It is to be presumed, that Bragg had implicit confidence that the Union Army would not dare to attack such a strong position as Bragg’s army then held. General Grant at once wrote the facts of the situation to Burnside and urged him to maintain his attitude at Knoxville, until a battle could be fought at Chattanooga and a detachment sent to his assistance. Not waiting for Sherman, he formulated his plans; and thus knew before the latter’s arrival, just where he should place Sherman, what his part of the attack should be, and that he should march immediately on his approach directly to the north end of Missionary Ridge. Grant planned furthermore that Hooker should attack Lookout Mountain from his position in Lookout Valley; the one should attack the right of the Confederate Army and the other the left. Sherman arrived at Bridgeport, with his leading division, on November 15. Arriving at Chattanooga ahead of his troops, he with Grant, Thomas, and Smith, looked over the entire situation and learned how, and by what route, he could reach his point of attack. It had become apparent to the Union commanders, that Bragg’s line did not reach the immediate river hills, at the north end of Missionary Ridge, but was deflected to the east, along the third hill to the south of the river, with a deep depression between it and the next hill to the north. This made necessary a much stronger position than the supposed location at Bragg’s right flank, and stronger forces and dispositions were needed. Grant announced his plan to his generals on the 18th and expected the attacks could be made on the 21st; a rain storm delayed, however, the arrival of Sherman’s troops. When they did arrive at Brown’s Ferry the high water had broken the bridge, which delayed the crossing. When the bridge was repaired, Sherman crossed it in plain view of the enemy’s signal station on the point of Lookout Mountain; he marched into the woods behind a series of hills on the north side of the river; these hills concealed his march all the way to the mouth of Chickamauga Creek, where Davis’s division of the Fourteenth Corps had been placed to cover his movement, and to protect the bridge there, after Sherman’s troops had again crossed to the south side. The crossing at the Chickamauga was also protected by artillery, placed on the heights north of the river. After crossing at the mouth of the Chickamauga, Sherman was to follow Missionary Ridge as far as the railroad tunnel. This seemed to be the principal point of attack; the plan further contemplated that all the forces available should be converged toward General Sherman’s position. Therefore Howard’s Eleventh Corps was taken from Hooker’s position and replaced by Whittaker’s and Grose’s brigades of the Fourth Corps; the Eleventh Corps was placed on the left of the Army of the Cumberland south of the river, looking towards Sherman’s position perhaps four miles further east. Thomas was to cooperate by moving his troops to his left, so that he could join with Sherman’s right, when the latter should push the Confederate forces back to the tunnel. The combined forces should then advance against the enemy, with the object in view of sweeping the Confederate Army into the south Chickamauga Creek, which runs on the opposite side of Missionary Ridge. General Hooker was to hold Lookout Valley with Geary’s division and the two brigades of Whittaker and Grose, and Howard’s corps was to be in readiness to act with either Sherman or Thomas, as circumstances should dictate. The plan was a fine one, because, if that flank could be defeated, the Confederate line of retreat could be easily cut off.
Colonel Long with his brigade of cavalry moved to Sherman’s left. When Sherman should sweep the ridge, he was ordered to cross the Chickamauga and raid the rear of the Confederate Army. This attack was to begin on the 22nd, but was postponed on account of the fact that two of Sherman’s divisions had not been able to cross Brown’s Ferry bridge, on account of a break. To avoid any further delay, Thomas suggested that Howard’s Corps be sent to General Sherman in place of the two delayed divisions, and that the latter be ordered to report to General Hooker, whose combined forces should immediately attack Lookout Mountain in order to divert the attention of the enemy from Sherman’s contemplated attack; this suggestion was in part approved by General Grant.
A singular thing happened on November 22. General Ewing’s division of Sherman’s troops had come into Lookout Valley at Trenton from Bridgeport; Bragg’s rear was thus threatened. The movement of some of Bragg’s troops to avert this calamity together with the former withdrawal of Longstreet’s Corps for Knoxville, produced the impression in the Confederate Army, that the whole was going to fall back. Deserters who came into the Union line reported this impression. Bragg also notified the Union commander to remove all non-combatants from the city; this was on the 20th. General Grant ordered Thomas to make a reconnoisance in front of Chattanooga in order to test the truth of this report, and to find out whether Bragg was really falling back, and if so, Thomas should prevent him from doing it undisturbed. The Army of the Cumberland was nearest to the enemy and in readiness to do this with the most celerity. It seems that General Bragg had such confidence in the strength of his position on the top of Missionary Ridge, about 500 feet high, that he was willing not only to send away Longstreet, but actually started other forces to follow him. The latter he recalled, however, in time to take part in the battle. He supposed, and with good reason, that Missionary Ridge could not be taken by assault; and even if Lookout should become untenable on account of the capture of the valley of Chattanooga, he would be safe in his entrenchments on Missionary Ridge. This must have been his conclusion, and he must have known that the Army of the Cumberland was receiving considerable reinforcements. Bragg’s lines were altogether too long. When the object of holding Lookout Mountain no longer existed, after the reopening of the river and railroad route to Bridgeport, he should have withdrawn from there and from Chattanooga Valley; he should either have concentrated on Missionary Ridge or taken Longstreet’s advice and fallen back to Dalton, behind the second ridge, southeast of Chattanooga, where he was finally driven.
