Again, when on the march, or going to or returning from a field day, by means of judging distance on prominent objects (to be checked afterwards from the map), or by noticing the features of the country and subsequently answering questions on them, or by guessing what is on the other side of a hill, habits of observation which are invaluable in a cavalryman may be inculcated. This last is a capital exercise, and one which the Duke of Wellington practised. It is related that he was posting with a friend, and they passed the time in guessing what was behind the next hill. His friend remarked how often he was right in his guesses. Wellington replied, “Well, it is what I have been practising all my life.” This instruction is best delegated to section leaders, since a squadron, or even troop, is too unwieldy for this kind of education, which is specially one which should aim at bringing the slower and more stupid men up to a good level. The Germans rightly lay the greatest stress on the fact that collective perfection is only attainable by individual excellence, and this can only be obtained by individual instruction.
It is not in the brigade nor even in the regiment that dismounted work can be taught, but it is there that the effects can be seen. It is in the troop and the squadron that men should be taught to be quick, not hurried, in getting on and off their horses, and it must be done without the old-fashioned caution in the navy, “Five-and-twenty for the last man up the rigging.”
A brigade is manœuvring against an enemy; a house, a garden, a clump of trees is seen, which, if seized and held by rifle fire, will prove a most valuable pivot of manœuvre. A squadron is ordered to seize it. Now is the time to see whether men have been taught their work in the squadron. Are they awkward in getting off their horses? Is there delay in handing over the horses to the Nos. 3? Is there uncertainty what to do with the lances? Are proper precautions taken? If the men have been well taught, they will be ready to meet with fire the opposing squadrons sent to seize it. And further, when the meeting between the brigades takes place, a well-trained squadron will have had time to mount again, and will be on the spot to throw in a flank attack, which may decide the fight. The cavalryman must learn that never is the difference between cavalry and infantry to be observed more than when cavalry are acting dismounted.
A whole brigade may have to act dismounted. One not trained in the work will leave its horses behind and become inferior infantry. If the squadron training has been well done, they will act like a swarm of bees, trying here, trying there, everywhere moral and movement, till the weak spot is discovered; and then the rush will be made with an irresistible force in the firing line, and no slow pushing up of supports and reserves.
We do not wish to see cavalry always getting off their horses and trying everywhere to shoot their enemy out of each bit of difficult ground, but neither do we wish to see a regiment or brigade sitting helplessly in mass with an infantry or cavalry patrol holding a defile in front of them, unable to turn them out because the ground prevents them galloping at it. Von Bernhardi says:[90]
Moreover, in the power of holding the balance correctly between fire and shock, and in the training of the former never to allow the troops to lose confidence in the latter, lies the real essence of the cavalry spirit. This, whether it be in the working out of some great strategical design, or in joining hands with the other arms to obtain by united fire action some common purpose, implies a balance of judgment and absence of prejudice of the rarest occurrence in normal natures.
The practical problems, which invariably follow upon contact with the enemy, placed before his subalterns, unexpectedly for choice, by means of flags or real troops, and their proposed solutions, actually carried out, and then followed by a discussion, constitute the best and most useful work done by a squadron leader. If his imagination fails him, he must read up instances. Nor should he forget to give them problems which are what would be called unfair in a test examination, because the odds are too great, or the situation too difficult. He can and should explain this later, coram populo, but meantime it is just such problems which come to try the cavalry officer most highly. For if he is doing his duty he must constantly find himself in scrapes, and what our ancestors called “outfalls,” in which the life and liberty of his men, and more, victory and honour, depend on his action. Often enough a rapid dispersal with a prearranged rendezvous is the only rational course and alternative to defeat or heavy and useless loss. Again, a bold front shown or a feint at attack may give time to warn others or to get to cover.
These problems come as too much of a surprise in war for the ordinary individual, unless he has acquired character and a large degree of confidence by frequent exercises in peace-time such as those indicated above. But, thus equipped, and steeled, as it were, by a doctrine of resolution, the officer or non-commissioned officer will perhaps call to his mind some saying such as “a mounted man and a shower of rain can get through anywhere.” In an instant he has drawn swords, indicated, first, the line of attack, and second, the rendezvous after dispersal, then with a cheer or view-holloa he goes at them. His bold and rapid course of action pulls him through with little or no loss.[91] The Japanese Cavalry Training, p. 57, says:—
From commander to privates all cavalry soldiers must be accustomed to act on their own initiative throughout the various trainings and instruction, and in all cases should observe the following rule:
Attack—but do not be attacked.
Problems can be found in the support of mounted attacks by fire, dismounted attacks, rearguard actions, the defence or attack of positions taken up in farms or kopjes by flankguards or rearguards, feints made to draw the enemy or distract his attention, the precautions necessary at a halt to water or when in bivouac, the scouting of an enemy’s outpost line or in getting into a position before dawn, the passage of obstacles and defiles, and so on. Always remember to vary the ground, conceal the enemy’s numbers, and insist on decisive action. In practice, in cavalry matters, the wrong action taken in a resolute fashion is sometimes preferable to right action arrived at after vast consideration.