Our Cavalry

by Michael Frederic Rimington

Meantime a belief gained from the American War that dismounted tactics were the solution to the cavalry question obsessed some, as it always will those who lack (i.) a practical knowledge of the arm, (ii.) imagination, (iii.) an acquaintance with military history, though the most acute thinker of that time, Henderson, lays down very concisely in Science of War, p. 60, “that mounted infantry were absolutely worthless against cavalry.”

In peace, as the value of the bullet rose, the use of cavalry fell in the mind of the man of theory. Probably only the few, who with an open mind thoroughly tested the two rival lines of action in the field, and on every kind of ground, were able to give a correct appreciation. But these never swerved from the opinion that mounted men relying only on the rifle were hopeless in attack or in the open against cavalry, but were, on the other hand, of great value in defence, or in broken ground, or in retreat, and further, that many small opportunities, far more than for shock action, would be offered to them, which cunning and versatility would enable them to profit by.

But all this talk had not been without its effect, and the result was that it was not considered ridiculous that a large force of mounted men should be frittered away in ineffective dismounted action, sitting all day on a hill or ridge, and firing at great distances at an equally sticky enemy. Such action is a slur on cavalry for whom “Action and again action” is the motto.

If both cavalries work on this principle, and this was often the case both in the early portion of the South African War[40] and in the Manchurian campaign, certainly no important combats will take place; but, directly one side begins to “push,” mounted combats will result, and as each side finds that the greatest number of squadrons, ceteris paribus, wins, there will be great combats of masses, and a “fight to a finish” amongst the cavalry on the flank of the great general encounter.

As we have said, in the South African War during the first year, with few exceptions, fire at long distances and infinitely wearisome tactics were the rule; it was only in the last year of the war that the British cavalry, colonials, and mounted infantry—their attack in some cases supported by really effective and à propos artillery and machine-gun fire—began to push and gallop at the Boers at every opportunity. Then the Boers always galloped away, but gradually they, too, learnt from us the value of pushing, and Botha, Delarey, and others executed some good charges with marked effect, but they never attempted, and wisely so, to charge men armed with swords. That was too much for the cavalry soldier to hope for.

In the Manchurian War the Japanese, with their small force of cavalry, wisely played the defensive game; the Russians,[41] trained and organized for twenty years on wrong principles, and led without much attempt at reasoned dash or enterprise, seldom imposed their will on the enemy, or made any effort to push in with their numerous squadrons and sotnias on an open flank. If there was an exception it was when, before the battle of Mukden, a force of Cossacks under General Liubarin attacked the Japanese right flank in the mountains, and are stated to have “rendered the situation critical” till driven off by mixed forces of infantry and cavalry. This is given as one of the few cavalry lessons of the Manchurian War. The Russian cavalry officer had not received sufficient training in grand tactics, nor does the combined action of their horse artillery with cavalry appear to have been in any respect effective.

The lesson for our cavalry from these two wars appears to be, that we should teach our officers to think about something bigger than the tactics of a squadron or regiment, to learn esprit d’armée, to remember that a few independent squadrons cut up rarely influence a war, whereas in every big combat the result (and that result may be affected largely by the leading of a few squadrons) is a national matter. And there always recurs the most supreme question for the cavalry leader of masses on the battlefield, whether, apart from the cases in which a sacrifice is necessary, the anticipated results are in any way proportionate with the stake. Even the riding down of an infantry brigade will not always compensate for the expenditure of a cavalry division.

Langlois pictures “cavalry with its light batteries in the decisive attack moving by ways which are hidden from view and fire ... falling on the enemy in mass and surprising him. Reconstructing his (the enemy’s) defences, and keeping hostile troops at a distance, measures which,” he says, “require a short dismounted fight, then part of the cavalry advance and harass and prevent the enemy returning, whilst the rest holds the position with fire. The infantry will follow the cavalry as quickly as possible.”

There is no more important subject of training for the cavalry officer than cavalry action on the battlefield of all arms. Theoretical study is not enough, it is absolutely necessary to study in the field with troops or flags representing troops. Since cavalry action is almost invariably[42] on the flanks, staff rides, cavalry instructional rides, manœuvres, and other exercises can commence by dealing with only one flank, thus half the number of men, flags, etc., will suffice.

The director should never permit one side to know the strength in any arm on the other side; this is desirable, if only to increase the difficulty and value of gaining information by reconnaissance in these exercises. For this purpose a proportion of cavalry-scouting parties should be detailed. Too much stress can scarcely be laid on this essential of training. Cavalry can now simulate infantry, smokeless powder renders it impossible to judge the volume of fire, every bit of information has to be fought for, and will cost the lives of both horses and men. Even the boldest and most cunning scouting, without fighting, will not lead to any certain information; it is “peacetime talk” to imagine that it will be otherwise. Having this in view, the director should lay the greatest stress on dash and enterprise as opposed to stickiness and a desire to do nothing or await further report. It is at these exercises that the director can go far to establish a doctrine, that of the resolute offensive.