Whilst all knowledge is often little more than a means of amusement, there is no science which a soldier may not at some time or another find bearing on the business of life and death; your knowledge of a wholesome herb may involve the feeding of an army, and acquaintance with an obscure point of geography the success of a campaign.
This is applicable to the cavalryman and his horses.
De Brack devotes eight pages of his valuable work, Cavalry Outpost Duties, to a chapter on “Forage and Subsistence,” every word of which should be known to any cavalry officer who may have to serve in Europe or elsewhere.
The theory of horse management is brought now to a very high standard by our Veterinary Department, and their publication of an excellent book on Animal Management marks a step forward which must be appreciated by all who are in agreement with the theory expressed earlier in this chapter, that the horse question is one-tenth in war. It is little different from Frederick the Great’s saying that “Victory lies in the legs.”
One word of caution is necessary for those who command cavalry in war. They must metaphorically keep a finger on the equine pulse, and this is, most of all, necessary when working horse artillery in heavy ground, or horses fed on anything less than full rations, or horses in bad weather. Wet saddle-blankets put next a horse’s back act like a poultice. There is no alternative in wet weather in a bivouac but to keep the blanket dry, or dry it before a start is made. Further, since the health of their horses is vital to the efficiency of cavalry, their leader must be willing to take risks in grazing, off-saddling, and foraging for food. Against surprise on these occasions long range rifles and our guns now confer on us great advantages.
In this matter of attending to the welfare of the horse, however, it must be fully realized when it is permissible and when the horse must be sacrificed to the exigencies of the situation.
An instructive example of what far-reaching results may come from ill-judged watering of horses is given in the American Civil War, by General Alexander. In June 1864 Grant, after his encounter at Cold Harbour with Lee, undertook the bold step of moving south across the James River and attacking the Confederate right flank. For three days, though the movement was reported to Lee, he would not believe it.
On the 15th of June the Federal General Smith, with 1600 men, was moving on Petersburg, a vital point on Lee’s right. Beauregard, the Confederate commander, then had only about 2500 men to hold his extended lines with; he, however, expected reinforcements by night. Every hour’s delay of the Federal advance was therefore invaluable. With one cavalry regiment and a battery he delayed Smith’s column for three hours, and it was not till 5 P.M. that that General had completed his reconnaissance of Beauregard’s position. By 6 P.M. everything was ready for the attack; but it was then found that the Chief of Artillery had sent all the artillery horses to water. This delayed the attack till 7 P.M. It was partially successful, and a portion of the Confederates’ lines were captured; but night came on, and with it the Confederates’ reinforcements. “Petersburg was lost and won by that hour.” That was on the 15th June 1864, and Petersburg did not fall into Federal hands till April 1865.
The question, whether the present day greatly-extended rôle of cavalry on the battlefield, hitherto entirely confined to theory, will answer in practice, is a burning one for the horse-master. Without an enormous force of cavalry will there be squadrons available for these services?
In Frederick the Great’s army the horses were a first consideration, and he got the greatest results. In Napoleon’s campaigns there is not much evidence of the horses being considered.