Not only do these brave men “let us in,” on every possible occasion (especially when they are so brave and foolish as to neglect proper precautions), but they forget that the sole thing in war is to “get there,” that is, to bring the enemy to his knees and win.
One of their failings, and it is a typical British failing, is the neglect to pursue, or, if they pursue, they neglect to do so properly. Again, and again, in the early part of the operations in South Africa was this neglected. The first good instance of pursuit, conducted on proper principles, was that carried out by General French, and resulting in the ultimate surrender of Cronje. Why was this on the right principle? The answer is, “Because it was conducted on the principle of “the parallel pursuit,” and resulted in intercepting Cronje at a crossing of the Modder River.”
It is in such matters that the professional has the advantage of the amateur; the latter would, no doubt, see no reason why a pursuit should do otherwise than follow in the tracks of the enemy, forgetting that there he will find the best and freshest troops, with good supplies of ammunition, and under the best leaders,[45] their orders may probably be, “To stop and die.” Again, that along this line he will run his head against positions, hastily prepared no doubt, but still positions, which are meant to delay pursuit. The whole proceeding would be analogous to trying to beat the enemy at chess by taking piece after piece till only the king was left.
Compare with this the “parallel pursuit.” Sufficient troops are pushing the enemy’s rearguard and lulling his main force to a fancied security; then the cavalry leader moves several miles to the flank of the direction taken by the enemy with as much speed as possible, since there is nothing to delay him, and he goes on till there is some obstacle, perhaps some defile, which the enemy must cross; here he throws himself boldly in the way of the enemy, of whom those who have led the stampede, the weakest and least courageous, will be in front. Ten to one some of these will surrender, unable to bear up against this fresh disaster, and may be used to assist to block the defile, and thus affect the moral of those who are following, and who are, perhaps, in better order.
To the minds of leaders of the stamp of Napoleon’s marshals this form of pursuit was ever present, and we come on instances of it.[46] It is essentially a duty of cavalry and horse artillery.
That it often requires strong determination on the part of the leader to urge tired men and horses to pursue is well known. After the battle of Katzbach, Blücher had pressed his cavalry to pursue, but these made a very weak attempt at pursuit, blaming the weather and alleging extreme fatigue. Blücher summed up the situation of cavalry as follows:—
The State can afford to lose a few hundred horses in order to make a victory complete, or when it is a question of the annihilation of the enemy’s entire army. To neglect to obtain the full results of a victorious battle is inevitably to oblige yourself sooner or later to gamble again.