That there are very diverse opinions on the power of rifle fire against cavalry must be evident from the fact that instructions so very different in their import as the following were issued in Mounted Troops’ Manuals shortly after the war in South Africa:—
“This Memorandum is not meant for cavalry who turn their backs, but for those who, when they see the enemy preparing to charge with sabre and lance, will coolly dismount, form up, and when he gets within reach, pour in such a withering fire as will in five minutes kill as many of the enemy as the same enemy with sword and lance would kill in five hours on active service.”—Preface to Lord Dundonald’s Cavalry Training, Canada, 1904.
“If an attack of cavalry is imminent, mounted troops should, if time admits, gallop to cover or enclosed or broken ground and there repel and retaliate.”—General Hutton’s Mounted Service Manual, Australian Commonwealth.
The method is illustrated on an opposite page and shows the formation of square, horses inside. This formation offers a splendid target to H.A. or machine-gun fire for preparation of the attack which would undoubtedly be made by cavalry from a direction at right angles to that fire.
Colonel Henderson, in Science of War, page 160, sums up the situation as follows:—
It is beyond question that dealing with a dismounted force, whatever may be the amount of fire with which it is endowed, shock tactics may play an important part.
The opportunities of effective outflanking and surprise may possibly be few; but the very fact that the enemy has both the power and the will to seek out such opportunities and to charge home is bound to hamper the movements and to affect the moral of any force of horsemen which depends on fire alone.
Such a force, even if it could hold on to its position, would be unable, except under favourable conditions of ground, to make any forward progress, for directly it mounted it would be at the mercy of its antagonist,[27] and it would thus be absolutely prevented from bursting through the hostile cavalry and from acquiring the information which it is its main object to obtain.
In the valley of the Shenandoah in 1864 the Confederate squadrons were armed only with rifles, while the Federals under Sheridan were trained both to fire and charge. The result is significant. The southerners, though admirable horsemen, were worsted at every turn, and their commander had at last to report that his mounted infantry were absolutely useless against the Union cavalry.
Dismounted Action of Cavalry
Objection is often raised to cavalry practising the rôle of the infantry attack, and generally with reason, for, where there is any other better plan for cavalry, it is obviously wrong for them to dismount, leave their horses far behind, and immobilize themselves in order to carry out this form of attack. But on the other hand, and especially in rearguard affairs, it is quite possible that a weak rearguard or detached force well posted in a gorge or other unturnable position will hold out till such an attack is made. Then take plenty of cartridges, carry your swords with you,[28] and “go in.” But do not imagine that this costly mode of attack should be adopted on all occasions.
It may be taken as a general rule that full value is not obtained from cavalry who are far distant or long separated from their horses. In the latest German cavalry regulations there is an important modification. It is laid down that the decisive dismounted action should only be attempted when the leader is convinced of possessing numerical superiority, and very rarely over ground giving the enemy a prepared field of fire. It is fatal, they say, to commit your forces with numbers insufficient for success. They further say (para. 452): “Half-hearted dismounted action contains the germs of failure”; and evidently disapprove of the view that the extent of the rôle of cavalry dismounted should be delimitated, as there is a tendency to do in our army by those who expect the cavalryman to protest if they ask him to dismount, and to argue how far he should go in attack—whereas he must be, and will be, ready to accept any rôle which aids victory.
Prince Kraft’s contribution to the discussion which followed the war of 1870–71 should be regarded, by the British army at any rate, as out of date. He wrote: “A blow is given to the true spirit of cavalry if a trooper once believes that he can fight without his horse.” This blow, duly received by the British cavalry, has proved innocuous; they have learnt to reculer pour mieux sauter, with an additional power, in the form of the rifle, of the greatest value to them, whilst at the same time they will retain the tradition that their