Our Cavalry

by Michael Frederic Rimington

v. Often the O.C. the regiment or squadrons A——A may have to decide if he shall show up as bait, but in doing so he must, again, never mask the artillery. He may (in this case) move west to his left, especially if he thinks Blue cavalry is coming on and has not seen the regiments C——C and B——B making their flank movement. But usually the regiment or squadrons A——A should move up in this case more to the right, east, as this means that Blue horse artillery will come into action facing south and consequently cannot easily change front and pelt the regiments C——C and B——B.[31]

As our horse artillery will always if possible come into action on a hill or on high ground there will be some hill behind which A——A is able to manœuvre or to get cover, or to simulate (by showing up in different places) a larger force than it actually represents.

The leading of the regiments B——B and C——C will depend on the signals sent from the Brigadier (who rides wide on the inner flank—eastern side in this case—and where he can see the enemy’s advance) to the Brigade Major. These regiments B——B and C——C should make their move if possible under cover from view, and at the critical moment the order to attack should be conveyed to them.

As one of the objects of this manœuvre is to give our guns a good target, the O.C. horse artillery must direct his fire on the enemy’s squadrons, in this case, X——X and Y——Y. The enemy’s artillery, if already in action, will sustain little harm from his fire. The result of the encounter will depend on which side wins the shock action, therefore every shell which falls in an enemy’s squadron is a help. The enemy’s supporting squadrons are a special target, also the enemy’s rallying squadrons.

Let the O.C. horse artillery remember that the sight and sound of his bursting shells will often enlighten the Brigadier as to the position of the enemy’s squadrons and guide him in his attack, on which everything depends.

Before the combat, Resolution, i.e. fixedness of purpose, the instant adaptation of stratagem to the features of the terrain, an attack at the psychological moment galloping knee to knee; in the combat, constantly keeping a reserve and constantly re-forming into good order for the next effort,—these are the secrets with which to ensure coming successfully out of a cavalry encounter. “’Tis dogged as does it.” But do not let the leader imagine that he will always be making an advance, when this combat comes off.

Especially to be deprecated is the unreasoning gallop of squadrons, so commonly seen at manœuvres in an advance towards an enemy, which deprives them of any value from the reports of officers, patrols, etc.

If it is evident that the enemy has forestalled our manœuvre, and that any move to the front will place our brigade in the jaws of his attack, then, as Von Bernardi (page 147, Cavalry in War and Peace) says, the “deployment should either be on existing lines or to the rear, and should be covered by dismounted action of the advanced guard or by artillery fire. Only thus can the lost freedom of action be regained, as superior breadth of deployment is the first and perhaps the most important step towards maintenance of the initiative.”

Other cases in which it may be a positive advantage to allow the enemy some measure of initiative occur either when you are quite ignorant of his strength, or when the ground on which your squadrons stand or in their rear is most suitable for the combat from your point of view.

In the passage of defiles in the face of an enemy, say, in the case of a river or swamp, the rule is for the column, as it emerges from the far end of the defile, to move in column of troops parallel to the river or swamp. It will thus (i.) be ready to wheel into line and attack quickly, (ii.) there is no fear of the column being pushed back on to succeeding troops coming through the defile, (iii.) the head of the defile is kept clear of troops, (iv.) there is one safe flank for your column, i.e. that on the side of the swamp or river, and (v.) there is not the same danger of the enemy pounding[32] an easy mark at the mouth of the defile with his artillery. If your own artillery can occupy any ground on this side of the defile, from which the exit can be seen, the accompanying diagram shows that a considerable force of your cavalry can make the passage with comparative safety under cover of its fire. It should always be remembered that the attack against troops, in course of the passage of a defile, will usually take place when only that proportion has crossed which the enemy thinks he can beat decisively.