactions of the morning of the 11th of September. Then citing the 3d Section of Article III of the Constitution of the United States, and the decisions of all courts upon it, argued that the acts committed came within the provisions of the Law. He said that “taking the whole transaction together, this man Hanway, if guilty at all, is guilty by virtue of his presence upon the ground and joining with the conspirators, the whole transaction being the overt act.” His conduct, Mr. L., thought, was not that of an innocent man; but that it confirmed the hypothesis of guilty intent before going to Parker’s. The conflict of testimony to this point, must, he thought, be decided in favor of the Government’s witnesses. Elijah Lewis’s evidence, he told the Jury, must be weighed with the utmost caution. Without attributing perjury to him, it was suggested “that he would shape his course, so as to swear his friend who was the leader, he being the lieutenant, out of the difficulty, and his friend would come and swear him out in turn.”

The alleged case of kidnapping, he said, was committed by a party of imprudent Southerners, who, under the decision of the Supreme Court in Prigg’s case, had taken the law in their own hands and carried their slave away without process. He argued, too, that Hanway’s good character could not avail him in such a prosecution. The testimony in regard to Kline’s bad character was, he thought, the result of opposition to the Fugitive Slave Law, and was more than met by the witnesses who had been produced in rebuttal. He then defended Kline from the imputation of cowardice, which it appeared rested upon him, from his conduct at Parker’s house, and contended he had acted as a good officer and brave man. Mr. L. then pointed out and attempted to reconcile to the Jury some discrepancies in the evidence, and concluded by some eloquent remarks upon the value and importance of the Union.