To establish a system by which you “picket the enemy,” which may be defined as placing observers round him so that he can make no movement without your knowledge, is the acme of good work in the outpost line: it is almost a counsel of perfection. But there are two points which deserve consideration in this connection: the first is that the mounted men whom you employ for this purpose must know, or have time to learn, the country thoroughly; and the second is that, however thoroughly you may imagine that you have picketed the enemy, he will be able to move out of his environment at night, and if your safety is based on knowledge of his movements he will, as likely as not, upset your calculations. This deduction is drawn from facts. The Boers habitually picketed our garrison towns and columns, but our columns, taking the ordinary precautions of moving by night and off the main tracks or roads, constantly surprised and captured their laagers of waggons. The “desultory operations for two or three years in South Africa,” 1899–1902, contain no unusual circumstances, we are told, but one is tempted to consider whether the outpost system evolved out of their own consciousness by the Boers was not better than that so laboriously studied by us in former days at Sandhurst. Our system was almost entirely directed towards “security,” and largely neglected “information.” Theirs studied information of the enemy first, a desire for security being a secondary consideration.[60]
As regards a service of information, certainly an idea of using contact squadrons had long been known and considered by us. Had we not long ago read the fascinating account of Curély’s adventures in De Brack, and also the “Conduct of a Contact Squadron,” translated from the German? But it soon became evident in South Africa that it was not very easy to carry out; every native was of assistance to the Boers, and afraid to serve us, even if we understood their language and could interrogate them. In this respect the Russians in Manchuria were almost similarly handicapped. It will usually be the same in war; one side can go anywhere, the other finds every man’s hand against it. Under these circumstances, to lay down one law for both sides is obviously folly. Every report on the Peninsular War shows the extent to which the French were handicapped by the guerrillas, and how our troops were assisted.
De Brack and many other writers make it plain that whilst from 1805 up to, perhaps, 1812 information was easily gained by the French cavalry for Napoleon, later a complete change came over the scene, and the Cossacks, overrunning the country, picketed the French columns. Perhaps the natives were weary of French exactions, but in any case the result is said to have been that “the genius of the Emperor was paralysed by the activity of the Cossacks.”
We have at least four or five instances where one side’s light cavalry or guerrillas “paralysed the genius” of the other’s generals by gaining superiority in the outposts, or, rather, anywhere outside their opponent’s outposts: (a) in 1812, 1813, 1814; (b) in the Peninsular War; (c) in the early part of the American Civil War; (d) in the South African War; and (e) in the Manchurian War.
With these examples before us it must become a serious factor in taking thought for a campaign, how far the cavalry will be able to effect this. Our training must be such as to enable us to play this part, of picketing the enemy, if possible; certainly we should do so in a friendly country.[61] We know it is usually only done by the side which has a knowledge of the country; but may not the almost universal knowledge of map-reading in the cavalry and a good supply of maps obviate this? But let us remember above all things that nothing will be done in war which has not by constant practice become a second nature in peace. Let us then practise not only our officers, but our men, in picketing every large body of troops which train within fifty miles of us.
Often C.O.’s, shortsightedly we think, do not welcome the attention of cavalry thus picketing them; but even if this is the case, it may still be practised by our cavalry, but in a way which does not draw attention to the fact—the training will be none the worse, and (though perhaps hardly in this sense) the “offensive spirit” must be second nature to us.[62]
The instruction of cavalry in outpost work is difficult, because in the first place many parts of the duty make great demands on the instructor’s imagination, powers of explanation, and what we may call ability for stage management.
In teaching recruits, it is far better, instead of saying “You will imagine the enemy are in that direction,” to say, “Those red flags carried by horsemen, or those men in the white caps are the enemy.” Farther, the parties carrying the red flags should, in order to show that they are enemies, take some action, such as to come within about 800 to 600 yards, and shoot with blank at the parties of recruits, retiring when the latter return the fire, etc., etc. Beginning from this point the recruit may be asked by the instructor how they would suggest that the duties of a vedette, or, better, “look-out man”[63] should be carried out, and he will then gradually impart to them the accepted mode of outpost duty, which is, after all is said and done, only common sense. For it is certain that, under active service conditions, men learn very quickly by their own mother-wit in real dangers and difficulties what precautions are necessary. These services are consequently ill taught by theoretical instruction in the barrack-room, and well taught if the work is done from the start in the open, and, for choice, in unknown ground and with a represented enemy. The ground also must be changed constantly, and this, certainly in the United Kingdom, is difficult, and makes considerable demands on horse-flesh and on the instructor’s time. But it is the one thing for which horse-flesh must not be grudged, even though the work is thankless from the point of view of immediate reward or recognition, for it is work which presents more difficulties in regard to inspection than any other; consequently, a careful instructor gets little or no credit for his work till war begins. It is only then that the immense difference between the cavalry or infantry, who are well grounded and thoroughly honest in their outpost work and those who are not so, comes to light in so-called “regrettable incidents.”
A cunning enemy will soon discriminate between those who do their outpost work well and those who do it carelessly, and will attack the latter. It may be of interest to state that a very close union soon grows up between regiments of cavalry and infantry in a column, where there is a mutual recognition of honest work in the outposts, whilst there is a wholesome detestation for slack regiments. A most important point is to train men in the duty of night outposts, whilst the subordinate leaders should have it dinned into their minds that there is always a definite point beyond which no one is to retire. It has been very truly said that sentries always think of retiring on groups, groups on pickets, pickets on supports, and supports on reserves, with the result that the enemy is in camp before you know where you are.
The training of regiments in the duties of outpost work cannot be carried out really satisfactorily and thoroughly unless the regiment goes into camp for a few days. Otherwise, many of the real difficulties, such as the cooking and supplies of food, the off-saddling, watering, reliefs of sentries and pickets, lighting of fires, arrangements for men to get a good sleep, are never grasped.