General Forrest called immediately for assistance. Ector’s and Wilson’s infantry brigades of Walker’s Corps returned down the stream and drove Croxton. This brought Brannan with his two remaining brigades forward; he in turn drove back the Confederate force. Brannan in his report[19] says, that his troops came upon a strong force of the enemy, consisting of two divisions instead of the supposed brigade. Very soon Baird’s division was sent in on the right of Brannan; this at first drove the Confederate force that was attacking Brannan, but in turn it was attacked directly on its right flank and rear by Liddell’s division, which threw it into temporary confusion. In the meantime McCook’s Corps arrived on the field. R. W. Johnson’s division of that corps was sent in, at noon, on Baird’s right; it struck Cheatham’s division on its right flank, driving it back in confusion. Johnson’s was overlapped and in immediate danger, when General John M. Palmer’s division of Crittenden’s Corps, relieved the right of his division; Crittenden had very wisely dispatched Palmer’s division toward the sound of the firing and this burst upon the enemy. Palmer’s right was soon overlapped when Van Cleve from Crittenden’s Corps came to the rescue, but later in the day he also was beaten back. Then Reynolds’s division of Thomas’s corps advanced on the left of Palmer’s division, and two brigades of Van Cleve’s division came in on Palmer’s right. Davis’s division of McCook’s Corps attacked most opportunely and drove the enemy, but was compelled somewhat to give way. In this attack Colonel Hans C. Heg of the Fifteenth Wisconsin Infantry was mortally wounded. In the meantime Crittenden’s remaining division under Wood attacked the Confederates and turned the tide. Lee and Gordon’s Mill was at that moment uncovered, all of Crittenden’s Corps having marched towards the left. About 3 o’clock p. m. McCook was ordered to send his remaining division (Sheridan’s) to support the line near Wood and Davis, and to place Lytle’s brigade at Lee and Gordon’s as the extreme right. This stayed the Confederate advance in that section.
Lytle’s brigade was considered sufficient at that time to hold a point against which Bragg was, at first, directing his whole force. This point—at Lee and Gordon’s—was the left of the Union Army on the 18th; at noon on the 19th it was the right.
Negley’s division, which had been posted near Crawfish Springs the night before, was then the only Union division which did not partake in the battle at first, but arrived in accordance with orders on the field about 4:30 p. m. He was ordered to the place, from which Van Cleve had been driven, in order to attack; he drove the enemy steadily, while Thomas was driving him on the Confederate right; these movements continued until night.
It can readily be perceived that the battle of the 19th was more or less a haphazard fight, neither side being aware of the position of the other. The undergrowth of the woods was so dense in most places, that opposed sides could not perceive each other until they were within a few yards, except by the firing. It was unfortunate that Rosecrans was not present with Thomas, when the latter’s corps crossed the Lafayette road. Before an attack was made, the Twenty-first Corps, being the nearest one to the Fourteenth, should have been formed on the right of the Fourteenth, both in a compact line, and with a brigade for each division in reserve; and the Twentieth Corps—when it closed up on the right of the Twenty-first in the same compact order—should have advanced swiftly upon the Confederates, some of whom were still crossing the river, and some with their right flanks to the Union line of attack. It is possible that such an attack would have driven the Confederates into the river in great confusion; but an attack by only one division (Brannan’s) on Forrest’s cavalry beyond the Confederate right flank, simply notified the Confederate commanders, and gave them ample time to wheel their divisions into the proper direction, and signalled them where to attack. General Rosecrans in his report does not mention a night fight that occurred on the extreme Union left. In fact, he says, there was no firing after dark. Just as it began to grow dark, however, Cleburne’s division of Hill’s Corps arrived from across the river. He boldly and characteristically marched through the defeated and prostrated divisions of Walker and Cheatham, was joined by two brigades of Cheatham’s division, Jackson’s, and Preston Smith’s, and then attacked with great fierceness the Union troops under R. W. Johnson and Baird; they covered Johnson’s front and lapped over on Baird. It was too dark to recognize friend from foe, and it was more or less a hand-to-hand contest. Finally the attack was repulsed, the Union troops holding the field. The Confederate general, Preston Smith, and two of his staff officers were killed.
Some idea of the severity of the fighting on the 19th—the charging and falling back of both sides; the difficulty in keeping alignments; the impossibility of officers identifying friend or foe; the losing of artillery batteries and single pieces, their recapture; and the awful slaughter in both armies—can be obtained only by reading official reports in serial numbers 50 and 51 of Rebellion Records. Its intensity can be estimated from the following data. Breckenridge’s division was not in the fight of September 19, but fought on the 20th only; his loss in killed and wounded was 1,075. Cleburne was in the night fight of the 19th, and was as active as Breckenridge on the 20th; his loss was 1,743 in killed and wounded. The total difference of 668 does not give an accurate comparison of the two days’ fighting, but does give some idea of the awful slaughter. The battle of the 19th was fought without breastworks; it was a square stand-up fight; nearly every division engaged on both sides, first attacked, then drove its opponent, and after falling back in some disorder, reformed, and again advanced, until the day and part of the night were gone.