Fortunately for the success of the Union movements, Bragg did not do the things that an abler general would have done. He stood stolidly in his original line along its whole length until the opening of the battle of Missionary Ridge. It has been stated, that Bragg expected Grant when he discovered the departure of Longstreet for East Tennessee, would send forces to support Burnside.
In pursuance of the order to make a reconnoisance, Thomas ordered Granger, who commanded the Fourth Corps, to advance a division of his corps towards Orchard Knob November 23, about noon. This elevation of land is located about half way between the city and Missionary Ridge, at the left of Thomas’s line. Between the Union line and this knob was a growth of trees and bushes. These concealed the formation of the troops for a while only from the enemy. Wood’s division was deployed in front of Fort Wood. Sheridan’s division formed next on the right and rear of Wood. Howard’s Corps was massed in the rear of these two divisions. General Baird’s division fell, in echelon, at the right of Sheridan. General Johnson’s division (formerly Rousseau’s) of the Fourteenth Corps stood with arms in the entrenchments, ready to move in any direction. This really placed the latter in echelon with Baird. It is said the enemy looked upon these movements as a parade for display or to obtain wood for fires, when seeing them from the top of Missionary Ridge. The Confederates had a line of rifle-pits along the base of Orchard Knob, following Citico Creek for a mile or more.
With Willich’s and Hazen’s brigades in front and Beatty’s in reserve, General Wood moved forward about 2 p. m. His troops pushed back easily whatever was in their front. Willich struck Orchard Knob squarely on his front, and soon captured it, clearing it of the enemy’s lines. Hazen met more resistance from the Confederates who were perhaps more numerous or better fighters, although the hill he attacked was not so high as Orchard Knob. He carried the hill, however, and captured the Twenty-eighth Alabama Regiment and its flag. This advanced line gave a good position for further advances, and was held; the rest of the troops on the right moving up to and extending the line far to the right. General Wood fortified his line over Orchard Knob, and General Howard formed his corps on its left. The summit of this Knob gave a splendid outlook over the field between it and Missionary Ridge, and gave a fine view of the ridge itself. It afforded an opportunity for Grant and Thomas to view later on the whole subsequent movements against the enemy. General Wood lost 125 men killed and wounded in this battle of Orchard Knob. The Fifteenth Wisconsin of Willich’s brigade took part in this engagement; its losses were not reported until after the battle of the 25th, when its commander reported 6 men slightly wounded in both engagements. Wood occupied this position until 3:15 p. m. on the 25th, when he moved forward with the rest of the army to the assault on Missionary Ridge. Bridge’s Illinois Battery occupied an epaulment in Wood’s line on Orchard Knob.
The taking of Orchard Knob had a most important bearing on the attack that General Hooker made on Lookout Mountain the next day. It caused Bragg to withdraw Walker’s division from that point to strengthen his right, which Bragg thought to be menaced by this advance to Orchard Knob. These troops prolonged Bragg’s line towards Sherman’s front but did not reach it. The Confederate general, Stevenson, signalled from the top of Lookout to Bragg that night that if an attack was intended by Grant, it would be delivered on Lookout Mountain. This is what actually occurred. Another of Sherman’s divisions crossed Brown’s Ferry on the 23rd; the bridge was again broken, however, leaving Osterhaus’s division still on the left bank. This gave General Sherman only three divisions besides General Davis’s of the Fourteenth Corps, with which to operate at the designated place on Missionary Ridge. General Thomas informed General Hooker of the proximity of Osterhaus’s troops and directed, that if they did not get over to Sherman, he should have them join him and “take the point of Lookout Mountain.” This division was at that time in command of General Charles R. Woods, one of its brigade commanders. How sagacious was General Thomas in seeing immediately the advantage that should be taken of a mere accident, like the breaking of a pontoon bridge! It looks as though Thomas had made this suggestion to Hooker, without having beforehand a distinct understanding with General Grant; for he told General Hooker later, that Grant still hoped Woods’s (Osterhaus’s) division could cross in time to participate in Sherman’s movement, but if it could not the mountain should be taken if practicable. Hooker, finding that there was little possibility of the bridge being quickly repaired, made preparations for the advance against the mountain. It will be observed further on, that this accident resulted in modifying the original plans very materially, as the taking of Orchard Knob had already done. The left of Bragg’s line was turned, but not his right; this movement was a result of the accidents to the Brown’s Ferry pontoon bridge. General Grant showed his broad mind in this affair as well as in other changes he made in his original plan, at a later date.
Chattanooga and Vicinity, November, 1863
Adapted from Fiske’s The Mississippi Valley in the Civil War, p. 288