The surgeon-general of the Union Army reported that about 4,500 wounded were treated after this battle of the 19th. The loss in killed and wounded must, therefore, have reached 6,000, but the Union reports do not separate the losses of the 19th from the total.
Late in the afternoon of the 19th, Brannan’s division was withdrawn from the left and placed in reserve, or rather in echelon at the right of Reynolds, near Brotherton’s house, at the right of Thomas’s line.
During the night of the 19th the lines of both armies were readjusted. That of the Union Army was drawn back. Palmer of Crittenden’s Corps and Johnson of McCook’s, who had reported to General Thomas the day before, were ordered to remain under his direction. He placed his troops in a compact line—facing east with the Lafayette road in his rear—around Kelly’s farm, but some distance in the woods. The divisions were in the following order from left to right: Baird, Johnson, Palmer, Reynolds, and Brannan; Brannan was drawn back so far, however, that he could be available as a reserve and at the same time close enough to advance quickly to the front line. The right and left were both refused. Baird had no reserve; but Johnson and Palmer had each a brigade in reserve. Each division was formed in two lines, and both were protected by hastily thrown up log breastworks. The artillery was in battery between brigades; this line was not broken during the battle of the 20th. Reynolds’s line crossed the Lafayette road at Poe’s house, near Brotherton’s, and from there to Lee and Gordon’s neither of the armies was in possession of the road. Reynolds had Turchin’s brigade in line and King’s in reserve. Baird’s left did not reach to the Lafayette road. Kelly Field, which was a parallelogram about half a mile long and a quarter of a mile wide, was the storm centre of battle during September 20. Besides the immense fighting along the main line of log works, there were five different charges, in rear of the main line from the south to the north side by five different Union brigades. These charges were made against the Confederate troops, which had turned on the left of Baird’s line and gained his rear. The brigades of Stanley, Van Derveer, Gross, Willich, and Turchin made these charges.
The right of the Union line on the 20th—from Brannan’s right—was neither compact nor protected. During the night of the 19th, or early morning of the 20th, the four divisions of Sheridan, Davis, Wood, and Van Cleve had been moved to the eastern slope of Missionary Ridge, a mile or more from the Lafayette road, in order to cover the road leading from Crawfish Springs to McFarland’s Gap, west of Rosecrans’s headquarters. General Rosecrans says he rode the line about daylight, and that he suggested certain changes to McCook, especially that he keep close to the left, which was not done, however, in time to prevent disaster. Negley of the Fourteenth Corps, who was in line on the right adjoining Brannan, was ordered to proceed to Thomas’s left, but only two brigades, John Beatty’s and Stanley’s, arrived, one at a time; both were driven away by the enemy. John Beatty’s brigade—which at 8:30 a. m. was placed on the left of Baird, so as to reach the Lafayette road—was not fortified; its thin line was swept away at the first attack by the enemy. Negley was expected to fill this gap with his whole division, and Thomas sent request after request for Negley’s division. There was so much re-adjustment going on at the wrong time, and much of it not going on at any time in the troops under McCook and Crittenden on the 20th, that it is difficult now to try to place them up to 11 a. m. Wood, with his two brigades from the reserve, relieved Negley’s two remaining brigades in the front line, next to Brannan’s about 9:30 a. m., his brigade being a little withdrawn in echelon. This was done to enable Negley to take position on Baird’s left. About 11 a. m. Van Cleve marched to the rear of Wood and had his men lie down. All these troops on the right—from Reynolds’s right to Sheridan’s the extreme right of the Union Army—were very thinly drawn out, and did no good in the day’s fight, with the exception of one full brigade of Wood’s, namely, Harker’s, one regiment of Buell’s brigade, and a few regiments from other divisions, which will be mentioned further on. The troops had done excellent service the day before; but future events will show that they seemed to be paralyzed, by not having been well fortified and compactly placed the night before. This mistake had been corrected to some extent, when the disaster came. On the 20th the troops faced Longstreet, a most sagacious general, who was exceedingly energetic in taking advantage of every defect of his opponent’s line and every blunder in his maneuvers.
McCook had Davis’s and Sheridan’s divisions still on his extreme right. Crittenden had Van Cleve’s and Wood’s, although the latter was in the early morning supposed to be in reserve. Wood came into the front line as stated, but Van Cleve seems not to have found a place there on the 20th.